Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to transporting an alien within the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (a)(1)(B)(i). At sentencing, the district court enhanced his total offense level for reckless endangerment pursuant to Section 2L1.1(b)(6) and for reckless endangerment while fleeing pursuant to Section 3C1.2. Defendant did not object and was sentenced at the bottom of the guideline range to 37 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court plainly erred by enhancing his total offense level pursuant to Section 2L1.1(b)(6).The Fifth Circuit held that the district court plainly erred by enhancing Defendant’s total offense level pursuant to Section 2L1.1(b)(6). Here, in support of the Section2L1.1(b)(6) enhancement, the presentence report cited the CBP agents’ findings that Defendant was transporting five undocumented aliens, four of whom were unrestrained, plus himself in a vehicle with a seating capacity of five. In support of the Section 3C1.2 enhancement, the PSR cited the 14-mile chase where Defendant reached speeds of up to 105 miles per hour at night. Because the district court enhanced Defendant’s sentence under both provisions, the Section 2L1.1(b)(6) enhancement cannot be based on his conduct while fleeing from the CBP agents. Thus, any support for the Section 2L1.1(b)(6) enhancement must come from his pre-flight activity. Defendant’s pre-flight activity does not support a Section 2L1.1(b)(6) enhancement, even under plain error review. View "USA v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two sisters, and a family friend own a large farm in north Louisiana. The farm sits atop the storied Haynesville Shale. A bank’s landman who was managing the sisters’ interests extended a mineral lease for only a tenth of the farm. The landman had misread the extension, which covered the whole farm. Within months, advances in drilling technology would open up the Haynesville Shale. Lease bonuses soared. But the faulty extension clouded the sisters’ farm.   Plaintiffs sued the bank for breach of contract. The district court found the landman violated the standards of his profession by extending the entire lease. But the court ruled this was a “mistake in judgment” under the bank’s contract with the sisters, shielding the bank from liability. It also ruled the mistake was not gross fault, which a Louisiana contract cannot exculpate.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Then court explained that the landman did not make a mistake in judgment, but a mistake pure and simple. He misread the extension. The contract’s exculpatory clause does not cover this kind of error, and so the court reversed the dismissal of the sisters’ claims. The court remanded as to damages. The extension stuck the sisters with a lower royalty rate than they would have gotten otherwise. But the parties’ experts disagree over whether the differing rates would make any economic difference. The district court did not resolve this technical, fact-bound question. View "Franklin v. Regions Bank" on Justia Law

Before the Fifth Circuit were three emergency motions to stay, pending appeal, and an order of the district court that requires the Louisiana Legislature to enact a new congressional map with a second black-majority district. The Fifth Circuit concluded that though Plaintiffs’ arguments and the district court’s analysis are not without weaknesses, Defendants have not met their burden of making a “strong showing” of likely success on the merits. The court concluded that the cautionary principle from Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006), prevents the ordered remedy from taking effect. Thus, the court vacated the administrative stay and denied the motion for stay pending appeal. The court explained that while Defendants urged the court to stay the district court’s order to give the Louisiana Legislature more time to enact a remedial plan, they have not explained why they cannot enact a new plan in the time that the district court allotted. View "Robinson v. Ardoin" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to 36 months in prison to be followed by five years of supervised release after pleading guilty to illegal reentry. As a special condition of release, the district court required that Defendant be turned over to immigration authorities upon his release and that he be deported to Mexico. If immigration authorities were unwilling to take Defendant, the court required he self-deport.Defendant challenged the special condition of release requiring he self-deport. The government conceded that the district court committed plain error. The Fifth Circuit remanded for entry of a new written judgment without the special condition requiring Defendant to depart the United States. View "USA v. Badillo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant XL Insurance America, Inc. (“XL”), as subrogee of Boh Bros. Construction Co., L.L.C. (“Boh Bros.”), challenged the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Turn Services, L.L.C. (“Turn”).   On appeal, Turn devotes significant ink to its contention that Boh Bros.’s responsibility for repairing the dolphin does not equate to a proprietary interest in it.   The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that Robins Dry Dock is not implicated by the $1.2 million that XL paid Boh Bros. to cover the repairs. The court explained that for nearly a century, Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927), has limited plaintiffs’ ability to recover “purely economic claims . . . in a maritime negligence suit.”1 “[A]bsent physical injury to a proprietary interest”—or one of a few other limited exceptions—plaintiffs asserting such claims are out of luck. The court explained the “spectre of runaway recovery lies at the heart of the Robins Dry Dock rubric.”   Further, the court concluded that it is clear that the doctrine would be inapplicable here if XL had paid the money directly to Plains because Plains had a proprietary interest in the damaged dolphin. That the money passes through the hands of an intermediary—here, Boh Bros.—is irrelevant to the concerns animating Robins Dry Dock. View "XL Insurance America v. Turn Services" on Justia Law

The Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DPSC”) regularly engages local parish jails to house convicted state prisoners. Five of the locally housed prisoners brought claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against local jail officials and DPSC officials. They alleged that the DPSC officials, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, looked away from the administrative failure they knew was leaving prisoners in jail who had served their sentences. The DPSC officials challenged the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.   Plaintiffs proceeded against Defendants under two theories, arguing that DPSC officials violated the Plaintiffs’ clearly established right to timely release from prison by: (1) failing to adopt policies ensuring the timely release of DPSC prisoners; and (2) directly participating in the conduct that caused their over detention.   The Fifth Circuit concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Defendants knew of a “pattern of similar constitutional violations,” such that their inaction amounted to a disregard of an obvious risk. DPSC’s Lean Six Sigma study revealed that 2,252 DPSC prisoners were annually held past their release date. Defendants cannot avoid the evidence that the study exposed unlawful detentions of prisoners. A reasonable factfinder could conclude that Defendants’ awareness of this pattern of delays and their conscious decision not to address it rises to the level of deliberate indifference. Further, because a reasonable jury may find that Defendants’ inaction was objectively unreasonable in light of this clearly established law, they have failed to show they are entitled to qualified immunity. View "Crittindon, et al v. LeBlanc, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and indicted on federal drug charges following the seizure of 400 grams of heroin 26 minutes into a traffic stop. At trial, Defendant unsuccessfully litigated a motion to suppress and then entered a conditional guilty plea. Defendant then appealed the denial of his motion to suppress.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. The traffic stop leading to the discovery of the narcotics was justified at its inception because Defendant was speeding, driving on the shoulder of the road, and littered a cigarette out his window. The court also held that the length of the traffic stop was justified. While a traffic stop must be temporary and last no longer than necessary, upon the development of reasonable suspicion, officers can extend the stop. Here, three minutes into the stop the officer determined Defendant's license was suspended. The officer could have arrested Defendant at this point for driving on a suspended license. However, as the stop progressed, the officer developed reasonable suspicion that Defendant was involved in the sale of heroin, leading to the permissible extension of the stop. View "USA v. Henry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a law firm with offices in Dallas, Texas and Atlanta, Georgia, sued to recover lost income and expenses incurred as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic under an insurance policy issued by The Cincinnati Insurance Company. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.   The court explained that under the policy a “Covered Cause of Loss” is a “direct ‘loss’ unless the loss is excluded or limited in this Coverage Part,” and “loss” is an “accidental physical loss or accidental physical damage.” So, to recover under any of the three forms of coverage, there must be a physical loss or physical damage to the Plaintiff’s property. Here, there was no Covered Cause of Loss as there was no underlying physical loss or damage to insured property. Plaintiff was not deprived of its property nor was there a tangible alteration to its property, so there was no underlying “direct ‘loss’” to trigger coverage. View "Ferrer & Poirot v. Cincinnati Ins Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his claims as barred by 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(g), colloquially known as the “three strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”).   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that Rule 11 provides courts with a “means to penalize the pursuit of frivolous suits that are removed to federal court.” And “[i]f a prisoner fails to pay a penalty imposed under Rule 11, the court may take other steps, such as revoking the privilege of litigating [IFP] or barring new suits altogether.” Courts may consider these measures where appropriate even where Section 1915(g) is inapplicable. Because Plaintiff did not bring this action in any court of the United States, the magistrate judge erred by determining that his claims were barred by Section 1915(g). Further, the record is devoid of any findings regarding exhaustion. The issue of exhaustion was in discovery by the parties when this appeal occurred. As Plaintiff suggested, the court held that remand is required to answer this question. View "Mitchell v. Goings, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of five counts of sex trafficking. He appealed his conviction, arguing that his right to a speedy trial was violated, that there is insufficient evidence to support one count of his conviction, and that the prosecutor made an improper remark in her closing argument.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that under the Speedy Trial Act the federal government must file an information or indictment against the defendant “within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges” otherwise the charges must be dismissed. Defendant argues that the Speedy Trial Act clock must include his detention by state authorities as the state charges were a “ruse” to avoid its reach in that State and federal authorities cannot “collude” to detain a defendant “solely for the purpose of bypassing the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act.” Here, the court held that the state had a legitimate and independent reason to detain Defendant and was not holding him primarily as a ruse for the federal government’s eventual arrest, Defendant was not denied his right to a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act. Further, Defendant was unable to show that the length of the delay was prejudicial. View "USA v. Mearis" on Justia Law