Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a man was found incompetent to stand trial, and his civil commitment proceeding was dismissed, he stayed in jail for six more years. Plaintiff, the man’s guardian, filed suit against the District Attorney, Sheriffs, and Clay County under Section 1983, challenging the man’s years-long detention.   The district court first dismissed the District Attorney from the case. However, the court determined that the Sheriffs were not entitled to qualified immunity on the detention claim because their constitutional violations were obvious. It denied summary judgment to Clay County too, finding that there was strong evidence that the Sheriffs were final policymakers for the county.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Clay County’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to the Sheriffs.  The court first held that it lacked jurisdiction over the ruling keeping Clay County in the case. The Court explained that, unlike the Sheriffs, municipalities do not enjoy immunity. Further, the court wrote it did not have pendent party jurisdiction over Clay County. Defendants assume that if Clay County’s liability is “inextricably intertwined” with that of the individual officers, that provides “support [for] pendent appellate jurisdiction.” But the court has never permitted pendent party (as opposed to pendent claim) interlocutory jurisdiction.   Further, taking the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, the Sheriffs violated the man’s due process right by detaining him for six years in violation of the commit-or-release rule and the circuit court’s order enforcing that rule. The court explained that it was clearly established that the Sheriffs could be liable for a violation of the man’s clearly established due process right. View "Harris v. Clay County, MS" on Justia Law

Defendant, seeking habeas relief, alleged that prosecutors unconstitutionally suppressed a document that would have aided his case and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial and his direct appeal.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed holding that Defendant failed to demonstrate that any of his habeas claims merit relief. Defendant first asserted that the prosecution violated his Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by suppressing FD-302 evidence favorable to his case. The court wrote that the impeachment value of the 302 is insufficient to undermine confidence in the trial and the jury’s verdict, such that the 302 is not material, and Defendant’s Brady claim therefore fails.   Next, because none of the prosecutor’s statements, taken in context, constitute improper vouching, Defendant cannot argue that his trial counsel should have objected to them and was ineffective for not doing so. And even if the prosecution acted improperly as to some of its closing remarks, Defendant fails to show how any strategic decision on his counsel’s part not to object rises to ineffective assistance. View "USA v. Valas" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). The jury instructions did not specify that the jury must find that Defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed a firearm. After Defendant’s conviction and sentencing, the Supreme Court decided in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), that knowledge of felony status is an essential element of that offense. The following year, Defendant filed a motion with the district court under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, arguing that because of Rehaif the court should vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Rehaif did not establish a new right that applies retroactively as required for such collateral actions.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded. The court considered whether in Rehaif the Supreme Court newly recognized a right and whether that right has been made retroactive to cases on collateral review. The court concluded that the Supreme Court did indeed recognize a new right—the defendant’s right to have the Government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed a firearm.Next, the court wrote, that rule applies retroactively. The Supreme Court has explained that “[n]ew substantive rules generally apply retroactively” to finalized convictions. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004). The court explained that remand is appropriate because the district court has not addressed procedural default or the merits of Defendant’s claim. View "USA v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Guatemalan citizen, entered the United States through Texas on May 10, 2005. He was detained the next day, but subsequently released on his own recognizance. Petitioner then moved to Connecticut without notifying the court or providing a new address. The court proceeded in absentia and ultimately ordered Petitioner to be removed. Fourteen years later, Petitioner sought to reopen the proceedings and rescind the in absentia order, claiming he did not receive adequate notice of the removal proceedings.The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") denied relief, and Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit denied the Petitioner's petition for review. The court noted that Petitioner did not provide any address, so he may not reopen proceedings on the ground that the date and time of his removal proceeding were not included in his notice to appear. The court also held that the BIA did not err in failing to consider Petitioner's own affidavit because the BIA adequately considered all the evidence presented. View "Gudiel-Villatoro v. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that they contracted COVID-19 while working at two Tyson Foods, Inc (“Tyson”) facilities in Texas during the first few months of 2020. Some of them died as a result. They alleged that Tyson failed to follow applicable COVID-19 guidance by directing employees to work in close quarters without proper protective equipment. They also alleged that Tyson knew some of its employees were coming to work sick with COVID-19 but ignored the problem and that Tyson implemented a “work while sick” policy to keep the plant open.   Tyson argued that it was “acting under” direction from the federal government when it chose to keep its poultry processing plants open during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic and that the district courts erred in remanding these cases back to state court.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's orders. The court explained that Tyson received, at most, strong encouragement from the federal government. But Tyson was never told that it must keep its facilities open. The court wrote that from the earliest days of the pandemic all the way through the issuance of Executive Order 13917, the federal government’s actions followed the same playbook: encouragement to meat and poultry processors to continue operating, careful monitoring of the food supply, and support for state and local governments. Tyson was exhorted, but it was not directed. Thus, Tyson has not shown that it was “acting under” a federal officer’s directions” and so the court need not consider whether it meets the remaining elements of the federal officer removal statute. View "Glenn v. Tyson Foods" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued a nursing home and its insurer in state court after their mother contracted COVID-19 at the facility and died. The home, Woodlawn Manor, removed the action to federal court. After dismissing Plaintiffs’ federal claims, the district court remanded to state court, declining supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims that remained.Woodlawn contested that remand arguing that the state-law claims pose federal questions that the district court could and should have heard. Further, Woodlawn argued that even if those claims did not pose federal questions the court should have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over them despite having dismissed all federal claims.The Fifth Circuit affirmed holding the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (“PREP” or “Act”) does not preempt state-law negligence claims. Second, Plaintiffs did not plead willful-misconduct claims. But even if they had, they could not have brought them under the Act. Further, Plaintiffs asserted state-law claims for negligence. Under Mitchell, the PREP Act does not preempt those claims, so they cannot support original federal jurisdiction. Thus, because Plaintiffs’ factual allegations, taken as true, do not state and could not support a willful-misconduct claim under the Act, there is no federal question here. View "Manyweather v. Woodlawn Manor" on Justia Law

The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) requested to stay the district court’s vacatur of a new immigration rule that radically reduces the federal government’s detention of those who are statutorily required to be removed post-haste. The district court determined that the rule conflicts with federal statutes, is arbitrary and capricious and that its promulgation was procedurally invalid.   The Fifth Circuit denied the motion for a stay, concluding that DHS failed to make a strong showing of the likelihood of success on appeal. The court distinguished the case-at-hand from a  recent decision by the Sixth Circuit, authorizing a stay pending appeal, based on differing precedent and the benefit of a complete trial record.   DHS contended that the States lack standing to challenge the Final Memo because any purported injury is speculative, unsupported by the evidence, not fairly traceable to the Final Memo, and not redressable in federal court. The court wrote that the data show that the Final Memo “increases the number of aliens with criminal convictions and aliens with final orders of removal released into the United States,” and Texas has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the cost of that reality has fallen on it and will continue to do so. Further, while DHS that the guidance in no way binds enforcement agents and their superiors, but “simply ensures that discretion is exercised in an informed way.” The court explained that as the district court stated, the record plainly belies that assertion. View "State of Texas v. USA" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery under 18 U.S.C. Section 1951(a) and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). The conspiracy conviction served as the predicate crime of violence for the firearm offense.Under the terms of the plea agreement, Defendant waived the right to challenge his conviction and sentence on direct appeal or through a collateral attack. However, following United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), Defendant brought a collateral attack on his firearm conviction under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, claiming that notwithstanding his waiver, his conviction must be vacated because it was predicated on the residual clause held unconstitutional in Davis.The Fifth Circuit held that Defendant's plea waiver was valid, and precluded collateral attack, citing Grzegorczyk v. United States, _ U.S. _ (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). View "USA v. Caldwell" on Justia Law

Joanna Guijarro rented a Jeep from Enterprise Rent-A-Car in Brownsville Texas, which is owned and operated by EAN, a Delaware LLC, whose sole member is a Missouri corporation, Enterprise Holdings. The Guijarros were driving in heavy rain when Joanna lost control of the Jeep. The vehicle slammed into a concrete culvert. All three family members were injured. The Guijarros believed that a defect in the Jeep’s braking system caused the accident. They sued Enterprise Holdings and EAN in Texas state court, alleging negligence, breach of contract, and violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, claiming that the defendants knew or should have known that the Jeep’s brakes “were in a defective and/or unsafe condition” and failed to disclose or correct the problem. The defendants removed the suit to federal court.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of the plaintiffs' remand motions, finding it apparent from the complaint that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 and that the Guijarros only sought to join Texas parties to escape federal court. Enterprise Holdings was properly dismissed as a defendant. Summary judgment for EAN was appropriate because Guijarro failed to produce competent evidence that the Jeep’s brakes were defective. Texas law required expert opinions that identified a “specific defect” in the vehicle and “ruled out other possible causes” for the crash. The only proof of a defect was Joanna’s lay testimony “that she applied the brakes” and the car “would not stop.” View "Guijarro v. Enterprise Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Texas applicants may transmit a voter registration form to the county registrar via fax, then deliver or mail a hardcopy of the application within four days, Elec.Code 13.143(d-2). Vote.org, a non-profit, non-membership organization, launched a web application, with which a user would supply the required information and an electronic image of her signature. The application would assemble a completed voter registration application, then transmit it to a third-party vendor, who would transmit the form via fax to the county registrar; another vendor would mail a hardcopy to the registrar. A 2018 pilot program in four counties “was an unmitigated disaster. Because applications submitted using the web application lacked an original, “wet” signature, the Secretary of State advised that those applications were incomplete. In 2021, House Bill 3107 clarified that for “a registration application submitted by [fax] to be effective, a copy of the original registration application containing the voter’s original signature must be submitted by personal delivery or mail” within four days.The district court concluded that the wet-signature requirement violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 52 U.S.C. 10101(a)(2)(B), because an original signature is “not material” to an individual’s qualification to vote and granted a permanent injunction. The Fifth Circuit granted a stay pending appeal, concluding that Vote.org lacks statutory standing and is unlikely to prevail on the merits. The wet-signature rule imposes a very slight burden on the right to vote and helps deter voter registration fraud. View "Vote.Org v. Paxton" on Justia Law