Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an inmate, brings a Section 1983 suit alleging the Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and unidentified prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court requested the Texas State Attorney General’s Office provide a supplemental administrative report, known as a Martinez report, to develop the record. Upon reviewing the report, the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims as frivolous.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. The court explained that in reviewing whether a district court properly dismissed a prisoner’s complaint for failure to state a claim, it applies the same standard as dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Further to show deliberate indifference a plaintiff must demonstrate that the official was aware that an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Here, Plaintiff did not mention any relationship between the allegedly unconstitutional acts and the Director or any prison policy. Without such an allegation, Plaintiff cannot state a claim against him.   Next, the court concluded that if the Martinez report conflicts with the pro se plaintiff’s allegations, the district court must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true, not the records in the report. Here, the district court relied on the Martinez report’s medical records in the face of Plaintiff’s conflicting allegations to conclude Plaintiff’s treatment was sufficient and any delay in treatment was not due to deliberate indifference. View "Davis v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action shortly after her son’s death, alleging that officers violated her son’s constitutional rights by failing to provide him with medical treatment while he was dying in a jail cell. The officers moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the officers’ motion. It found genuine disputes of material fact surrounding Plaintiff’s claims that the officers were deliberately indifferent to the man’s serious medical needs. And it concluded that the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and found that (1) the fact disputes identified by the district court are material to Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims, and (2) the court’s decision in Easter clearly established the man’s rights before the officers allegedly violated them.The court explained that in reviewing qualified immunity it looks to: (1) whether the defendant violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional or statutory rights; and (2) whether those rights were clearly established at the time of the violation. The court reasoned those it lacks jurisdiction to review the genuineness argument because the officers’ arguments do not address why the fact disputes the district court did find cannot affect the outcome of Plaintiff’s lawsuit—the materiality inquiry. Further, in reviewing Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459 (5th Cir. 2006), the court held that a reasonable jury could find that the officers each refused to treat the man, ignored his cries for help, and overall evinced a wanton disregard for his serious medical needs. View "Sims v. Griffin" on Justia Law

An asylum Petitioner argued that the Board of Immigration Appeals erred in denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Her application was based on membership in a particular social group and CAT. She defined the particular social group as “Salvadoran women in a domestic relationships who are unable to leave.” She stated that her ex-partner was physically, emotionally, and sexually abusive. The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied her application finding that she did not establish the requisite nexus between her harm and her particular social group and the BIA denied her motion to extend the briefing deadline.   The Fifth Circuit denied her petition. The court explained that under 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(a)(42)(A) an applicant seeking asylum must demonstrate that she “is unable or unwilling to avail . . . herself of the protection of [her] country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”  Further, an applicant seeking asylum or withholding of removal based on membership in a particular social group must make three showings. The court explained that while the IJ intimated that Petitioner’s proffered social groups were cognizable. The court has disagreed, holding that circularly defined social groups are not cognizable. Thus, because the IJ is bound to follow the law of this circuit on remand, he would be forced to conclude that Petitioner’s social groups were not cognizable, thus ending the analysis. View "Lopez-Perez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The City of New Orleans (the “City”) implemented a program called the Automated Traffic Enforcement System (“ATES”), which used mail to collect fines for traffic violations captured by street cameras. Plaintiffs alleged that the city violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by confiscating their property and keeping it without just compensation. The City moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and on interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) certified one question: whether the failure to comply with a state court judgment may be construed as a taking?   The Fifth Circuit answered in the negative. The court reasoned that Plaintiffs do not and could not argue that the extraction of fines under ATES was a taking. The court explained that takings are generally effected through the power of eminent domain. In this case, the City acquired Plaintiffs’ money not through eminent domain nor through any other lawful power, but rather through ultra vires implementation of ATES. That posture makes this case unlike prototypical takings actions. Further, Plaintiffs conceive of the city as “taking” their money in 2019, even when that money had been in the city’s possession since 2010 at the latest. And they insist that the City’s conduct from 2008 to 2010 was necessary to effect a taking that did not actually arise until 2019. Such a theory sits uneasily with a linear conception of time and is not rooted in the text of the Fifth Amendment. Thus, Plaintiffs are left with no plausible allegation that the city has effected a taking of their property. View "Lafaye v. City of New Orleans" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 846, 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). The probation officer determined that Defendant was a career offender under Section 4B1.1(a) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines because the instant offense, as well as Defendant’s prior convictions for possession with intent to distribute amphetamine and conspiracy to possess with intent to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine, qualified as controlled substance offenses. The district court overruled Defendant’s objection to the career-offender enhancement and sentenced him to 188 months of imprisonment.   Defendant argued that the district court erred in treating his instant and prior conspiracy convictions as controlled substance offenses. He asserted that even if Lightbourn was previously binding for the proposition that Section 4B1.2’s inchoate-offense commentary is subject to deference, that is no longer the case because Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019), fundamentally altered the deference afforded to the Guidelines commentary under Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that it cannot say Kisor unequivocally overruled the court’s precedent holding that Section 4B1.1’s career offender enhancement includes inchoate offenses like conspiracy. The court reasoned that mere “hint” from the Court as to how it might rule in the future is not enough to circumvent the rule of orderliness and disregard circuit precedent. View "USA v. Vargas" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of individuals affected by power outages during Hurricane Ida, filed a state court class-action lawsuit against various energy companies. The energy companies removed the case to federal court. The district court then granted Plaintiff's motion to remand the case back to state court. The energy companies appealed on various grounds, including under the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA").The Fifth Circuit dismissed the portion of the energy companies' appeal that did not fall under CAFA, finding a lack of jurisdiction. However, CAFA permits a district court to review a district court's decision to remand a case. Thus, the court held that it had jurisdiction to review the CAFA-related bases for the energy companies' appeal. Upon a review of the proceedings below, the court held that the district court properly remanded the case back to state court. View "Stewart v. Entergy Corporation" on Justia Law

Appellant is a pipeline-inspection company that hires inspectors and sends them to work for its clients. When Plaintiff was hired, Appellant had him sign an Employment Agreement that contained an arbitration clause. That arbitration provision explained that Plaintiff and Appellant agree to arbitrate all claims that have arisen or will arise out of Plaintiff’s employment. Appellant staffed Plaintiff on a project with Defendant, a diversified energy company that stores and transports natural gas and crude oil.   Alleging that the Fair Labor Standards Act entitled him to overtime pay, Plaintiff filed a collective action against Defendant; he brought no claims against Appellant. Appellant moved to intervene. The magistrate judge granted that motion, explaining that Appellant met the criteria for both permissive intervention and intervention as of right. Appellant claimed that it was an “aggrieved party” under Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and thus could compel arbitration. The magistrate judge rejected all the motions. The district court affirmed.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction Appellant’s appeal. The court held that Appellant is not an aggrieved party under Section 4 of the FAA and cannot compel arbitration. The court explained it is only where the arbitration may not proceed under the provisions of the contract without a court order that the other party is really aggrieved. Here, Plaintiff only promised to arbitrate claims brought against Appellant. Claiming that Plaintiff did not arbitrate its claims with Defendant is therefore not an allegation that he violated his agreement with Appellant. View "Hinkle v. Phillips 66 Company" on Justia Law

Defendants, ERR, LLC; Evergreen Resource Recovery, LLC (collectively “ERR”), owns and operates a wastewater treatment facility. One of ERR’s spill contractors, Oil Mop, performed oil removal and soil remediation. Oil Mop submitted a claim to the National Pollution Funds Center (“NPFC”) for reimbursement of removal costs after ERR refused to pay. The NPFC reimbursed Oil Mop and billed ERR for what it paid Oil Mop.   ERR refused to pay and the Government then sued ERR for what it paid Oil Mop. The Government moved to strike ERR’s demand for a jury trial.  The district court held a bench trial after concluding that the Government’s Oil Pollution Act (“OPA”) claims sound not in law but in equity.   On appeal, the Fifth Circuit addressed ERR’s Seventh Amendment challenge and held that the Seventh Amendment guarantees ERR’s right to a jury trial of the Government’s OPA claims. The court explained that it must consider two factors when determining whether a right of action requires a jury trial. First, the court compared the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, the court examined the remedy sought and determined whether it is legal or equitable in nature.   Here, the court concluded that the Recoupment Claim sounds in law and hence triggers ERR’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury. Next, the court held that both the nature of the Government’s action and the type of remedy sound in law. View "USA v. E.R.R." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), claiming that Defendant engaged in unlawful age discrimination and retaliation. Plaintiff filed a motion with the district court requesting additional time so that Defendant could respond to her requests for production. The court denied the motion and Plaintiff later filed a supplement to her Rule 56(d) motion, again asking the court to defer consideration of Defendant’s summary-judgment motion and allow Plaintiff to conduct discovery, or alternatively, deny Defendant’s motion. The district court granted Defendant’s motion and entered final judgment in their favor.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and held that a district court cannot deny discovery rights protected by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court explained that a Rule 56(d) movant first must demonstrate that additional discovery will create a genuine issue of material fact. Here, Plaintiff identified such evidence for (1) her age-discrimination claim, and (2) her retaliation claim. The court reasoned it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny Plaintiff the opportunity to conduct discovery on the relevant issues in question and then fault her for having “no evidence of a causal connection” between her protected activity and the adverse employment actions. Further, the fact that Plaintiffs requests for discovery were repeatedly denied does not reveal a lack of diligence on her part. View "Bailey v. KS Mgmt Services" on Justia Law

Petitioner applied for asylum and withholding of removal based on claims he was targeted by gangs for his religious activities. An immigration judge (IJ) disbelieved Petitioner’s story and denied his application. After the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal and denied reconsideration, Petitioner filed two petitions seeking review.   The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner’s application. The court first held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider this argument because Petitioner has not exhausted it. The court reasoned that Petitioner did not raise the argument initially before the BIA, despite the fact that he was in possession of the pertinent documents.   Next, in regard to Petitioner’s argument that the IJ’s bias denied him due process, the court held that the record does not show “obvious bias” and Petitioner failed to point to record evidence showing the IJ’s “hostility due to extrajudicial sources” or “a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” The court reasoned that IJ occasionally questioned Petitioner about his religious activities, but only because those activities were the basis for his claims.   Finally, Petitioner argued that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. The court held that the evidence does not compel the conclusion that the IJ’s negative credibility determinations were wrong. The court reasoned that IJ may assess credibility based on inconsistencies between an applicant’s testimony and prior statements. Here, the IJ cited “specific inconsistencies” and “identified crucial omissions in statements” by Petitioner and his sister and in the letters he provided. View "Cardona-Franco v. Garland" on Justia Law