Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioners Shrimpers and Fishermen of the RGV, Sierra Club, and Save RGV from LNG (collectively, “Petitioners”) challenge the issuance of a Clean Water Act (“CWA”) permit by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”). Petitioners allege that the Corps’ permit issuance violated the CWA and its implementing regulations.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that the Corps approved the least environmentally damaging practicable alternative presented before it during the permitting process and did not act arbitrarily in its evaluation of pipeline construction impacts and mitigation efforts. The court explained Petitioners’ first set of arguments centers on the Corps’ estimation that restoration will occur within one year. They state that the Corps did not consider the full construction period when quantifying the duration of impacts, which they allege is improper. However, they supply no evidence that the construction period must be, or even that it typically is, included when assessing whether impacts are temporary.   Further, the Corps’ analysis also comports with the EIS, which estimates that herbaceous vegetation will regenerate “within 1 to 3 years.” The EIS estimation necessarily includes the finding that vegetation may revegetate in one year, as the Corps concluded. Finally, the EPA feedback Petitioners relied upon does not consider the approved compensatory mitigation plan or the special conditions of the permit because the comments are from 2015 and 2018— well before the current permit (and even the original permit) was approved. The Corps considered this feedback and aligned its ultimate approach with the EPA’s recommendations. View "Shrimpers v. United States Army Corps" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 45-year sentence for attempting to produce child pornography. The district court enhanced his sentence based on Defendant’s prior aggravated sexual assault of a child under Texas law. Defendant contested the enhancement because, while the Texas crime can be committed against minors up to 16 years old, he claims the federal predicate offense only includes victims younger than 16. Defendant’s basic argument is this: because the Texas statute applies to 16-year-old victims, it criminalizes more conduct than Section 2251(e), which he claims applies only to 15- year-old victims.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the federal enhancement statute at issue, 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(e), specifically allows increased sentences for state sex crimes against minors up to 17 years old. See 18 U.S.C. Section 2256(1). The court rejected Defendant’s argument explaining Section 2251(e) is located in Chapter 110 of Title 18. “For the purposes of [Chapter 110],” the term “‘minor’ means any person under the age of eighteen years.” Section 2256(1). So, it is not true that the Texas statute “sweeps more broadly” than Section 2251(e). To the contrary, it sweeps more narrowly. The Texas crime applies to victims who are 16 years old and younger, whereas the predicate federal offense extends to 17-year-old victims. Consequently, Defendant’s Texas conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child qualifies as an enhancing offense under Section 2251(e). View "USA v. Grzywinski" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs’ son was caught in a sting operation conducted by the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force for the City of Conroe, Texas. Via a dating app, Plaintiffs’ son agreed to meet up with a 14-year-old boy—who was actually an undercover Task Force detective. After circling the meeting spot for two hours, all the while communicating with the detective via the dating app, Plaintiffs’ son was arrested and later charged with online solicitation of a minor. He posted bail and was released. Two days later, Plaintiffs’ son committed suicide by carbon monoxide poisoning. Thereafter, his parents sued numerous defendants in a Section 1983 lawsuit alleging claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution, municipal liability, and state law negligence claims. The district court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court did not err in granting Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs do not state plausible claims against the detective or the City of Conroe under Sections 1983 and 1985, as the detective had probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs’ son and therefore did not violate his constitutional rights. Plaintiffs’ municipal liability claim against the City of Conroe fails for the same reason. The Wellpath Defendants owed Plaintiffs’ son no duty upon his release from custody, thus defeating the Plaintiffs’ Sections 1983 and 1985 claims against them. And finally, Plaintiffs cannot show the requisite causation to sustain their state law negligence claims. View "Petersen v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for a construction company, Performance Contractors (Performance). She sued under Title VII alleging sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment to the construction company. On appeal Plaintiff argued that when Performance prevented her from working at elevation because she was a woman, it effectively demoted her, which amounts to an adverse employment action. Second, Plaintiff argued that her hostile-work environment claim survives summary judgment because Performance knew (or should have known) about the severe or pervasive harassment, and because Performance is not entitled to the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense. Third, she argues that a reasonable jury could find that Performance retaliated against her for opposing conduct that she reasonably believed would violate Title VI.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded concluding that Plaintiff raised genuine material fact issues on each claim. The court held that a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff was suspended and later fired because of her rejection of other employees’ harassment. Further, the court held that Performance was not entitled to summary judgment because reasonable jurors could find that Plaintiff was kept on the ground because she was a woman, and that she otherwise would have been allowed to work at elevation. Moreover, there is a material fact issue about whether Performance effectively implemented its anti-harassment policy. View "Wallace v. Performance Contractors" on Justia Law

Appellant, his law firm, and Amberson Natural Resources (“ANR”) (collectively “Amberson”) moved for rehearing by the Fifth Circuit. Though successful in convincing a majority of the panel that it has authority to consider the argument that a claim was not arbitrable, Amberson then lost on the merits of that argument. Amberson alleged that the Fifth Circuit erred in three ways: (1) it should not have considered the arbitrator’s fact findings in deciding the validity of the state court’s compelling of arbitration; (2) the state court record does not support that all the claims were intertwined; and (3) the appellees’ state court pleadings do not support the court’s finding of alter ego.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for rehearing. The court explained that Amberson cites no Texas caselaw that the evidence to support the validity of interlocutory orders reviewed on appeal after a final judgment must come only from the part of the record that existed when the orders were entered. Moreover, Amberson’s briefing, though, did not meaningfully dispute the accuracy of the arbitrator’s fact-findings. The arbitrator’s opinion contained the best summary of the facts. Absent any argument that the findings were erroneous, acceptance of the summary was proper and undue deference was not given to the arbitrator as to fact-findings. View "In the Matter of: Jon Amberson" on Justia Law

An individual and an advocacy group seek to appeal from the denial of a motion to quash two grand jury subpoenas and an order compelling compliance with one of them. There is no jurisdiction for appeals challenging a grand jury subpoena for production of documents unless (1) the appellant has been held in contempt, or (2) a client-intervenor asserts that documents in the possession of a subpoenaed, disinterested third party are protected by attorney-client privilege.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal explaining that neither exception applied. The court explained that the subpoenaed documents are in the hands of Appellants. They are interested third parties in that they are being investigated for witness tampering. They have a direct and personal interest in suppressing the documents that could potentially corroborate the witness tampering accusation. Consequently, Appellants obviously have “a sufficient stake in the proceeding to risk contempt by refusing compliance.” Accordingly, the court wrote it lacks jurisdiction over the appeal, and Appellants must either comply with the subpoena or be held in contempt to seek the court’s review. View "In re: Grand Jury Subpoena" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed a law enforcement officer violated his Fourth Amendment rights by punching him in the face, knocking him to the pavement, then standing over him for a time. The officer punched Plaintiff because he had not moved his vehicle quickly enough at an airport passenger pickup area. The district court dismissed on the pleadings.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment for the officer, and affirmed judgment for the city. The court concluded that the allegations in the complaint present a plausible claim that, viewed objectively, the excessive force used by the law enforcement officer was not just to insist the vehicle be moved, but it constituted a seizure that would prolong the encounter. On the other hand, Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege a municipal policy to support a claim against the city defendant. View "Vardeman v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

This insurance coverage dispute arises from underlying litigation in a single-vehicle accident that led to a lawsuit by J.O. against his employer, Riata Cattle Company, Inc. (“Riata”). J.O. sued Riata in Texas state court, alleging that he suffered bodily injury when Riata’s truck, which he was driving, malfunctioned and crashed due to Riata’s failure to repair and maintain it. J.O. also alleged that Riata committed negligence and gross negligence by failing to provide him with safety equipment, failing to warn him of any dangers, failing to inspect or repair the equipment, and other negligence theories. Riata sought coverage defense from its auto liability insurer, National Liability & Fire Insurance Company (“National Liability”), which is currently defending Riata in the underlying litigation under a reservation of rights letter. National Liability subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court, seeking a determination that it owes Riata neither a defense nor indemnity under the insurance policy (the “Policy”). National Liability contends it is entitled to a declaratory judgment because the Policy excludes coverage for employees of Riata. Riata seems to concede this argument but contends that the “Form F” endorsement on the Policy compels National Liability to defend and indemnify Riata.The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that J.O. is an employee of Riata, and according to the applicable Policy, National Liability is excluded from providing insurance coverage to Riata for the underlying litigation. And Form F does not change the employee exclusion in the Policy. View "Ntl L & Fire Ins Co v. Riata Cattle Co" on Justia Law

As part of his efforts to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, President Biden issued a series of sweeping vaccination mandates. This challenge concerns four actions that together constitute the “federal contractor mandate.” Having established that an injunction was warranted, the district court set out that the injunction would only apply “to all contracts, grants, or any other like an agreement by any other name between the Plaintiff States and the national government.” It then stayed the case pending appellate review.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of the injunction. The court wrote that it cannot rule on the efficacy of any vaccine, the wisdom of the President’s action, or even whether or not this action would, in fact, increase economy and efficiency in federal contracting. The court wrote that it was asked: where Congress has not authorized the issuance of this mandate, whether the President may nonetheless exercise this power. The court held he may not. The court explained that the President’s use of procurement regulations to reach through an employing contractor to force obligations on individual employees is truly unprecedented. As such, Executive Order 14042 is unlawful, and the Plaintiff States have consequently demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits. View "State of Louisiana v. Biden" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an Eritrean citizen, was forcibly conscripted into the Eritrean National Service, an open-ended requirement of compulsory service, and made to work as an armed guard at a highway checkpoint through which Eritrean security forces brought detainees. Several years later, Petitioner escaped and made his way to America, where he applied for asylum and withholding of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) concluded that Petitioner was ineligible because he assisted in the persecution of captives by impeding their escape at the checkpoint.   The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition, finding that BIA’s determination is supported by substantial evidence and the record does not compel a contrary result. The court explained that to succeed, Petitioner must show that “the record evidence compels a conclusion contrary to the agency’s determination.” The court held that none of the evidence Petitioner presented compelled the court to conclude that no reasonable factfinder could agree with the BIA that Petitioner failed to meet his burden of rebutting the application of the persecutor bar. The court explained that its decision does not affect the IJ’s unchallenged grant of CAT relief. View "Gebrgzabher v. Garland" on Justia Law