Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs' son was killed when he attempted to drive through a low water crossing in Camp Bullis, a military training base outside San Antonio, Texas. As Plaintiff's son navigated the crossing, water swept across the road, ultimately resulting in his death.Plaintiffs filed suit against the United States, claiming the government failed to inspect the low water crossing, failed to warn approaching motorists about the dangers of flooding, and failed to install guard rails that may have prevented water from accumulating on the road. The district court granted summary judgment to the United States, finding the discretionary exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") applied.The Fifth Circuit reversed. Under the FTCA, the federal government waives sovereign immunity for actions based on the negligence of federal employees who are acting within the scope of their employment. However, immunity is not waived if the federal employee is carrying out a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency. To be discretionary, an action must involve some element of judgment or choice.Here, the relevant regulation states that "[a]ll Range/Control Area/Impact Area gates will either be locked or guarded by the unit using the area." A natural reading of the regulation imposed an obligation on the officers who were on-site to lock the gate. Thus, the discretionary exception to the FTCA did not apply. View "Barron v. USA" on Justia Law

A former military prisoner violated a condition of his supervision. After being arrested and while being detained, he brought the current lawsuit claiming that the condition he violated was unconstitutional. He has been released, and his term of supervision has ended. He has been denied all veterans’ benefits due to the violation. The court addressed whether the denial of the benefits is a collateral consequence sufficient to avoid finding his claim to be moot now that he has completed his term of supervision.Plaintiff argues that his claims remain viable because of collateral consequences resulting from his alleged violation of the special condition. The Department of Veterans Affairs notified him that his benefits were terminated because he was a “fugitive felon”. The VA stated to Plaintiff that he would have to provide evidence showing that he was not a fugitive felon to resume his benefits.The court explained that there is little authority on whether the denial of VA benefits would be a collateral consequence sufficient to defeat an otherwise moot habeas petition. The loss of VA benefits due to his violation of the condition challenged in his petition may be an ongoing collateral consequence that prevents this case from being moot. However, the court stated while some of Plaintiff's claims are moot they cannot make a holding in the absence of briefing from the government. Thus, the court remanded the issue for the district court to consider. View "Foster v. Warden, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant, Union Pacific, is a national rail carrier. Plaintiff, The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen ("BLET"), is a labor union representing Union Pacific engineers. Division 192 is the exclusive representative for Union Pacific employees around the area. An issue arose when an off-duty fistfight broke out during a union meeting between local division officers and an engineer. About two months after the fight, the engineer filed a complaint with Union Pacific, alleging that was threatened and assaulted by local division representatives in retaliation for taking extra shifts. The suspension of six union members effectively barred all of Division 192’s leadership from Union Pacific’s premises.BLET sued Union Pacific in federal court, alleging Union Pacific retaliated against the union for its shove policy. BLET argued the retaliation violated the section of the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”) prohibiting carrier interference with union activity.The court first found that federal courts have jurisdiction over post-certification disputes alleging that railroad conduct motivated by antiunion animus is interfering with the employees’ “choice of representatives.” Next, the court found that the facts support the determination that the union was likely to succeed in showing that the discipline was motivated by a desire to weaken the local division. Thus, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the union is likely to prevail in showing that Union Pacific’s suspension of effectively all the division’s elected representatives amounted to the prohibited interference under the RLA. View "BLET v. Union Pacific Railroad" on Justia Law

Epic Companies, LLC ("Epic") was a general contractor specializing in the decommissioning of oil platforms. Epic hired the vessel Nor Goliath to lift oil platform components out of the water. These components were then transported to shore by tugboats, which were owned by various other companies.When Epic went bankrupt, the company's suppliers filed suit in the district court to recoup their costs. Several towing companies joined in the suit, asserting maritime liens under the Commercial Instruments and Maritime Liens Act ("CIMLA") against the Nor Goliath. The towing companies claimed that they provided "necessary services" by towing the barges ashore. The district court granted summary judgment in Nor Goliath's favor.The Fifth Circuit affirmed. CIMLA provides that those who provide "necessary services" to a vessel obtain a maritime lien against the vessel and may bring a civil claim to enforce this lien. Under 46 U.S.C. Sec. 31301(4), necessary services include repairs, supplies, towage, and the use of dry dock or marine railway. Here, the Nor Goliath's role was to lift platform components out of the water and place them on barges. Thus, the Nor Goliath's necessaries were the goods and services used to accomplish this task, but not those related to Epic's larger goal of decommissioning oil platforms. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that the towing companies did not perform necessary services to the Nor Goliath. View "Central Boat Rentals v. M/V Nor Goliath" on Justia Law

BITCO General Insurance Corporation (“BITCO”) and Monroe Guaranty Insurance Company (“Monroe”) issued general liability insurance policies to 5D Drilling & Pump Service Inc. (“5D”). A property owner sued 5D for breach of contract and negligence. BITCO sought a declaratory judgment that Monroe also owed a duty to defend 5D.The parties dispute whether any “property damage” alleged could have occurred during Monroe’s policy period. The magistrate found that damage must have occurred during a period when Monroe’s policy was in force.The court reasoned that under Texas law, courts determine whether an insurer’s duty to defend has been triggered by using the “eight corners” rule. The party seeking coverage has the initial burden of establishing that the underlying claims potentially state a cause of action. When pleadings in the underlying lawsuit have been amended, the court analyzes the duty to defend by examining the “latest, and only the latest, amended pleadings.”Typically, the eight-corners rule prevents courts from considering any extrinsic evidence. Texas law recognizes a limited exception to the eight-corners rule when it is impossible to discern whether coverage is potentially implicated and when the extrinsic evidence goes solely to a fundamental issue of coverage.Monroe contends that even if the owner’s pleading alleges damage within its policy period, it still has no duty to defend because all the damage falls within policy exclusions. The court found that Monroe cannot carry its burden because it cannot show that either exception unambiguously applies. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s order. View "BITCO Gen Ins v. Monroe Guar Ins" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras, sought asylum in the United States after the Department of Homeland Security charged that she, her husband, and her minor son were removable as aliens present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. The immigration judge (“IJ”) and Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) rejected her application.Petitioner contended that she had been sexually abused throughout her childhood by various males in her life. Further, she alleged that the MS-13 gang threatened her. Despite the police claiming they would investigate the allegations within a few weeks, petitioner fled to the United States.To obtain asylum, petitioner must demonstrate that she is a “refugee” by showing that she has suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground. 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1101(a)(42)(A). Here, petitioner's persecutors were nongovernment actors. Thus, she must also establish that the authorities were “unable or unwilling to control” them. Tesfamichael v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 109 (5th Cir. 2006). The court found that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that petitioner did not establish that the government is unable or unwilling to control the persecutors. The fact that police could not complete their investigation to petitioner's satisfaction within a single week does not compel the conclusion that they were unable or unwilling to help her. That alone defeats petitioner's asylum application; the court declined to reach the alternate bases for the BIA’s denial.. View "Sanchez-Amador v. Garland" on Justia Law

In November 2005, Petitioner, a citizen of Guatemala, was charged with being a removable alien. Petitioner failed to appear at his removal hearing, and he was ordered removed. Petitioner remained in the United States and, in 2013, married a United States citizen. Petitioner’s wife then sought and obtained a visa for Petitioner in 2016.Subsequently, Petitioner and the Department of Homeland Security jointly sought to reopen and dismiss Petitioner’s removal proceedings so he could apply for an immigrant visa. The immigration judge denied relief. Petitioner did not appeal, but filed a second motion to reopen, which the immigration judge denied. Petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), claiming that his attorney’s ineffectiveness was the cause of his untimeliness. The BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s decision.The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the BIA has jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s case if he establishes equitable tolling applied. The court vacated the BIA’s opinion, remanding the case for the court to consider whether Petitioner can establish his claim was subject to equitable tolling. View "Boch-Saban v. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a temporary employee on a construction job suffered a diabetic attack at work. Six days later, the plaintiff was terminated along with several others. After exhausting her administrative remedies, the plaintiff sued her employer in the Eastern District of Texas, bringing claims for damages under the ADA, alleging she had been discriminated against due to her diabetes.The circuit court found that the evidence was that plaintiff was terminated immediately after an event that highlighted her ADA-protected disability. The court reasoned proximity of her diabetic episode on the job and her termination was sufficient to constitute a prima facie case that she was included in the group to be terminated for ADA violative reasons. The court further found that plaintiff has presented evidence sufficient to rebut the defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason for termination and show that a fact question exists as to whether that explanation is pretextual. Thus, the plaintiff established the elements of her prima facie case and she has also presented “substantial evidence” that the defendant’s nondiscriminatory rationale for her inclusion in the reduction in force was pretextual. An issue of material fact remains regarding whether the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of her disability by including her in the reduction of force. View "Gosby v. Apache Industrial" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured while she, her father, and others were tracking a wounded deer at night in the woods. Her father’s Remington Model 710 rifle accidentally discharged and injured her. Plaintiff and her family members filed suit in the district court.At issue before the circuit court is whether the district court erred when it held that Section 60 of the LPLA did not bar her from bringing a claim under Section 56 of the LPLA, which is a general section applicable to design-defect claims.The LPLA “establishes the exclusive theories of liability for manufacturers for damage caused by their products.” LA. STAT. ANN. Sec. 9:2800.52. The court found is that Section 60(B) unambiguously bars design defect claims. Plaintiff argues that because Section 60(C) precludes claims against manufacturers for improper use of firearms, that part of the statute is superfluous if Section 60(B) had already precluded all non-Section 55 manufacturing-defect claims against manufacturers.The court found Section 60(C) precludes claims based on conduct by a broader category of actors than Section 60(B). Further, the court disagreed with plaintiff’s argument that Remington’s interpretation would render Section 60(D) Section 60(E) superfluous. Section 60(B) does not block all failure-to-warn claims but only those based on harm resulting from a shooting injury by a specific actor subset. Finally, the court found that the plain text leads to preventing a meaningful category of potential claims against the manufacturers of firearms. The court reversed and rendered judgment for defendant. View "Seguin v. Remington Arms" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of seven counts of mail fraud. The pre-sentence report noted that Defendant had a criminal history category of 1 and that the offense level was 39, based on losses of $9,922,428.63. At sentencing, the prosecution conceded that the total loss amount should be reduced by $325,540.35. After applying reductions, the district court sentenced Defendant to 121 months in prison with three years of supervised release. The court also ordered restitution in the amount of $9,922,428.63.Defendant challenged his sentence on several grounds. The district court erred in calculating the total loss amount when it did not accept the prosecution’s concession of the $325,540.35 reduction. Had the district court reduced the total loss amount, the Guidelines would have reflected a lower sentencing range. Here, the district court sentenced Defendant near the bottom of the guideline range. Thus, because the recalculation of the total loss amount lowers the guideline range, the case was remanded for the court to resentence Defendant. View "USA v. Alfaro" on Justia Law