Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A man detained at the Yazoo County Detention Center died after bleeding internally for hours. His survivors alleged that law enforcement officials knew that the man had been assaulted with a metal pipe and that he was vulnerable to internal bleeding if injured, yet they ignored requests for help from the man his family, and his fellow detainees, and left the man to suffer in his cell until it was too late. In rejecting the officials’ qualified immunity defense at summary judgment, the district court found numerous factual issues that, if resolved in Plaintiffs’ favor, would establish their liability on the federal denial-of-care claim. It did not, however, consider whether that constitutional violation was clearly established at the time of the man’s death.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Yazoo City’s appeals for lack of jurisdiction, affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the individual defendants on the federal denial-of-medical-care claim, and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that it has granted qualified immunity when law enforcement misconstrued the symptoms of a serious medical condition for intoxication, or a less serious illness. Here, however, the officers’ knowledge of risk was based on much more than just symptoms: They also knew that the man had a life-threatening condition and had suffered trauma of the type that would trigger that condition. Those additional factors distinguish this case from the symptoms-only scenarios in Roberts and Cheney. Further, is clearly established that an official who refuses to treat or ignores the complaints of a detainee violates their rights. View "Williams, et al v. City of Yazoo, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Preble-Rish Haiti, S.A. filed this case pursuant to Rule B of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It sought to attach assets to secure a partial final arbitration award against the Republic of Haiti and the Bureau de Monétisation de Programmes d’Aide au Developpement (BMPAD). Garnishee BB Energy USA, L.L.C.(BB Energy) admitted to holding credits belonging to BMPAD located in the Southern District of Texas.   Although BB Energy raised BMPAD’s sovereign immunity from prejudgment attachment again, the district court stated it had already decided that issue and cited its August 10, 2021 order. BB Energy appealed the January 4, 2022 order pursuant to the collateral order doctrine   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and vacated the writ of attachment. The court explained that to satisfy Section 1610(d), an explicit waiver of immunity from prejudgment attachment must be express, clear, and unambiguous. Anything short of that is insufficient. Here, because there is no such explicit waiver in the contract or elsewhere, the district court erred in concluding BMPAD waived its sovereign immunity from prejudgment attachment. View "Preble-Rish Haiti, S.A. v. BB Energy USA" on Justia Law

While awaiting trial a woman began tapping her hairbrush on the cell door. One of the two primary jailers asked the woman to turn around to be handcuffed. When she did not obey, the jailer used pepper spray which caused her to retreat toward the far wall. While the woman remained at the back of her cell facing away from the jailers, one of the jailers sprayed the woman with pepper spray three more times.   The struggle resulted in the woman lying flat on her stomach with her hands handcuffed behind her back, and one of the jailers, who weighed 230 pounds, sitting atop of her with his knee on her back. The other jailer, who weighed 390 pounds, pressed his forearm against her neck for over two minutes. The jailers rolled the woman over to find her unresponsive and she was declared dead. The woman’s parents filed a section 1983 suit against the county and the jailers. At summary judgment, the district court held that the jailers’ use of force was reasonable.   The Fifth Circuit reversed, explaining that a jury could conclude that the jailers used excessive force. Further, the jailers’ continuing to apply that force for more than two minutes after the woman was subdued would violate clearly established law. The court explained any reasonable officer would see that the woman represented a low threat at the moment when the jailer threw her to the floor and applied continuous force. Further, the woman did not actively resist at these critical stages of the encounter. Finally, the amount of force was not proportional to the need for force. View "Fairchild, et al v. Coryell Cty, et al" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Defendant on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. Defendant moved to suppress the revolver and ammo, arguing the officers unlawfully stopped him. At an evidentiary hearing, an officer testified for the government, and Defendant introduced bodycam footage from an officer who arrived on scene after the seizure, as well as photographs and maps of the area.   Defendant challenged only whether the officers had reasonable suspicion for the stop; he does not challenge the frisk. He argued the description of the wanted gang member was too general and the detail about the past flight from police on the bicycle was too “sparse” and potentially “stale.” The government relied on the description of the subject and the bicycle, the location, and the officers’ knowledge of gang activity in the area.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress and vacated his conviction and sentence. The court held that the officers’ stop of Defendant was not supported by reasonable suspicion. This case involves an outstanding warrant—completed criminal activity—so the information the officers relied on must satisfy a higher level of specificity than if they were responding to a report of ongoing or very recent criminal activity.   Further, the court wrote it does not blindly accept officers’ reliance on information obtained through police channels; the government must substantiate the basis of the information. Here, the government has not established reasonable suspicion that could have been transferred between officers, the collective knowledge doctrine does not apply. View "USA v. Alvarez" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of sexually abusing a minor girl over a period of three years and conspiring to obstruct justice by destroying his laptop computer. Defendant appealed raising numerous arguments. The Fifth Circuit found no reversible error in the district court’s decision and affirmed.   Defendant argued that the federal prosecution violated double jeopardy because he was subjected to punitive pretrial bond conditions in state court before being tried and convicted in federal court. The court explained that the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause states that no person may be “twice put in jeopardy” “for the same offense.” Thus, the court held that law-of-the-case doctrine forecloses Defendant’s double jeopardy argument.   Further, Defendant argued that his constitutional rights were violated when he was prohibited from discovering certain evidence that purportedly showed the victim and others’ financial motives to lie. The court found that the relevant events do not establish that Defendant was denied a “meaningful opportunity” to present a complete defense.   Finally, the court reviewed the district court’s decision to exclude evidence as a sanction for violating a discovery rule or pretrial order for abuse of discretion. Aside from arguing that exclusion is never appropriate, Defendant does not contend that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded his medical records. Consequently, we treat the issue as waived and leave undisturbed the district court’s decision to exclude these documents. View "USA v. Wills" on Justia Law

In a criminal appeal, Defendant presented two issues. First, whether evidence discovered after a consent search of Defendant’s car should be suppressed because law enforcement stopped Morris without reasonable suspicion or overbore his free will to obtain consent to search his vehicle. Second, whether at sentencing the district court erred in holding that Defendant was ineligible for a minor role adjustment because the other participants in the crime had not been indicted or otherwise identified. 
 The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress and remanded for reconsideration of his motion to suppress. The court wrote it was convinced that the sheriff’s deputies in the case effected a stop of Defendant under the Fourth Amendment. The court explained that because the district court held that Defendant was not stopped, it did not determine whether the deputies had reasonable suspicion to do so. Thus, the court’s decision is a determination that the district court must make in the first instance, as it usually involves assessing the credibility of witnesses and weighing this evidence under the totality of the circumstances. View "USA v. Morris" on Justia Law

Beatriz Ball, LLC, is a Louisiana company doing business as Beatriz Ball and Beatriz Ball Collection. Barbagallo Company, LLC is a New Jersey company doing business as Pampa Bay. Plaintiff alleged that Pampa Bay has been marketing and distributing products that infringe on Beatriz Ball’s registered copyrights and its unregistered trade dress for its “Organic Pearl” line of tableware.   Plaintiff challenged the district court’s conclusions that (1) the company lacked standing under the Copyright Act because the plaintiff did not obtain a valid assignment of its claim, and (2) it failed to establish a protectable trade dress under the Lanham Act.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the district court erred in its standing determination and that certain errors in its analysis of the trade dress claim require reconsideration by the district court. The court explained that whether Beatriz Ball’s trade dress has acquired secondary meaning is considered a question of fact reviewed on appeal for clear error. Here, the record indicates that the district court clearly erred in analyzing three of the factors: volume of sales, the nature of the use of Organic Pearl trade dress in newspapers and magazines, and the defendant’s intent in copying the trade dress. Ultimately, a visual comparison of Pampa Bay’s products to the Organic Pearl line makes it difficult to deny that there was intent to copy. The designs are not just alike, they are indistinguishable in some cases. Thus, the sum of errors in the district court’s analysis of secondary meaning requires reconsideration of the evidence and overall re-weighing of the factors. View "Beatriz Ball v. Barbagallo Company" on Justia Law

Defendants settled a civil enforcement action that the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) brought against them for alleged securities violations. The SEC barred Defendants from denying that they engaged in the charged conduct as a condition of settlement (the “no-deny policy”). The parties executed consent agreements containing provisions to that effect and submitted them to the district court, which entered final judgments. Five years later, Defendants filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) and 60(b)(5) seeking relief from the final judgments to the extent that they incorporated the no-deny policy. They argued that the no-deny policy violates their First Amendment and due process rights. The district court denied the motion, and Defendants appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling holding that Defendants are not entitled to relief based on any alleged First Amendment Violations. Defendants argue that, in denying their motion for Rule 60(b)(4) relief, the district court adopted a cribbed view of Espinosa that the Fifth Circuit rejected in Brumfield. The court wrote that Defendants read Brumfield too broadly. That decision expressly recognized that “a judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4) only if the court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, ‘or it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.’”   Next, Defendants asserted that the judgments here should “be set aside as violating the public interest under Rule 60(b)(5).” They argue that retaining the no-deny policy in the judgments harms the public interest. The court explained that Defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing that changed circumstances warrant relief. View "SEC v. Novinger" on Justia Law

The Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) has denied prisoner requests to hold religious gatherings for the Nation of Gods and Earths (“the Nation”).   In response, Plaintiff, brought this suit against the TDCJ’s Deputy Director of Volunteer Services and Special Populations, in the hope of vindicating the rights of the Nation’s adherents to congregate. The suit was initially filed pro se over half a decade ago. But Tucker began receiving the aid of pro bono legal counsel a few years later. The State now says that it has promulgated a new policy to govern congregation requests on behalf of the Nation’s adherents. As a result, the State contends that this suit is now moot.   On appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment to the congregation claim, holding that there were genuine disputes of material fact as to “whether the state’s ban: (1) advances a compelling interest (2) through the least restrictive means.” Tucker v. Collier (Tucker I), 906 F.3d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 2018). After adopting the changes, TDCJ sought summary judgment on the grounds that Tucker’s case was. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim as moot.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and found that the case is not moot. The court explained that TDCJ’s policy change gives Plaintiff nothing more than the right to apply for a congregation—to date TDCJ has never approved the Nation for congregation. And it is the latter that this suit seeks to obtain. View "Tucker v. Gaddis" on Justia Law

Appellant challenged the district court’s 1) denial of his motion to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act, 2) imposition of a sentencing enhancement for reckless endangerment, and 3) adoption of the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) that treated two of his prior convictions as crimes of violence.   The Fifth Circuit rejected the first two grounds but vacated and remanded for resentencing in light of Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021), and United States v. Bates, 24 F.4th 1017 (5th Cir. 2022). The court explained that the district court correctly interpreted the Speedy Trial Act. However, the court was plainly wrong in its application of U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(a)(3). It is plain, post-Borden, that applying Section 2K2.1(a)(3) to the convictions at issue was in error.   Further, applying Section 2K2.1(a)(3) affected Appellant’s substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings. Without the two qualifying prior convictions for crimes of violence, Appellant maintains that his base offense level would drop from 22 to 20 under Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(B), and that he would receive at least one less criminal history point, which would result in a criminal history category of IV. 22 USSG Section 4A1.1(e), 4A1.2(a)(2). View "USA v. Kelley" on Justia Law