Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs challenged President Biden’s September 9, 2021 order requiring all executive employees to receive the COVID-19 vaccination. After finding that the equities favored the plaintiffs and that they were likely to succeed at trial, the district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of President Biden’s Order nationwide.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s prelamination injunction. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (“CSRA”) provides “comprehensive and exclusive procedures” for the review of employment-related disputes between civil-service employees and the federal government. The court held that the CSRA provides meaningful administrative review of the plaintiff’s claims. Because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust available review under the CRSA, the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs’ claim. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that their claim was "wholly collateral" to the CSRA scheme. View "Feds for Medical Freedom v. Biden" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when a gun manufactured by the defendant accidentally discharged. Plaintiff and her family filed several claims in the district court. The district court dismissed all parties’ claims except the plaintiff’s defective-design claim under the Louisiana Product Liability Act. Plaintiff recovered $500,000 and the defendant appealed.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding that the Louisiana Product Liability Act (“LPLA”) permitted the plaintiff’s claim. Section 60(b) of the LPLA provides that no firearm manufacturer can be held liable for any shooting injury unless the injury was “proximately caused by the unreasonably dangerous construction or composition of the product.” The court held that this language unambiguously bars design-defect claims. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the natural reading of Section 60(b) leads to an absurd result. View "Seguin v. Remington Arms" on Justia Law

Defendant was federally charged with various child pornography offenses. However, the district court found him incompetent and committed the defendant for evaluation and treatment. The defendant was released to live with his mother and, shortly thereafter, regained competency. However, before trial, the defendant was again deemed incompetent. The district court committed the defendant to a second term of competency-restoration treatment.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's order committed the defendant to a second term of competency-restoration. While it is a violation of due process to try an incompetent person for a crime, 18 U.S.C. 4241(a) allows the court to commit an incompetent defendant to the custody of the Attorney General for hospitalization and treatment for a reasonable period of time, but not to exceed four months. A defendant can be committed for a second term of hospitalization, provided the court finds there is a substantial probability the defendant will regain competency during that time. However, if the medical facility treating the defendant certifies he has regained competency, the court must hold a hearing.The Fifth Circuit rejected the defendant's claim that once the medical facility certified he was competent, he could only be subject to civil commitment. Section 4241(a) allows for two commitment periods. The hospital warden's certification of the defendant's competency does not affect the district court's ability to order a second period of commitment. View "USA v. Ceasar" on Justia Law

While shopping at a Wal-Mart Supercenter retail store in Weatherford, Texas, the plaintiff slipped and fell in the store’s deli section. Her amended complaint referred to the cause of her fall as “grease or a similar slick substance.” She alleged that Wal-Mart had either actual or constructive knowledge of the spilled grease yet failed to clean it up or warn her of the hazardous condition.Wal-Mart argued that the plaintiff’s testimony showed that she had no evidence that it had actual or constructive knowledge of the spill Plaintiff submitted an affidavit, and Wal-Mart objected that it “lack[ed] credibility” and was a “self-serving sham.” The Fifth Circuit explained that the sham-affidavit doctrine is not applicable when discrepancies between an affidavit and other testimony can be reconciled such that the statements are not inherently inconsistent.The court found that affidavit testimony did not inherently contradict her deposition testimony, and the district court abused its discretion in applying the sham-affidavit rule. Further, because the evidence shows a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Wal-Mart had constructive notice of the spilled grease, the district court erred in granting summary judgment. View "Seigler v. Wal-Mart Stores TX" on Justia Law

Visa and Pulse both operate debit networks; Pulse has a PIN network; Visa has a signature network (“Visa Debit”) and a PIN network (“Interlink”). In response to the Durbin Amendment and to avoid anti-competitiveness, Visa changed certain policies. Pulse then sued visa, alleging federal and state antitrust statute violations.On appeal, Pulse argues the district court erred in granting summary judgment based on Pulse’s lack of antitrust standing. Pulse contends it has antitrust standing to contest Visa’s PAVD program. The court reasoned that loss from competition itself— loss in customers’ choosing the competitor’s goods and services over the plaintiff’s—does not constitute antitrust injury, even if the defendant is violating antitrust laws to offer customers that choice.Moreover, antitrust standing requires a “proper plaintiff." The court held that Pulse is a proper plaintiff to challenge FANF. Finally, Pulse’s overarching contention is that the district judge had prejudged the case against Pulse. The court found that in light of all the evidence and challenges the judge may have evaluating the claims based on what was already presented, reassignment was necessary. The court reversed the summary judgment in part, remanded the case for further proceedings, and directed the Southern District of Texas to assign the case to a different district judge. View "Pulse Network v. Visa" on Justia Law

While the defendant was a pain-management doctor, he reached an agreement with a pharmacist (“MM”). Per the agreement, MM would create a boilerplate prescription pad designed to assist the defendant in prescribing unnecessary medication. Second, the defendant signed an incomplete form, and third, his employee would step in and complete administrative work before faxing the form to MM. MM would then complete the form for fraudulent insurance reimbursement.The Government brought an eight-count indictment against the defendant. The jury acquitted him on Counts 1–7, but it hung on Count 8. He moved to dismiss Count 8 on double-jeopardy grounds. The defendant must show that the jury necessarily found some fact, and this fact must be an essential element of a retrial. The court reasoned that the defendant failed to meet this because his participation isn’t a necessary element of the Count 8 offense. Defendant next argues that the Government cannot retry him without broadening the indictment. However, the defendant moved to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds, not on the grounds of constructive amendment or variance. Defendant argued only that the collateral-estoppel portion of the Double Jeopardy Clause imposes a total bar to retrial. Even if the defendant asked the district court to exclude a particular argument, the court does not have the authority to review that decision. View "USA v. Auzenne" on Justia Law

Walmart employees stopped the plaintiffs, a woman and her daughter, on suspicion of shoplifting. The plaintiffs sued Walmart in state court, alleging false imprisonment, among other claims. Walmart removed the case to federal court, and the district court dismissed some claims and entered summary judgment in favor of Walmart. Regarding the plaintiffs' Texas Deceptive Trade Practices & Consumer Protection Act claim, the court found they failed to identify any facts that would establish an unconscionable action. Next, plaintiffs assert that Walmart employees committed acts underlying their false imprisonment claims and that Walmart is vicariously liable. The court reasoned that the off-duty police officer is treated as an anon-duty police officer for vicarious liability purposes. As a result, Walmart cannot be vicariously liable for the off-duty officer’s actions. Plaintiffs further argue that Walmart did not establish that her detention was reasonable. The court found that plaintiff cannot state a prima facie case for assault, battery, or offensive contact. Finally, they do not provide any argument that they were harmed, let alone substantially prejudiced, by allowing Walmart to attach portions of depositions, an asset protection case record sheet, and body camera footage. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the necessary elements for their claims. View "Huynh v. Walmart" on Justia Law

A water control and improvement district in Harris County, Texas ("the District"), wanted a new headquarters, so it contracted with a construction company to build one. The District required the company to post a performance bond. The company engaged Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. (“Philadelphia”) to provide that bond, which explicitly stated that changes to the construction contract would not void Philadelphia’s obligations. However, the District’s project manager backed out, which led the District to execute a new agreement without Philadelphia’s knowledge or consent. The District sought what was owed under the performance bond and sued for breach of contract.At issue is whether a 2016 Agreement created a new contract between the District and the construction company or merely amended their 2015 Agreement. The court concluded that the 2016 Agreement was an amendment under Texas law. The court reasoned that the Supreme Court of Texas would examine the text of both agreements to identify the parties' objective intent. The court concluded the 2016 Agreement amended—instead of replaced—the 2015 Agreement. Thus, the court reversed and remanded the case, placing no limits on the matters that the district court may address on remand. View "Harris Cty v. Philadelphia Indem" on Justia Law

Tarango Trucking, L.L.C. (“Tarango”) appeals from a judgment declaring that its insurer, Penn-America Insurance Company (“PennAmerica”), owes neither defense nor indemnity concerning third-party claims against Tarango concerning a fatal accident on its property.At the time of the accident, Tarango was insured under a commercial general liability policy issued by Penn-America (“the Policy”). Penn-America defended Tarango but reserved its right to contest coverage. Texas law governs the insurance issues in this diversity case. The Policy contains both a duty to defend and a duty to indemnify. PennAmerica must show that the plain language of an exclusion avoids coverage of all claims within the confines of the eight-corners rule. Penn-America argues that the Policy’s Auto Exclusion satisfies this burden. Because the Parking Exception is an exception to the Auto Exclusion, it is reasonable to interpret it as employing the same “arising-out-of” nexus as the Auto Exclusion.The Fifth Circuit held that the Parking Exception applies to bodily injury and property damage arising out of parking. Because the petition alleges some claims that arise out of parking and are potentially covered by the Policy, Penn-America must defend Tarango. The court also held that it was premature for the district court to decide the indemnity issue. View "Penn-America Ins v. Tarango Trucking" on Justia Law

Following a guilty plea, Defendant was convicted of transportation of illegal aliens for financial gain. In Defendant’s Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”) the probation officer recommended a total offense level of 17. This included a three-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. Sec. 2L1.1(b)(6)) for “intentionally or recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person.” The basis of the proposed enhancement was the fact that there were nine people in Defendant’s seven-person vehicle at the time he was arrested.The district court rejected Defendant’s challenge to the enhancement and sentenced Defendant to 24 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit first held that assessing the district court’s interpretation of the guidelines de novo review is appropriate. Moving on to the district court’s application of Sec. 2L1.1(b)(6)), the court found the evidence insufficient to apply the reckless endangerment enhancement. Without additional aggravating factors, nonsubstantial overcrowding alone is not enough to justify the application of Sec. 2L1.1(b)(6)). View "USA v. Castelo-Palma" on Justia Law