Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Jennifer Leonard alleged Tyler Martin rear-ended her when she stopped in traffic. She sued Martin and his insurer, Wadena Insurance Company, in Louisiana state court seeking damages for injuries she allegedly sustained during the accident. Martin removed the lawsuit to federal court based on the existence of diversity jurisdiction. This appeal related to a Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 45 subpoena issued to third party Dr. Joseph Turnipseed requiring him to perform patient record audits and generate data about how frequently he recommends a particular course of treatment. Turnipseed, an anesthesiologist and pain management specialist, treated Leonard for neck and back pain allegedly caused by the accident. Among other treatments, Turnipseed performed a cervical radiofrequency neurotomy on Leonard. According to Turnipseed, Leonard responded favorably to the cervical neurotomy and he recommended that she undergo the procedure annually for the next five to six years. These future treatments make up a large percentage of Leonard’s life care plan and alleged damages. Defendants disputed the medical necessity of those expensive, future treatments. Turnipseed moved to quash the subpoena on undue burden grounds. The district court denied his motion to quash. He appealed. In the alternative, he sought a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to quash the subpoena. "With misgivings about the district court’s substantive ruling," the Fifth Circuit dismissed Turnipseed’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine, and denied his alternative petition for a writ of mandamus for not having demonstrated a clear and indisputable right to the writ. View "Martin v. Turnipseed" on Justia Law

In 2012, then-sheriff Gusman of the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office claimed constitutional violations at the Orleans Parish Prison, including inadequate housing for detainees with mental-health needs. The United States intervened that September, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997c. That same month, the sheriff brought in the city as a third-party defendant. At issue here was whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the city’s motion for relief from January and March 2019 orders, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5). The Fifth Circuit held that '[a] Rule 60(b) motion, of course, is not a substitute for a timely appeal from the judgment or order from which relief is requested." The Court determined it had jurisdiction to review the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion, but not the underlying January and March 2019 orders. The denial of the city's Rule 60(b) motion was affirmed. View "Anderson v. City of New Orleans" on Justia Law

Triller Inc., a social media company was being sold to a group of owners, including Carnegie Technologies, Inc. Prior to the sale, Triller executed a promissory note in favor of Carnegie and then immediately assigned the note to a group of “legacy” owners—including Carnegie—as part of the deal’s closing. After the note was defaulted, Carnegie sued Triller to collect the amounts due. Triller claimed that it had no obligations under the note because it had been assigned, resulting in novation. The district court rejected Triller's novation defense and Triller appealed.The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that the plain meaning of the agreement was silent on the extinction of any obligation between Triller and Carnegie. The laws of both California and Texas require clear evidence illustrating the parties' intent to replace an earlier agreement, and the agreement's merger clause precludes evidence of a contemporaneous or earlier agreement. Thus, the court held that Triller failed to raise an issue of material fact regarding whether its obligations under the note were extinguished. View "Carnegie Technologies. v. Triller" on Justia Law

Fountain of praise, a church, leased space to Central Care Integrated Health Services. Shortly after the execution of the lease, the relationship soured when the parties disagreed on the frequency and amount of rent payments. Eventually, Fountain of Praise terminated the lease and successfully evicted Central Care from the premises.Subsequently, Central Care filed for Chapter 11 reorganization. Central Care then sued Fountain of Praise in state court, claiming breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Fountain of Praise then removed the case to bankruptcy court as an adversary proceeding. The bankruptcy court entered judgment in favor of Fountain of Praise, finding that any breach was excusable due to Central Care's failure to make timely rent payments and that Central Care lacked the requisite interest in the property for an unjust enrichment claim.Central Care appealed, and the district court judge assigned to the case reassigned the case to a magistrate judge who affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated the magistrate judge's order, finding that the district court improperly authorized referral of the appeal from a bankruptcy court decision to a magistrate judge. Under 28 U.S.C. Section 158, appeals from a bankruptcy court must be heard either by the district court or a panel of bankruptcy court judges. View "South Central v. Oak Baptist" on Justia Law

American Express National Bank (“AmEx”) filed suit for breach of contract in Mississippi state court to recover $2,855.74 of unpaid credit card debt incurred on Plaintiff's account. Plaintiff contended an unknown person incurred this debt fraudulently. Plaintiff then filed Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) claims against AmEx and other defendants in Mississippi state court. The district court denied AmEx’s motion to compel arbitration.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the decision of the district court and remanded for reconsideration in the first instance in light of Forby v. One Techs., L.P and Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. The court held that these cases were decided on the same day and after the district court’s ruling. Forby clarified the test for waiver by a party of the right to compel arbitration and reiterated that waiver analysis occurs on a claim-by-claim basis. In addition, Morgan addressed this and other sister circuits’ tests for waiver by a party of the right to compel arbitration. The court explained that although it can apply subsequent precedent to cases before it, “[a]s a court for review of errors, we are not to decide facts or make legal conclusions in the first instance." Thus, the court’s task is to review the actions of a trial court for claimed errors. View "Barnett v. American Express National" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were tenants at Arbor Court, a Houston apartment complex that received subsidies from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). After flooding that occurred during Hurricane Harvey, Arbor Court’s owner failed to maintain the property in decent, safe, and sanitary condition. Accordingly, HUD approved a transfer of the complex’s subsidy to a different property, offering Arbor Court tenants a choice between moving at no cost to the new property or receiving housing vouchers that they could use at new housing of their choice. After choosing the latter option, Plaintiffs sued HUD, seeking relocation assistance under the Uniform Relocation Act (“URA”). The district court dismissed the complaint.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The court held that Plaintiffs are not entitled to relocation assistance under the URA. The court explained, as required by statute, Plaintiffs have not pled that they moved from Arbor Court “as a direct result of a written notice of intent to acquire or the acquisition of such real property [i.e. Arbor Court] in whole or in part for a program or project undertaken by a Federal agency or with Federal financial assistance.” Plaintiffs argued that under the applicable Department of Transportation (“DOT”) regulations, the Section 8(bb) subsidy transfer from Arbor Court to Cullen Park qualifies as “such other displacing activity.” However, this regulation merely defines the phrase “program or project.” It does not prescribe any “displacing activit[ies]” that cause one to become a “displaced person” under the URA. View "Jackson v. HUD" on Justia Law

Petitioners overstayed their permission to visit the United States 20 years ago, and they’ve been here ever since. For the second time after they were ordered removed, they asked the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) to reopen their removal proceedings. For the second time, the Board refused.On appeal, Petitioners focused on the BIA’s failure to consider certain evidence of changed country conditions. They argue that amounted to an abuse of discretion. (They also argue the BIA committed various other errors.)The Fifth Circuit denied their petition, holding that (A) Petitioners’ claims are number-barred. Then the court wrote that it (B) rejected Petitioners’ resort to federal regulations and instead apply the statute as written. Finally, the court (C) denied the petition without remanding it to the BIA. The court explained that the number bar is a separate impediment to relief. The INA first lays out the number bar: Petitioners generally get one and only one motion to reopen. Section 1229a(c)(7)(A). Then the statute creates one and only one exception. In the same sentence as the number bar itself, Congress said: “[T]his limitation shall not apply so as to prevent the filing of one motion to reopen described in subparagraph (C)(iv).” And everyone agrees that petitioners do not qualify for the single statutory exception to the number bar in (C)(iv). Thus, Petitioners'’ motion to reopen is number-barred. View "Djie v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the denial of an income tax deduction he claimed for a charitable donation of an aircraft. Because Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements for such a deduction, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Tax Court.   The court explained Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code governs deductions for charitable contributions. For a contribution of a qualified vehicle, including airplanes, whose value exceeds $500, the taxpayer must provide contemporaneous written acknowledgment from the donee organization of the contribution, including the name and taxpayer identification number of the donor. Further, the donee organization must provide the IRS with the information contained in the acknowledgment.   Here, the court wrote that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (“Commissioner”) was entitled to summary judgment as Petitioner was disallowed from claiming the deduction as a matter of law. Petitioner failed to provide a contemporaneous written acknowledgment from the donee organization that satisfied the requirements of 26 U.S.C. Section 170(f)(12)(B). Petitioner did not provide a satisfactory contemporaneous written acknowledgment with his Form 1040X. He included a letter dated December 30, 2010, from the Society discussing the donation of the airplane, but the letter was not addressed to Petitioner. The letter does not mention Petitioner and does not provide his taxpayer identification number. Thus, the court held that the letter cannot substantiate the contribution of the airplane under Section 170(f)(12)(B)(i). View "Izen v. CIR" on Justia Law

Yogi Metals Group, Inc. applied for an EB-1C visa for one of its employees. The United States Customs and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied the application. Yogi Metals and the employee filed suit in federal district court, arguing that USCIS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the application. The district court granted summary judgment to USCIS.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellants argued that USCIS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the EB-1C visa petition having granted the employee a temporary L-1A visa, with similar requirements. But Appellants did not present this argument to the district court and the court does not consider arguments first raised on appeal. Further, regardless, the deference here due the agency decision has not been overcome, discretion informed by its announced rule that the previous grant of a temporary visa does not bind USCIS to later grant a permanent visa. View "Yogi Metals Group v. Garland" on Justia Law

The district court enjoined Texas laws regulating the disposal of embryonic and fetal tissue remains. The state requires facilities performing abortions to dispose of these remains in one of four ways: “(1) interment”; (2) cremation; (3) incineration followed by interment; or (4) steam disinfection followed by interment. Tex. Health & Safety Code Section  697.004(a). The district court assumed that the Texas laws further a legitimate state interest. Under the Casey balancing approach, the district court concluded that “the challenged laws impose significant burdens on abortion access that far outweigh the benefits the challenged laws confer.”   The Fifth Circuit held that because the Supreme Court overruled Casey and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), now under Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., -- S. Ct. --, 2022 WL 2276808 “[t]he Constitution does not prohibit the citizens of each State from regulating or prohibiting abortion.” Thus, the court vacated the injunction issued in the case and remanded for further proceedings consistent with Dobbs. View "Whole Woman's Health, et al v. Young" on Justia Law