Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After an alleged collision with a mail vehicle, Plaintiff submitted a claim to the U.S. Postal Service under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), seeking about $15,000 for damage to his truck. The postal service denied his claim because Plaintiff’s insurance covered it. Under the FTCA, this triggered a six-month window in which Plaintiff could either seek reconsideration or sue. He did neither. Instead, over eight months later, Plaintiff filed a second claim with the postal service, now seeking $2 million for back injuries from the same incident. The district court dismissed his suit as time-barred and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.   The court explained that Plaintiff’s first SF-95 presented his entire claim based on the November 14, 2019, accident. This claim could have been amended to include personal injury damages or appealed—all consistent with the procedures outlined in the FTCA. When the USPS denied that claim on March 26, 2020, the six-month clock started running, and it stopped ticking on September 26, 2020. During that time, Plaintiff neither sought reconsideration nor filed suit. Accordingly, the district court correctly ruled that Plaintiff’s action is untimely and his claim is, therefore “forever barred.” View "Broussard v. USA" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)  brought an enforcement action against BP, alleging the company capitalized on the hurricane-induced chaos in commodities markets by devising a scheme to manipulate the market for natural gas. BP sought judicial review of FERC’s order finding that BP engaged in market manipulation and imposing a $20 million civil penalty.   The Fifth Circuit explained that because FERC predicated its penalty assessment on its erroneous position that it had jurisdiction over all (and not just some) of BP’s transactions, the court must remand for a reassessment of the penalty in the light of the court’s jurisdictional holding. Thus, the court granted in part and denied in part BP’s petition for review and remanded to the agency for reassessment of the penalty.   The court explained that it has rejected FERC’s expansive assertion that it has jurisdiction over any manipulative trade affecting the price of an NGA transaction. The court, however, reaffirmed the Commission’s authority over transactions directly involving natural gas in interstate commerce under the NGA. The court further determined that there was substantial evidence to support FERC’s finding that BP manipulated the market for natural gas. The court found that FERC’s reasoning in imposing a penalty was not arbitrary and capricious, though the court concluded that FERC’s reliance on an erroneous understanding of its own jurisdiction necessitates remand for recalculation of the penalty. Finally, the court held that neither separation of functions nor statute of limitations issues justify overturning the Commission’s order. View "BP America v. FERC" on Justia Law

in 2008, Congress passed the Consumer Financial Protection Act, which created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and transferred to the Bureau administrative and enforcement authority over 18 federal statutes which prior to the Act were overseen by seven different agencies. In 2016, then-Director of the CFPB proposed a rule to regulate payday, vehicle title, and certain high-cost installment loans (the “Payday Lending Rule”). The Rule's “Payment Provisions” limit a lender’s ability to obtain loan repayments via preauthorized account access.Plaintiffs sued the Bureau seeking an order seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the Payday Lending Rule under the theory that it violates the separation of powers doctrine.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision granting summary judgment to the CFPB in total, finding that Congress’s cession of its power of the purse to the Bureau violates the Appropriations Clause and the Constitution’s underlying structural separation of powers. View "Cmty Fin Assoc America v. CFPB" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants, forty-eight owners of property located near the former Dresser Industrial Valve Operations Facility (“Dresser Facility”) in Rapides Parish, Louisiana, appeal the district court’s order dismissing the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (“LDEQ”) as improperly joined and denying their motion for remand. They further challenge the injunction issued by the district court against Plaintiff M.G. from pursuing a proceeding in state court.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s ruling. The court concluded that Defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing that LDEQ was improperly joined. Although the district court carefully reviewed certain Louisiana constitutional provisions and statutes in determining that Plaintiffs had not stated a cognizable claim against LDEQ, the court noted that at least one Louisiana appellate court has recognized that LDEQ may be sued in tort for its negligence under circumstances similar to those alleged by Plaintiffs. Additionally, it is unclear whether LDEQ would have discretionary immunity under La. R.S. Section 9:2798.1 in this case under the court’s standard for determining improper joinder, any ambiguity or uncertainty in the controlling state law must be resolved in Plaintiffs’ favor. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal without prejudice of LDEQ and its denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for remand. View "D & J Invst of Cenla v. Baker Hughes" on Justia Law

Ultra Petroleum Corp. (HoldCo) and its affiliates, including its subsidiary Ultra Resources, Inc. (OpCo), entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy deep in the hole. But during the bankruptcy process, these debtors (collectively, Ultra) hit it big—as natural gas prices soared, they became supremely solvent. Ultra proposed a $2.5 billion bankruptcy plan. It provided that OpCo’s creditors would be paid—in full and in cash—their outstanding principal and all interest that had accrued before bankruptcy, plus interest on both at the Federal Judgment Rate for the duration of the bankruptcy proceeding. Two groups of creditors complain that the plan falls some $387 million short.   The issue on appeal is whether the Bankruptcy Code precludes the creditors’ claims for the Make-Whole Amount; second, even if it does, whether the traditional solvent-debtor exception applies; and third, whether post-judgment interest is to be calculated at the contractual or Federal Judgment rate.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s judgment. The court held the Bankruptcy Code disallows the Make-Whole Amount as the economic equivalent of unmatured interest. But because Congress has not clearly abrogated the solvent-debtor exception, the court held that it applies to this case. And the solvent-debtor exception demands that Ultra pay what it promised now that it is financially capable. The court further held, given Ultra’s solvency, post-petition interest is to be calculated according to the agreed-upon contractual rate. View "Ultra Petro Corp v. Ad Hoc Com" on Justia Law

Petitioner’s filed a petition in the district court under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 challenging his state convictions for armed robbery, kidnapping, and purse snatching on various constitutional grounds. The district court dismissed the petition as time-barred and denied Petitioner a certificate of appealability (COA). Petitioner then asked our court to grant him a COA on both the district court’s procedural ruling as well as the substantive claims in his Section 2254 petition.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the COA and dismissed the appeal. The court explained that Petitioner’s “procedural-only” COA is barred by Section 2253. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that such a COA is invalid because it says nothing at all about the Constitution. The court further reasoned that while it can also issue a valid COA in place of the invalid one, that does not apply here. Here, having examined the constitutional claims in Petitioner’s Section 2254 petition, the court cannot say he has made a substantial showing as to any of them. View "Pierre v. Hooper" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of numerous crimes stemming from their participation in a violent New Orleans street gang. Defendants filed timely notices of appeal, raising a number of issues. The Fifth Circuit affirmed their convictions in large part, vacated them in part, and remanded. The court explained that because the jury may have improperly relied on the charged RICO conspiracy as a predicate for Defendants’ Section 924 convictions, the court vacated some of the Defendants’ convictions under Counts 3, 6, 8, 11, 13, 16, and 18 and remanded for further proceedings. For similar reasons, the court vacated some of the Defendants’ restitution orders and remanded. Otherwise, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Hankton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff fled from three officers investigating drug activity. An officer chased Plaintiff and commanded him to stop. Eventually, Plaintiff stopped and turned suddenly toward the officer. The officer feared Plaintiff was reaching for a weapon, so he tased him. Plaintiff and his grandmother sued Harris County and the officer. The district court dismissed the Monell claim against Harris County for failure to state a claim and granted summary judgment to the officer based on qualified immunity.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that to establish Monell liability on a failure-to-train theory, a plaintiff must prove that: “(1) the city failed to train or supervise the officers involved; (2) there is a causal connection between the alleged failure to supervise or train and the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise constituted deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”   Here, first, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the County failed to train the officers involved on the constitutional use of tasers. Second, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a causal connection between any failure to train officers and the alleged violation here. Third, has not plausibly alleged that any failure to train constituted deliberate indifference. The court further explained that Plaintiff concededly ran from police, then stopped suddenly and turned toward the pursuing officer. Thus, neither Newman nor Darden involves materially similar facts and hence cannot clearly establish the law. View "Henderson v. Harris County" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of three counts of producing, distributing, receiving, and possessing an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1466A(a)(1); five counts of using an interactive computer service to transport obscene matters, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1462(a); and one count of engaging in the business of selling or transferring obscene matters, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1466(a). On appeal, Defendant challenged his conviction and sentence.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed convictions on Counts 2 through 9, reversed the conviction on Count 1, and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that the fact that the charged drawings here do not depict real minors does not render Arthur’s convictions on Counts 1, 8, and 9 unconstitutional. However, as to Count 1, the court wrote it was not satisfied that the charged image, which was admitted at trial as Government’s Exhibit 10A, is “patently offensive.”   While the charged images in Counts 8 and 9 are both detailed, color, cartoonlike drawings depicting pre-adolescent girls being forced to perform fellatio on disembodied and engorged male genitalia, the charged image in Count 1 is a simple black and white pencil or charcoal drawing with minimal detail depicting an adolescent girl alone, reclining and apparently masturbating. Importantly, unlike the children depicted in the images in Counts 8 and 9, there is no indication that the subject of the image in Count 1 is being forced to perform a sexual act. View "USA v. Arthur" on Justia Law

Two former students of Tulane University, on behalf of a putative class of current and former students, sued the University for failing to provide a partial refund of tuition and fees after Tulane switched from in-person instruction with access to on-campus services to online, off-campus instruction during the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court agreed with Tulane that the student's complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court concluded that the claim is not barred as a claim of educational malpractice because the Students do not challenge the quality of the education received but the product received. Second, the court rejected Tulane’s argument that the breach-of-contract claim is foreclosed by an express agreement between the parties because the agreement at issue plausibly does not govern refunds in this circumstance. And third, the court concluded that Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Tulane breached an express contract promising in-person instruction and on-campus facilities because Plaintiffs fail to point to any explicit language evidencing that promise. But the court held that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged implied-in-fact promises for in-person instruction and on-campus facilities. Moreover, the court found that the Students’ alternative claim for unjust enrichment may proceed at this early stage. Finally, genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Plaintiffs saw and agreed to the A&DS preclude reliance on the agreement at this stage. Thus, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a claim of conversion. View "Jones v. Admin of the Tulane Educ" on Justia Law