Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a negligence suit under Louisiana law against many parties, including Defendant, an entity that participated in a construction project at the Republic National Distribution Company (“Republic”) warehouse in New Orleans, Louisiana. Defendant’s specific role was to build a concrete mezzanine platform. Months after Defendant completed its work, Plaintiff was working on the platform when an unguarded ceiling fan struck him in the head. The district court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The district court found that while Defendant had a general duty to provide a safe working environment and to refrain from creating hazardous conditions, it did not owe several “heightened duties” that Plaintiffs argued applied. The district court also held that Defendant did not breach its general duty because it repeatedly warned and admonished Republic about the fan, which was turned off from the date of a prior incident until the date of Plaintiff’s injury.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision granting summary judgment in Defendant’s favor, holding that Plaintiffs failed to show there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether Defendant breached his duty to refrain from creating a hazardous condition. The court reasoned that Plaintiffs did not point to any authority which support their theory as to the breadth of Defendant’s general duty. Instead, the jurisprudence limits Defendant’s duty, particularly in circumstances where the contractor lacks control or responsibility for the worksite at the time of the injury. View "Donahue v. Makar Installations" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a petition for damages in the 19th Judicial District Court in East Baton Rouge Parish. Plaintiff totaled his car in an accident and alleged that GoAuto, his car insurance carrier, paid less in policy benefits than his policy and Louisiana law required. GoAuto filed its notice of removal, Plaintiff received permission from the Louisiana court to amend his complaint again and, as accepted on appeal, filed the amended complaint. This amendment changed the definition of the class from class “residents of Louisiana” to class “citizens of Louisiana.” After removal, the parties filed several competing motions disputing which complaint controlled and the sufficiency of GoAuto’s notice of removal.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order remanding the case to state court, finding that Defendant is a citizen of Louisiana and thus the suit lacks the minimal diversity necessary to vest a federal court with jurisdiction. The court declined Defendant’s request to disregard the Louisiana state court’s pre-removal procedural rulings applying Louisiana law and substituted its own Erie guesses at how a Louisiana court ought to rule on a motion to amend a pleading.   Further, in regards to Defendant’s argument that it is plausible that some class members are not citizens of Louisiana, the court held that none of these individuals, assuming they had relocated to Colorado, Texas, or Florida before the filing of the complaint, qualify as citizens of Louisiana. Finally, the court held that Defendant points to nothing in the text of the statute that would bar Plaintiff’s class definition. View "Turner v. GoAuto Insurance" on Justia Law

On the panel's initial hearing of the case, Judge Higginson concluded that the restrictions on the President's removal authority under the Consumer Financial Protection Act are valid and constitutional. Judge Higginson found that neither the text of the United States Constitution nor the Supreme Court's previous decisions support appellants' arguments that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is unconstitutionally structured, and thus he affirmed the district court's judgment.More than two years later, and after conducting a vote among the circuit judges, the Fifth Circuit vacated its previous opinion and elected to hear the case en banc. View "CFPB v. All American Check Cashing, et al" on Justia Law

In a consolidated appeal, Plaintiffs challenged the district court’s application of the independent intermediary doctrine to dismiss their Fourth Amendment false arrest claims. Plaintiffs are motorcyclists who had gathered at a meeting and were eventually arrested following a shootout for Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity (“EIOCA”). All were arrested pursuant to the same “form warrant affidavit” that was presented as the basis for the arrest warrants. Following their arrests, Plaintiffs filed multiple individual Sec. 1983 actions asserting similar false arrest claims, which were premised on alleged defects in the form affidavit used to secure the arrest warrants. The district court granted in full the motion to dismiss the false arrest claims, but it did not discuss the merits of the claims.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and found in favor of Plaintiffs in their challenge of the district court’s application of the independent intermediary doctrine to dismiss their Fourth Amendment false arrest claims. The court held that the district court erred in its application of the independent intermediary doctrine. The court reasoned that an adequately pled Malley or Franks claim will also suffice to functionally apply the taint exception to the magistrate’s decision, if a plaintiff adequately pleads that a second intermediary, such as a grand jury, has been misled in a similar fashion, then the taint exception will apply to that intermediary’s decision as well. The court declined to decide whether Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded a Franks violation with respect to any of the named defendants. View "Miller, et al v. Stroman, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued PetroTel Oman, LLC (“PetroTel”) and affiliated entities in Texas state court, alleging that they breached an oral contract to compensate him for helping them raise funds for an oil and gas project in Oman. The PetroTel entities removed the action to federal court, arguing that removal was proper under the federal officer removal statute because they “acted under” a federal agency by partnering with the United States International Development Finance Corporation  (“DFC”) to raise funds for the project. The district court remanded the action, rejecting both grounds for removal offered by the PetroTel entities.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding rejecting Defendant’s grounds for removal to federal court. The court held that the federal officer removal statute nor the Grable doctrine provides a basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction in Plaintiff’s breach of contract action against Defendant.   First, the court reasoned that PetroTel did not assist or help the DFC carry out a task that the DFC—or any federal superior—otherwise would have had to do itself. Accordingly, PetroTel did not act under the DFC, so it was not entitled to remove under Sec. 1442(a)(1).  Next, the court held that because Plaintiff’s state court petition does not satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule, the district court correctly determined that Grable does not provide a basis for federal jurisdiction. View "Box v. PetroTel" on Justia Law

Appellants, the Edwards Family Partnership (“EFP”) and Beher Holdings Trust (“BHT”), two companies owned by Edwards and collectively referred to as the “Edwards entities” and Appellee, the trustee who presently manages Dickson’s former company, Community Home Financial Services Corporation (“CHFS”), each raised various issues on appeal relating to the business relationship between EFP, BHT, and CHFS. The dispute revolved around two business transactions: (1) the initial home improvement loans from Edwards to CHFS and (2) a subsequent arrangement of seven mortgage portfolios of subprime loans (the “Mortgage Portfolios”) purchased as “joint ventures” between Edwards and CHFS.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s and bankruptcy courts’ conclusion that the Appellant’s right to repayment for their funding of certain mortgage portfolios was barred by the statute of frauds.  Appellants argued the “statute of frauds does not apply to agreements already fully performed by one party; or to agreements capable of being fully performed within 15 months, even if performance is not expected.” The court reasoned that the bankruptcy court’s determination that CHFS could not repay the Edwards entities until it had collected on the underlying loans in the Portfolios,which would take more than five years, based on the terms of the loan agreement is plausible in light of the record. View "Edwards Family Partnership, et al v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Student is an elementary school pupil at the School District (“SD”). The SD moved her from general education into an essential academics program after they determined that despite the accommodations it offered her, Student was not making appropriate progress. Student’s mother objected to the SD’s decision and sought a due process hearing under the IDEA. A hearing officer concluded that the SD’s proposal was: (1) Student’s least restrictive environment; and (2) appropriate in light of her circumstances. Student’s mother appealed to the district court which affirmed the hearing officer’s decision. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision.   The court held that It is Student’s burden to establish that the SD’s decision violates IDEA and she has not carried that burden. The court reasoned that the proposed blended placement IEP is Student’s least restrictive environment. The court found that the SD took steps to accommodate Student by reviewing her overall record and found that she was not making appropriate progress in light of her circumstances. Further, the court considered what effect Student had on the general education classroom.   Finally, the court reasoned that to comply with the IDEA, a student’s plan must provide for exposure to nonhandicapped students to the maximum extent appropriate. Here, although Student occasionally saw glimpses of progress, the bottom line was one of minimal improvement and even regression. The proposed blended placement IEP was the next logical step when the SD found that Student was still not improving. View "H.W. v. Comal Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. Section 1326. At sentencing, the judge included the following condition of probation: "If the probation officer determines that the defendant poses a risk to another person (including an organization), the probation officer may require the defendant to notify the person about the risk and the defendant shall comply with that instruction. The probation officer may contact the person and confirm that the defendant has notified the person about the risk." At sentencing, Defendant did not object to the condition, but later challenged the condition on appeal.The Fifth Circuit, reviewing for plain error, held that the condition was not an improper delegation of authority to probation officers. The court reasoned that Defendant's probation officer was not given the authority to determine whether Defendant was subject to the condition; only that the probation officer can determine when, where, and to whom Defendant must give notice. View "USA v. Mejia-Banegas" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an office services and facilities management company, refused to bargain with a labor union based on its position that the union was not a "properly certified representative of its employees." In turn, the union filed a claim with the NLRB, claiming that Petitioner violated the NLRA by refusing to bargain in good faith. The NLRB found in the union's favor.The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, rejecting Petitioner's argument that the prosecution was ultra vires. Petitioner claimed that President Biden's removal of the NLRB General Counsel was unlawful and that his replacement lacked authority to bring the complaint against Petitioner. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, finding that no provision of the NLRA protects the General Counsel of the NLRB from removal.The Fifth Circuit then rejected the merits of Petitioner's claim, finding that there was substantial evidence in the record supporting the NLRB's decision. Thus, the court granted NLRB's cross-petition for enforcement. View "Exela Enterprise Solutions v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of aggravated burglary, manslaughter, and second-degree battery in federal court and was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA). Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), Petitioner sought permission to file a second Sec. 2254 petition. The court granted Petitioner's request, mentioning only his aggravated burglary and second-degree battery convictions. However, on remand to the district court, Petitioner collaterally attacked his manslaughter conviction, claiming it did not constitute a "violent felony" under the ACCA. The district court considered Petitioner's claim as it pertained to his manslaughter conviction and rejected it. Petitioner appealed.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated the portion of the district court's order denying Petitioner's claims, and dismissed the claim as it pertains to the manslaughter conviction. The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction because Petitioner did not have the court's permission to challenge his manslaughter conviction on remand. View "USA v. Hanner" on Justia Law