Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Union Pacific Railroad Company (“Union Pacific”) sought to end its operations in Palestine, Texas but has been unable to do so because of a 1954 Agreement between its predecessor and Defendants City of Palestine (“Palestine”) and Anderson County, Texas (“Anderson County”) has prevented it from leaving.   Union Pacific filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted, holding that the 1954 Agreement was expressly and impliedly preempted. After the district court entered judgment, Palestine and Anderson County filed suit in Texas state court seeking to enforce the 1955 Judgment which had approved the 1954 Agreement.   Defendants appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Union Pacific and the denials of their motion to dismiss for failure to join a necessary party, motion for judgment on the pleadings, and cross-motion for summary judgment.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment for Union Pacific after determining that federal law preempts the statutorily mandated contractual agreements between the parties, both expressly and as applied. The court explained that there is no requirement for contemporaneous movement of property related to the rails for the regulation to be preempted. If the facilities or services—in any non-incidental way—relate to the movement of property by rail, they are preempted by the ICCTA.  Further, the court held that the district court properly determined that the Anti-Injunction Act does not bar Union Pacific from seeking declaratory relief. View "Union Pac. RR v. City of Palestine" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a 1983 civil rights complaint against various employees of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) who worked at the Wallace Pack Unit. Plaintiff, who is Muslim, alleged that when he was evacuated from the Stringfellow Unit (a state prison) to the Wallace Pack Unit due to Hurricane Harvey, he was not provided with kosher meals, even though such meals were received by similarly situated Jewish inmates.   The district court granted Defendants’ summary judgment motion. The court noted that Plaintiff had never submitted an amended complaint, and it explained that it could not consider any new allegations that Plaintiff had presented in his response to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.   The Fifth Circuit previously instructed the district court to make sure that, on remand, Plaintiff had an “adequate opportunity to cure the inadequacies in his pleading,” despite his status as a pro se litigant. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred by not giving him an opportunity to cure the inadequacies in his complaint.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded explaining that the district court read the court’s mandate too narrowly. The court wrote that the record indicates that the district court only explicitly “informed” Plaintiff of its requirement that a motion for leave to amend must be accompanied by a proposed amended complaint. For a pro se litigant, such a denial of a motion to amend is not, by itself, an adequate opportunity to cure. At a minimum, the district court should have construed Plaintiff’s reply to Defendants’ answer as a proposed amended complaint, which it should have accepted. View "Lozano v. Schubert" on Justia Law

Petitioner was ordered to be removed from the United States in absentia on June 23, 2006. On August 26, 2019, Petitioner, represented by counsel, filed a motion to reopen the removal proceedings and rescind the in-absentia removal order. The immigration judge (“IJ”) denied that motion, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed. Petitioner petitioned the court to review that affirmance, arguing that the BIA erred in determining that she was not entitled to equitable tolling of the statutory deadline for filing a motion to reopen because, although she had shown exceptional circumstances, she had not shown that she had pursued her rights diligently.   The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition to reopen. The court explained that it has authority to review only the final decision of the BIA unless the underlying decision of the IJ influenced the BIA’s decision. Here, the court explained that even accepting arguendo that Petitioner was prevented from participating in the 2006 proceedings or seeking that they are reopened by her abusive partner and that she was traumatized and unable to seek legal help for some time after escaping the abuse, Petitioner admits that she obtained legal representation—from the very same lawyer representing her here—more than two years before filing her motion to reopen the removal proceedings. Thus, the court cannot conclude that the BIA abused its discretion in finding that Petitioner failed to act with reasonable diligence in pursuing her rights. View "Masin-Ventura v. Garland" on Justia Law

The State of Texas sought to enjoin the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo from holding live-called and electronic bingo. The district court granted the injunction and the Fifth Circuit upheld it under its prior decisions.   In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Texas v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, 955 F.3d 508 (5th Cir. 2020), overruled by No. 20- 493, 2022 WL 2135494 (2022), the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court wrote that the Supreme Court granted the Pueblo’s petition and rejected Texas’s contention that Congress has allowed all of the state’s gaming laws to operate as surrogate federal law enforceable on the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo Reservation.   Under the Court’s interpretation of the Restoration Act, “if a gaming activity is prohibited by Texas law”—that is, absolutely “banned in Texas”—then “it is also prohibited on tribal land as a matter of federal law.” But if the gaming activity is merely regulated by Texas law—that is, “by fixing the time, place, and manner in which the game may be conducted”—then it’s only “subject to tribal regulation” and “the terms and conditions set forth in federal law, including [the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act] to the extent it is applicable.” View "State of TX v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner alleged that the Angolan government identified her as a supporter of the independence movement after she attended a church-organized, pro-independence rally in 2016. Soon thereafter, three armed men in government uniforms broke into her home and, in front of her children, beat and raped her, leading to a three-day hospital stay. Petitioner claimed, in her asylum application and in sworn testimony before an IJ, that she was never formally a member of FLEC, but rather has only supported independence through peaceful protest and organizing, which is a family tradition of sorts for many Cabindans. However, the IJ interpreted unsworn, nonverbatim statements from Petitioner’s credible fear interview (CFI) as indicating that Petitioner was a member of FLEC. The BIA found this adverse credibility finding reasonable, and affirmed.   The primary issue before the Fifth Circuit was whether the BIA erred in upholding the IJ’s adverse credibility finding. The Fifth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review, vacated the decisions of the BIA and IJ denying Petitioner’s application for asylum and CAT relief, and remanded. The court explained that the BIA and IJ relied heavily on an unsupported conclusion that Petitioner is not a credible witness. At the same time, there appears to be little dispute that, if Petitioner’s claims are true, she would be entitled to asylum under 8 U.S.C. Section 1158(b)(1)(A). As such, the court concluded that the adverse credibility finding is not supported by specific and cogent reasons derived from the record. View "Ndudzi v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Independent Pharmacies Association (“LIPA”) sued Express Scripts on behalf of its members, seeking a declaratory judgment on whether La. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sections 22:1860.1 and 46:2625 are preempted by Medicare Part D.1 Express Scripts moved to dismiss LIPA’s request for declaratory judgment regarding the reimbursement provision for failure to state a claim, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), on the basis that Medicare Part D preempts the reimbursement provision for prescriptions covered by Part D plans The district court concluded, however, that Express Scripts failed “to meet its burden of showing preemption or any other basis for dismissal.” Express Scripts moved to certify the order denying its motion to dismiss for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. Section1292(b). The district court granted certification,   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order concluding that the court lacks both federal question and diversity jurisdiction. The court explained that here, LIPA seeks a declaration that Express Scripts’ state law and related contractual obligation to reimburse LIPA’s member pharmacies for the provider fee is not preempted by federal law. Applying the well-pleaded complaint rule requires the court to imagine a hypothetical coercive lawsuit brought by Express Scripts against LIPA’s member pharmacies. But none is conceivable, thus, because Express Scripts has no possible ground for a coercive lawsuit, no federal question arises for purposes of jurisdiction in LIPA’s declaratory judgment case. Accordingly, the court concluded that LIPA must make the same showing to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. View "LA Indep Pharmacies v. Express Scripts" on Justia Law

The SEC accused Defendant of violating antifraud and registration provisions of the Securities Act and antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. Defendant neither admitted nor denied those allegations but consented to a judgment containing four relevant prongs of relief. The SEC asked for “disgorgement” in that amount and calculated the prejudgment interest at $424,375.38. It did not specify the appropriate civil penalty but requested that the court impose one of the options in the highest tier allowed by statute.   The court entered final judgment ordering Defendant to pay $1,901,480 in “disgorgement” and $424,375.38 in prejudgment interest. It also imposed a civil penalty after concluding that Defendant’s conduct merited the highest amount provided by the Exchange Act   Defendant appealed each of those orders and the denial of an evidentiary hearing. He says the lack of an evidentiary hearing denied him due process. He also renews three substantive challenges to the district court’s remedies. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment order.   The court explained that none of Defendant’s challenges to the district court’s remedies has merit. He has foreclosed some of them by failing to raise them timely or to raise them properly. And Congress has foreclosed his position on the availability of disgorgement without tracing or a profit-generating res. The district court had authority to impose each element of its remedies, and it did not abuse its discretion in doing so. View "SEC v. Hallam" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), anticipating Petitioner Gulfport Energy Corporation’s (“Gulfport”) insolvency, issued four orders purporting to bind the petitioner to continue performing its gas transit contracts even if it rejected them during bankruptcy. Petitioner asked the Fifth Circuit to vacate those orders. The court granted the petitions and vacated the orders holding that FERC cannot countermand a debtor’s bankruptcy-law rights or the bankruptcy court’s powers.   Gulfport attacked attacks FERC’s orders on two fronts. Gulfport first says that FERC lacked authority to issue them. It then contends that the orders are unlawful because they violate the Bankruptcy Code and purport to restrain Gulfport’s bankruptcy-law rights and the powers of the bankruptcy court. The court explained that FERC did have authority to issue the orders. But because the orders rested on an inexplicable misunderstanding of rejection, the court must vacate them all. The court wrote that each order rests on the incorrect premise that rejecting a filed-rate contract in bankruptcy is something more than a breach of contract.   The court further wrote that FERC can decide whether actual modification or abrogation of a filed-rate contract would serve the public interest. It even may do so before a bankruptcy filing. But rejection is just a breach; it does not modify or abrogate the filed rate, which is used to calculate the counterparty’s damage. So FERC cannot prevent rejection. It cannot bind a debtor to continue paying the filed rate after rejection. And it cannot usurp the bankruptcy court’s power to decide Gulfport’s rejection motions. View "Gulfport Energy Corporation v. FERC" on Justia Law

Petitioners Wages and White Lion Investments, LLC, d/b/a Triton Distribution (“Triton”) and Vapetasia, LLC (“Vapetasia”) sought to market flavored nicotine-containing e-liquids for use in open-system e-cigarette devices. Petitioners needed to submit premarket tobacco product applications as required by 21 U.S.C. Section 387j—which the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) deemed applicable to e-cigarette tobacco products. FDA denied the requested marketing authorizations, finding that Petitioners failed to offer reliable and robust evidence (such as randomized controlled trials or longitudinal studies) to overcome the risks of youth addiction and show a benefit to adult smokers. Petitioners sought review of those marketing denial orders (“MDOs”), and prior to the consolidation of the two cases. Petitioners argued that the FDA lacks the authority to impose a comparative efficacy requirement and that FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by “requiring” scientific studies.   The Eleventh Circuit denied the petitions for review. The court explained that Congress passed the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (“TCA”) in an active effort to protect public health. Relevant here, the Deeming Rule subjected e-cigarette manufacturers to the TCA’s prior authorization requirement—manufacturers of “new tobacco product[s]” must submit premarket tobacco product applications (“PMTAs”). The court held that the FDA’s consideration of the lack of cessation as a risk and comparing that risk between new tobacco products and old tobacco products “fall[s] squarely within the ambit of the FDA’s expertise and merit[s] deference.”  As such, the court cannot say that FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by disagreeing with Petitioners as to the significance of the evidence they presented. View "Wages and White Lion Investmen v. FDA" on Justia Law

An officer performed a traffic stop on Defendant in the middle of the night. Having been given reason to suspect that Defendant who revealed an aggravated robbery conviction, had a gun, the officer handcuffed him and asked where it was. Defendant answered, and the officer’s partner arrived later to find a .40 caliber pistol and .37 ounces of marijuana in Defendant’s backpack between the front seats of the van he drove. Before Defendant divulged that information, the officer did not provide Miranda warnings.   A grand jury indicted Defendant for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant then moved to “suppress all statements [he made] in response to the officer’s questioning once he was in handcuffs.” The district court granted the suppression motion. The government filed an interlocutory appeal from the district court’s judgment and the trial has been continued pending resolution of the appeal.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that the admissibility of Defendant’s unwarned statements, therefore, depends on whether he was “in custody” as contemplated by Miranda at the time he offered them.   Here, based on the totality of the circumstances a reasonable person in Defendant’s position would not have equated the restraint on his freedom of movement with formal arrest. But even if Defendant could have reasonably thought that he was in custody for Miranda purposes after being handcuffed, the environment in which the officer questioned him was not tantamount to a station house interrogation as contemplated by Miranda. View "USA v. Coulter" on Justia Law