Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case concerns attorney misconduct in the Court-Supervised Settlement Program established in the wake of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil rig disaster. Appellant, a Louisiana attorney representing oil spill claimants in the settlement program, was accused of funneling money to a settlement program staff attorney through improper referral payments. In a disciplinary proceeding, the en banc Eastern District of Louisiana found that Appellant’s actions violated the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct and suspended him from practicing law before the Eastern District of Louisiana for one year. Appellant appealed, arguing that the en banc court misapplied the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct and abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sanction.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the en banc court’s order suspending Appellant from the practice of law for one year each for violations of Rule 1.5(e) and 8.4(a). The court affirmed the en banc court’s holding that Appellant violated Rule 8.4(d). Finally, the court remanded to the en banc court for further proceedings, noting on remand, the court is free to impose on Appellant whatever sanction it sees fit for the 8.4(d) violation, including but not limited to its previous one-year suspension. The court explained that the en banc court misapplied Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(e) and 8.4(a) but not Rule 8.4(d). Additionally, the en banc court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a one-year suspension on Appellant for his violation of 8.4(d). View "In re Jonathan Andry" on Justia Law

This case arises from major flooding events in the Houston area in 2016 and 2017. Local political subdivisions sued the United States Army Corps of Engineers, seeking compliance with alleged regulatory obligations. The district court dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The fundamental issue in the case is whether the Corps has violated any enforceable, legal obligation in the management of the relevant dams and reservoirs. A potential source for obligations imposed on the Corps is the 2012 Water Control Manual (“WCM”) adopted by the Corps for flood control in the relevant watershed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that Section 702 of the APA has been satisfied in that the complaint alleges Plaintiffs have been aggrieved by agency action, that the suit is not one for money damages, and that the injury arises from an officer or employee who has acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of law. Further, the court held that the Tucker Act does not provide an “adequate remedy” to the County’s claims within the meaning of Section 704. Further, the court wrote that since the regulation does not specify when such conditions require the Corps to update a WCM, the Corps must exercise discretion in deciding when updating a WCM is necessary. Such discretion is antithetical to a mandatory duty. Thus the court concluded there is no discrete, mandatory duty to revise. View "Ft Bend Cty v. US Army Corps" on Justia Law

Defendant brought a facial challenge to Section 922(g)(8). The district court and a prior panel upheld the statute, applying the Fifth Circuit’s pre-Bruen precedent. Defendant filed a petition for rehearing en banc; while the petition was pending, the Supreme Court decided Bruen. The prior panel withdrew its opinion and requested a supplemental briefing on the impact of that case on this one.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and vacated Defendant’s conviction. The court held that Bruen requires the court to re-evaluate its Second Amendment jurisprudence and that under Bruen, Section 922(g)(8) fails to pass constitutional muster. The court explained that the Government failed to demonstrate that Section 922(g)(8)’s restriction of the Second Amendment right fits within the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Government’s proffered analogues falter under one or both of the metrics the Supreme Court articulated in Bruen as the baseline for measuring “relevantly similar” analogues: “how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense.” As a result, Section 922(g)(8) falls outside the class of firearm regulations countenanced by the Second Amendment. View "USA v. Rahimi" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted in 2015 of possessing child pornography and sentenced to an 86-month term of imprisonment and six years of supervised release. In 2019, Defendant violated the conditions of his supervised release, and the district court sentenced him to fifteen more months of imprisonment to be followed by five years of supervised release. After starting his second term of supervised release, Defendant again violated its conditions. The district court revoked Defendant’s supervised release and sentenced him to eighteen more months of imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that his constitutional rights were violated at his preliminary revocation hearing, that the district court erred in detaining him pending the final revocation hearing, and that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence upon revocation.   The Fifth Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court reasoned that because it is impossible to say how the district court would have sentenced Defendant if it had known that the Guidelines range was nine months total and that the total statutory maximum sentence was twenty-four months, not nine months per violation, the court cannot resolve whether the district court’s error affected Defendant’s prison sentence. The district court may have varied or departed upwards and imposed the same eighteen-month sentence or a longer one, up to the twenty-four-month statutory maximum. Or, as evinced by the district court’s desire to follow the Guidelines, the district court may have imposed a more modest upwards variance or departure than eighteen months. Thus, the district court’s misunderstanding of its authority to sentence Defendant was not harmless. View "USA v. Greer" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition and was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), given his multiple prior violent felony convictions. While on supervised release, Defendant was again convicted of being a felon in possession of ammunition, resulting in revocation of his release as well as a separate conviction and an attendant sentence of 15 years and 3 months, again enhanced by the ACCA. Defendant challenged the ACCA sentencing enhancements in both cases.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed as moot his claim regarding his first federal conviction and sentence and affirmed the sentence of his second federal conviction. The court explained that Defendant had completed his “term of imprisonment imposed following the revocation of his supervised release” and had “no remaining supervised release term that may be modified or terminated.” As a result, even a favorable determination in this action will have no impact on his sentence, meaning that is impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief to Defendant. View "USA v. Sosebee" on Justia Law

PHI Group, Inc. (“PHI”), offers helicopter services for numerous global customers in the oil and gas, air medical, technical services, and healthcare industries. Zurich American Insurance Company (“Zurich”) sold an “all-risk” insurance policy covering PHI. PHI sued Zurich in a civil action in diversity to recover economic losses for the partial interruption of its business during the COVID pandemic. The district court dismissed PHI’s claims because its losses were not caused by a physical loss or damage to corporeal property, its claims were not novel in the post-pandemic legal environment, and the Fifth Circuit has resolved comparable cases similarly.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that PHI alleged a material difference in the insurance policies in Q Clothier and here. In Q Clothier, the policy covered “direct physical loss of or physical damage” to property, while here, the policy covers “direct physical loss or damage” to property. But the Fifth Circuit has found no ambiguity here, regardless of whether “physical” modifies only loss or both loss and damage. Further, PHI has not established any facts that indicate that coronavirus caused direct physical loss or damage, which remains at the crux of any recovery under its insurance policy. Regardless of the contamination exclusion, PHI does not have a plausible claim for coverage. An exclusion cannot create coverage that does not exist under the plain meaning of the policy. View "PHI Group v. Zurich American Insurance" on Justia Law

The Texas State Preservation Board is charged with preserving and maintaining the Texas Capitol and its ground. Inder the 1987 Capitol Exhibit Rule, members of the public could submit an exhibit for display in the Capitol, provided the submission met certain undemanding requirements and had the endorsement of a qualifying state official.In 2016, Texas Governor Greg Abbott directed the Preservation Board to remove an exhibit that was submitted by the Freedom from Religion Foundation. Ultimately, the Board repealed the Capitol Exhibit Rule and the Foundation. Nevertheless, the district court held that the Board's exclusion of the Foundation’s exhibit was unlawful, and ordered them to display the exhibit in the Texas Capitol. The Board appealed.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the Board closed what was a limited public forum and that the Board's actions mooted the Foundation's claim to injunctive relief. However, the court also noted that its holding does not preclude the Foundation from showing that it is entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988, given that the Board repealed the Capitol Exhibit Rule in apparent response to the Foundation’s lawsuit. View "Freedom From Religion Fdn v. Abbott" on Justia Law

This case concerns rules and regulations issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) governing two types of pilot credentials: airline transport pilot (ATP) certificates, which enable pilots to fly for airlines, and type ratings, which authorize pilots to command complex, “type-rated” aircraft. Flight Training International, Inc. (FTI), a provider of flight training courses, wants to offer a course that uses type-rated aircraft but culminates in the issuance of an ATP certificate without a type rating. A rule (Rule) issued by the FAA in 2020 prohibits it from doing that, so FTI petitioned us to set aside the rule. FTI argued that the rule effectively amends portions of 14 C.F.R. pt. 61, and, therefore, should have been promulgated only after notice and comment in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).   The Fifth Circuit agreed and granted the petition. The court explained that the Must-Issue Rule is a legislative rule, but it was not promulgated after notice and comment as required by the APA. Because the Rule was issued “without observance of procedure required by law,” FTI’s petition must be granted, and the Rule set aside. In light of this disposition, the court did not reach FTI’s alternative argument that the Rule is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” View "Flt Training Intl v. FAA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a black woman who worked for Lincare, Incorporated. She sued her former employer under Title VII, claiming that she suffered from a racially hostile work environment and that Lincare both failed to address the situation and retaliated against her when she complained. She also sued for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Lincare. On appeal, Plaintiff contended that summary judgment was improper on her Title VII claims for a hostile work environment and unlawful retaliation.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even assuming that Plaintiff suffered from severe or pervasive harassment, Lincare cannot be liable under Title VII because it took prompt remedial action. Aside from one remark, Plaintiff could not remember any use of the N-word in the office after she made her reports to HR. Nor does she identify a single racially insensitive comment that occurred after the offending parties received final warnings. In short, Lincare “acted swiftly in taking remedial measures, and the harassment ceased.” Because of its prompt and effective response, Lincare cannot be liable under Title VII for creating a hostile work environment.   Further, the court explained, there is no evidence that Plaintiff’s working conditions were impacted, only that the plan opened up the possibility of further action (which never occurred). An employment decision is not an adverse action if it does not objectively worsen the employee’s working conditions. View "Hudson v. Lincare, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue is whether Defendant was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment when an officer, with emergency lights engaged, pulled behind Wright’s parked vehicle, and he did not attempt to flee or terminate the encounter but failed to comply fully with the officer’s commands. The district court, at the end of an evidentiary hearing, however, denied Defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding erroneously that the Terry stop was initiated instead at a later point in the encounter.   The Fifth Circuit, while retaining jurisdiction over the appeal, remanded to the district court for it, based on the record developed at the suppression hearing, to prepare expeditiously written findings of fact and conclusions of law on whether the seizure at the earlier point in time was in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court explained that Defendant not complying fully with some of the Officer’s commands was improper, to say the least, but his behavior does not show defiance of the Officer’s authority. Defendant sufficiently submitted to the show of authority because he objectively appeared to believe he was not free to leave, and he did not attempt to flee, nor terminate the encounter. The court further explained that because the district court’s findings and conclusions turn instead on events occurring after the Terry stop, the court is unable to deduce from them whether the district court concluded the totality of the circumstances prior to the Officer’s pulling behind Wright’s vehicle provided reasonable suspicion justifying the stop. View "USA v. Wright" on Justia Law