Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

During a routine traffic stop, Houston Police Officer fatally shot John Allen, Jr. Plaintiffs brought over a dozen claims against Defendant, two other involved police officers, and the city. The individual defendants claim the benefit of qualified immunity. After years of litigation, the district court, in ruling on a motion to dismiss in response to Plaintiffs’ complaint, dismissed the claims in toto. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal and requested reassignment to a different district judge.   The Fifth Circuit agreed with Plaintiffs that the dismissal of the Section 1983 claims against Defendant for excessive force, denial of medical care, and unlawful arrest was an error. The court reversed and remanded those claims. The court explained that taking as true that Defendant had no reason to believe Allen was armed and that Defendant knew Allen was seriously injured and likely could not move, a police officer would know, under these precedents, that to handcuff Allen was an arrest without probable cause under clearly established law. The court affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims is affirmed. The court denied, as moot, Plaintiffs’ request for reassignment to a new judge. View "Allen v. Hays" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence following his guilty-plea conviction of felon in possession of a firearm. He argued that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence under U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B), which applies only when a defendant’s firearm “had an altered or obliterated serial number,” because there is no evidence that his rifle ever had a serial number.   The Fifth Circuit agreed and vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded. The court explained that it agreed that Section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) does not apply when there is no evidence that the firearm ever had a serial number. The text of Section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) is clear that it only applies when the firearm “had an altered or obliterated serial number.” U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B). And in ordinary parlance, something cannot be “altered or obliterated” if it never existed in the first place. Consequently, to apply an upward enhancement under the provision, the government must present evidence showing that Defendant’s rifle once had a serial number. Because there was no such evidence, the court held that the district court erred in applying a four-level enhancement under Section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B). View "USA v. Sharp" on Justia Law

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued Methodist Hospitals of Dallas (Methodist) for allegedly violating the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The EEOC asserts that Methodist’s categorical policy of hiring the most qualified candidate violates the ADA when a qualified disabled employee requests reassignment to a vacant role, even if he or she is not the most qualified applicant. The EEOC also alleged that Methodist failed to reasonably accommodate a disabled employee, who was not reassigned to a vacant position for which she applied. The district court granted Methodist’s motion for summary judgment on both claims. The EEOC appealed, arguing that the Supreme Court’s ruling in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett requires Methodist to make exceptions to its most-qualified-applicant policy and that the employee was entitled to a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court as to Methodist’s most-qualified-applicant policy and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The court affirmed the judgment as to the EEOC’s reasonable accommodations claim involving the employee. The court explained that at summary judgment, an employee’s “unilateral withdrawal from the interactive process is fatal to her claim,” so long as the employer “engaged in a good-faith, interactive process with the employee regarding her request for a reasonable accommodation.” Based on the evidence, no reasonable jury could find that Methodist was unwilling to participate in the interactive process. When the employee did not respond to either the August 7th letter or the follow-up letter after her appeal of her termination, she caused the breakdown of the interactive process. Thus, Methodist did not act unlawfully. View "EEOC v. Methodist Hospitals" on Justia Law

MLB and the MLBPA began an investigation into the sale and use of performance-enhancing drugs; Plaintiff and his company were among those investigated. Since then, Plaintiff has filed a series of lawsuits across the country against MLB, the MLBPA, their members and employees, and an increasing number of assorted defendants. This appeal involves the latest in a series of unsuccessful lawsuits by Plaintiff, proceeding pro se. Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) in five separate motions; MLB and the MLBPA also moved for sanctions. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims, denied him leave to amend, and imposed sanctions.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed and granted Defendants’ motion for sanctions. The court ordered that no pleading or lawsuit in any federal court within the jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit shall be filed by, or on behalf of, Plaintiff, his affiliates, or his related entities against any of the defendants in this suit without first obtaining the permission of the court in which he seeks to file. He must attach a copy of this opinion to any such request for permission. The court explained that aggravating the situation is Plaintiff’s patent bad faith. Plaintiff was not only on notice from the district court that he was a vexatious litigant and that his lawsuit was frivolous, but he was also on notice from two other courts that have imposed sanctions on him (a California federal court and a New York state court) that his claims have no merit. View "Nix v. Major League Baseball" on Justia Law

A disabled public-school student was sexually assaulted by another student with known violent tendencies. Despite knowing of this attack, the victim’s teachers let both her and her aggressor wander the school unsupervised, and she was again assaulted by the very same student. The victim’s mother sued various school officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging liability under the so-called “state-created danger” doctrine, an exception to the general rule that government has no duty under the Due Process Clause to protect people from privately inflicted harms. The school officials sought dismissal on qualified immunity grounds, arguing that the state-created danger doctrine was not clearly established in this circuit when the underlying events occurred. The district court denied their motion.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the Section 1983 claim. The court explained that the circuit has never adopted a state-created danger exception to the sweeping “no duty to protect” rule. And a never-established right cannot be a clearly established one. The court further wrote that it does not think it is prudent to adopt a never-recognized theory of Section 1983 liability in the absence of rigorous briefing that grapples painstakingly with how such a cause of action, however widely accepted in other circuits, works in terms of its practical contours and application, details on which the court’s sister circuits disagree. Also, beyond the lack of thorough briefing, the court explained it is reluctant to expand substantive due process doctrine given the Supreme Court’s recent forceful pronouncements signaling unease with implied rights not deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition. View "Fisher v. Moore" on Justia Law

BNSF Railway Co. (“BNSF”) petitions for review, contending that the refusal of the Federal Railroad Administration (“FRA”) to grant a waiver of standard track-inspection regulations so that BNSF could test a new technology was arbitrary and capricious.   The Fifth Circuit granted review, vacated, and remanded for reconsideration. The court explained that “Agency action must be reasonable and reasonably explained.” The agency must “articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. Here, the court found that the FRA’s letter lacking in this regard. Therefore, on limited remand, the court directed the FRA to enter its decision no later than one hundred days from the announcement of the court’s opinion. View "BNSF Railway v. FRA" on Justia Law

Two years after an unfortunate single-boat accident, one of the boat’s two occupants died as a result of his injuries. The boat in which he was a passenger had struck a warning sign that was totally submerged at the time of the allision between the boat and sign. His estate and survivors sued the companies responsible for the sign in question. The district court granted summary judgment to the Defendants on the ground that the incident occurred on water governed by Louisiana law rather than federal. The parties agreed that if Louisiana law governs, the claims are barred. At issue in this appeal is whether or not the allision occurred in “navigable” waters such that federal law governs   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that navigational servitude relates to actualities – “the waters below the ordinary high-water mark,” “the line of the shore,” and so forth, id. – rather than potentialities. Should the Corps permanently flood the Refuge, the water there would likely be navigable. But as the parties agree that the Corps has not, in fact, permanently flooded the refuge, the water may not be said to be navigable under this theory. Further, the unvegetated channel establishes the ordinary high-water mark of the Bayou; water outside of that channel is not navigable. Moreover, Plaintiffs here failed to present even slight evidence concerning a commercial purpose for the channel in question. Accordingly, the court found that the water in which the allision occurred was not navigable and summary judgment was proper. View "Newbold v. Kinder Morgan SNG Operator" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a former federal employee and participant in a health-insurance plan (“Plan”) that is governed by the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (“FEHBA”). The Plan stems from a contract between the federal Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) and Blue Cross Blue Shield Association and certain of its affiliates (together, “Blue Cross”). Blue Cross administers the Plan under OPM’s supervision. Plaintiff suffered from cancer, and she asked Blue Cross whether the Plan would cover the proton therapy that her physicians recommended. Blue Cross told her the Plan did not cover that treatment. So Plaintiff chose to receive a different type of radiation treatment, one that the Plan did cover. The second-choice treatment eliminated cancer, but it also caused devastating side effects. Plaintiff then sued OPM and Blue Cross, claiming that the Plan actually does cover proton therapy. As against OPM, she seeks the “benefits” that she wanted but did not receive, as well as an injunction directing OPM to compel Blue Cross to reform its internal processes by, among other things, covering proton therapy in the Plan going forward. As against Blue Cross, she seeks monetary damages under Texas common law. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s suit.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that neither the advance process nor the proton-therapy guideline poses an immediate threat of injury, so injunctive relief is therefore unavailable. Further, the court found that FEHBA preempts Plaintiff’s common-law claims against Blue Cross. Accordingly, the court held that no relief is available under the relevant statutory and regulatory regime. View "Gonzalez v. Blue Cross Blue Shield" on Justia Law

Four police officers unlawfully arrested Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The officers appeal the district court’s denial of their summary judgment motion as to (1) excessive force (Officer W.), (2) false arrest (all officers), and (3) fabrication of evidence (Officer L.).   The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal and held that it lacked jurisdiction. The court explained that Officer W. argued that Plaintiff took a defensive and threatening posture, resisted being pulled from the vehicle, struggled after being removed, and willfully and aggressively refused to follow commands while resisting the officer’s detainment. Contrary to Officer W.’s argument, those facts are of a genuine dispute. Officer W. failed to take the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, instead relying on facts different from those assumed by the district court. Accordingly, the court wrote that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Officer W.’s appeal of the genuineness of the district court’s factual determinations.   Further, the court addressed the basis of our jurisdiction over Officer L.’s appeal, which does not invoke qualified immunity. Federal courts of appeal have jurisdiction over “appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.” Denial of summary judgment is not a final decision. Thus, the court explained that it lacked jurisdiction over Officer L.’s appeal of this claim. View "Ducksworth v. Landrum" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Lewisville Independent School District (“LISD”) and seven school board members, alleging that the district’s at-large election system violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) and seeking injunctive relief. The district court determined that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring his Section 2 claim because he is white. The district court then granted Defendants’ motion for sanctions against Plaintiff, his attorneys, and their law firm based on the findings that Plaintiff’s lawsuit was frivolous under 52 U.S.C. Section 10310(e) and his attorneys multiplied proceedings unreasonably and vexatiously under 28 U.S.C. Section 1927.   
The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s sanctions order and remanded to determine the extent to which the order is footed upon specific contemptuous conduct in the attorneys’ prosecution of the case. The court held that Plaintiff’s lawsuit did not merit sanctions. The court concluded that sanctions against Plaintiff were unwarranted because precedent in the circuit did not squarely foreclose his legal argument and because he sought to extend existing law. Critically, LISD points to no precedent in the circuit considering whether a voter in his position has standing under the VRA, let alone “squarely controlling precedent.” Further, as Plaintiff’s s lawsuit was not frivolous and relied on an “unsettled legal theory,”  his attorneys cannot be sanctioned under Section 1927 simply for filing the action. View "Vaughan v. Lewisville Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law