Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) disapproval of State Implementation Plans (SIPs) submitted by Louisiana, Texas, and Mississippi under the Clean Air Act (CAA) to address interstate air pollution. The EPA disapproved these SIPs, arguing that they did not meet the requirements of the Good Neighbor Provision, which mandates that states prevent their emissions from significantly contributing to nonattainment or interfering with maintenance of national air quality standards in downwind states.The lower courts had not previously reviewed this case. The case was directly brought to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, where the petitioners sought to vacate the EPA's disapprovals. The petitioners argued that the EPA's actions were arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent with the CAA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied the petitions for review from Louisiana and Texas, finding that the EPA's disapprovals were justified based on the states' own data and interpretations of the Good Neighbor Provision. The court concluded that the EPA had reasonably considered the relevant issues and provided adequate explanations for its decisions.However, the court granted the petition for review from Mississippi, vacated the EPA's disapproval of Mississippi's SIP, and remanded the matter to the EPA. The court found that the EPA's disapproval of Mississippi's SIP was arbitrary and capricious because it was based on updated data that was not available to Mississippi at the time of its SIP submission. The court held that the EPA failed to reasonably explain its decision to use this updated data in an outcome-determinative manner. View "Texas v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Ellen Williams purchased a residential property in Houma, Louisiana, which was mortgaged by Flagstar Bank. Since Williams did not insure the home, Flagstar obtained a lender-placed hazard insurance policy from Integon National Insurance Company at Williams's expense. The policy named Flagstar as the "Insured" and Williams as the "Borrower." Williams paid all premiums and complied with all policy requirements. The policy included a provision stating that if the loss amount exceeded Flagstar's insurable interest, Integon would pay Williams any residual amount due for the loss, not exceeding the policy limit.In August 2021, Williams's home was damaged by Hurricane Ida. Although Integon inspected the property and exchanged repair estimates with Williams, it ultimately refused to pay for the full property repairs. Williams sued Integon in the 32nd Judicial District Court for the Parish of Terrebonne, asserting breach-of-contract and bad-faith claims under Louisiana law. Integon removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, arguing that Williams lacked standing to sue under the policy. The district court agreed with Integon, ruling that Williams was not a named insured, additional insured, or third-party beneficiary, and dismissed the case without allowing Williams to amend her complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the policy's loss payment provision clearly manifested an intent to benefit Williams, provided a certain benefit when the loss amount exceeded Flagstar's insurable interest, and that this benefit was not merely incidental. The court held that Williams might be able to plead plausible facts supporting her status as a third-party beneficiary. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to allow Williams to amend her complaint. View "Williams v. Integon National Insurance" on Justia Law

Trevor Dylan Lehew pleaded guilty to Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Child under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c). As part of his plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal, with certain exceptions. Lehew challenged a $5,000 special assessment imposed under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, arguing that the appeal waiver did not apply because he was indigent and that the special assessment exceeded the statutory maximum.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas accepted Lehew's guilty plea and sentenced him to 420 months of imprisonment, a $100 special assessment, the $5,000 JVTA special assessment, and supervised release. The court did not explicitly discuss Lehew's indigency during the sentencing hearing but adopted the presentence investigation report (PSR), which detailed Lehew's financial situation and potential future earnings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Lehew argued that the district court erred by imposing the JVTA special assessment without determining his indigency and that his appeal waiver did not bar this challenge. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the appeal waiver barred Lehew's challenge. The court noted that the district court implicitly found Lehew to be non-indigent by adopting the PSR, which included information about his financial history and future earning potential. The court held that the district court conducted the requisite analysis by adopting the PSR and that Lehew's appeal waiver expressly waived any challenges to the determination of any monetary penalty or obligation.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Lehew could not appeal the JVTA special assessment as a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum and that his appeal waiver barred his appeal. View "United States v. Lehew" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Perry Spriggs was struck by a U.S. Postal Service vehicle while riding his bicycle on Calliope Street in New Orleans on March 23, 2022. On March 23, 2023, Spriggs faxed his medical records and a signed Standard Form 95 (SF-95) to the Postal Service, addressed to Tara D. Lennix, a Louisiana District Tort Claims/Collections Specialist, at the correct fax number. Spriggs received a fax confirmation stating successful transmission. On March 22, 2024, Spriggs filed a lawsuit against the United States for personal injury and property damage from the accident.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed Spriggs’s claims with prejudice, granting the United States' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court found no affirmative evidence of receipt of the SF-95 by the Postal Service, relying on declarations from Postal Service employees stating they did not receive the fax. The court also dismissed the claims under Rule 12(b)(6) due to the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations for presentment to the agency.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in disregarding the fax confirmation sheet as probative evidence of presentment under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The Fifth Circuit held that a fax confirmation sheet indicating successful transmission to the correct recipient is probative evidence that the FTCA’s presentment requirement has been satisfied. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Spriggs v. United States" on Justia Law

Texas Game Warden Dustin Delgado arrested Joshua McClain for driving while intoxicated after observing his truck swerve and conducting field sobriety tests. McClain later sued Delgado for false arrest. The district court denied Delgado qualified immunity. However, because McClain did not carry his burden to show Delgado violated his constitutional rights, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially reviewed the case. Delgado moved for summary judgment on both the false arrest and malicious prosecution claims, arguing that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court granted the motion for the malicious prosecution claim but denied it for the false arrest claim. Delgado appealed the denial of qualified immunity for the false arrest claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Delgado had reasonable suspicion to stop McClain based on his swerving and probable cause to arrest him after observing clues of intoxication during field sobriety tests. The court found that McClain did not establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Delgado's conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's denial of Delgado's motion for summary judgment, granting Delgado qualified immunity. View "McClain v. Delgado" on Justia Law

Three Coast Guard servicemembers, Eric Jackson, Alaric Stone, and Michael Marcenelle, objected to a COVID-19 vaccination mandate issued by the Coast Guard, which operates under the Department of Homeland Security. Their requests for religious accommodations were denied, and they faced reprimands for refusing the vaccination. They filed a class action lawsuit against the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Defense, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and the Assistant Commandant for Human Resources, alleging violations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the First Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the case as moot after the Department of Defense rescinded its vaccination mandate, and the Coast Guard followed suit. The Plaintiffs' motion for relief from final judgment was also denied, leading to their appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal de novo. The appellate court found that the case was not moot because the Coast Guard had not issued policies protecting unvaccinated servicemembers from discrimination, unlike the Navy, which had implemented such protections. The court noted that the Plaintiffs could still face adverse actions based on their vaccination status and that a court order could provide effective relief. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. Noem" on Justia Law

Highland Capital Management, L.P., a Dallas-based investment firm, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2019 due to numerous unpaid judgments and liabilities. During the bankruptcy proceedings, James Dondero, a co-founder, stepped down as a director and officer but continued as an unpaid portfolio manager. The unsecured creditors' committee and independent directors opposed Dondero's reorganization plans, leading to his resignation in October 2020. The bankruptcy court held Dondero in civil contempt and sanctioned him for obstructing the proceedings. The proposed reorganization plan included provisions to shield Highland Capital and associated entities from liability, including an Exculpation Provision and an Injunction Provision with a Gatekeeper Clause.The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan, but on direct appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the plan in part, striking certain non-debtors from the Exculpation Provision. The investment fund parties requested clarification on whether the same entities should be removed from the Gatekeeper Clause. The bankruptcy court conformed the plan by narrowing the definition of "Exculpated Parties" but did not change the definition of "Protected Parties" in the Gatekeeper Clause, leading to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the bankruptcy court failed to implement its instructions properly. The court held that the definition of "Protected Parties" in the Gatekeeper Clause must be narrowed to include only the Debtor, the Independent Directors for conduct within their duties, the Committee, and the members of the Committee in their official capacities. The court reversed the bankruptcy court's decision in part and remanded the case for the plan to be revised accordingly. View "Highland Capital Fund Advisors v. Highland Capital Management" on Justia Law

Jessie Hoffman was convicted of first-degree murder for the kidnapping, rape, and murder of Mary "Molly" Elliot in 1998 and sentenced to death. After exhausting all state and federal post-conviction remedies, his execution was delayed due to the unavailability of lethal injection drugs. In 2024, Louisiana adopted nitrogen hypoxia as a method of execution. Hoffman challenged this new method, arguing it violated the Eighth Amendment.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana granted Hoffman's motion for a preliminary injunction, preventing his execution by nitrogen hypoxia. The court concluded that Hoffman had exhausted his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and found that nitrogen hypoxia posed a substantial risk of superadding pain and suffering. The court suggested that execution by firing squad would be a reasonable alternative that would reduce the risk of severe pain.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Hoffman had indeed exhausted his administrative remedies. However, it disagreed with the district court's conclusion regarding the Eighth Amendment. The Fifth Circuit held that nitrogen hypoxia is painless and that the district court erred in suggesting that the Eighth Amendment requires a more painful method of execution, such as a firing squad. The court emphasized that the Eighth Amendment does not guarantee a painless death and that Hoffman failed to show that nitrogen hypoxia presented a substantial risk of severe pain compared to other methods.The Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, allowing Louisiana to proceed with Hoffman's execution by nitrogen hypoxia. View "Hoffman v. Westcott" on Justia Law

John Doe was found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) for an offense in Arlington County, Virginia, in 2014 and was committed to a state hospital in 2015. After his first job offer was rescinded due to his arrest and commitment, he changed his legal name and moved to Texas in 2020. In 2022, he was arrested based on a Virginia bench warrant for failure to appear but was released when Virginia declined extradition. In 2023, Doe received a job offer from Charter Communications, pending a background check by HireRight. HireRight reported that Doe had a criminal record and an active warrant, leading Charter to rescind the job offer.Doe filed a pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Charter, HireRight, and Paul Ferguson, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Arlington County, Virginia, alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed Doe’s claims, finding that his FCRA claim against Charter was barred as there is no private right of action against users of consumer reports, and his Fourteenth Amendment claim against Ferguson was duplicative of a previously litigated case in Virginia.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court agreed that Doe’s constitutional claims against Ferguson were duplicative and therefore frivolous. It also upheld the dismissal of Doe’s FCRA claim against Charter, interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(h)(8) to bar private enforcement of section 1681m in its entirety. The court found that Doe’s FCRA claim against HireRight and ADA claim against Charter were based on the allegation that the warrant was unlawful or inaccurate, which had already been addressed in the Virginia litigation. View "Doe v. Charter Communications" on Justia Law

In 2017, Dr. Oscar Lightner opened Jomori Health and Wellness in Houston, Texas, where he prescribed controlled substances to 97% of his patients, often without proper examinations. Many patients were brought in by "runners" who paid fees to reserve spots and later resold the prescribed pills. Andres Martinez, Jr., the office manager, collected these payments. Both Lightner and Martinez were indicted on drug-related charges under the Controlled Substances Act.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas tried the case. After a five-day trial, the jury found both defendants guilty on all counts. The district court sentenced each to 84 months of imprisonment. Martinez and Lightner appealed their convictions and sentences.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Martinez argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, but the court found that the evidence, including his interactions with runners and knowledge of Lightner's prescribing practices, was sufficient. Lightner raised several issues, including the jury instructions, alleged spoliation of evidence, and the denial of a motion to strike a witness's testimony. The court found no reversible error in these claims.The court also reviewed the sentencing enhancements applied to Lightner, including the calculation of drug weight, a two-level premises enhancement, and a four-level leadership enhancement. The court found that the evidence supported these enhancements and that any potential error was harmless given the substantial downward variance in Lightner's sentence.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, finding no reversible error in the convictions or sentences of Martinez and Lightner. View "United States v. Lightner" on Justia Law