Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his jury trial conviction for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. He argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove he possessed a firearm. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that although the Government presented no direct evidence of possession, a reasonable jury could conclude that Freeman possessed the firearm. The jury saw videos of Defendant running from the police—first in his car and then on foot. And it heard testimony that suspects who run often have narcotics or weapons in their possession. The Government also presented evidence that police recovered the gun in a field about twenty feet from Defendant’s flight path. The jury heard testimony that a grown man could easily have thrown the two- or three-pound gun this distance. View "USA v. Freeman" on Justia Law

In the wake of a 2017 mass shooting in Las Vegas, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, interpreted existing regulations on machineguns as extending to bump stocks. Plaintiff relinquished several bump stocks and then filed this case, seeking to invalidate ATF's interpretation.The district court found in favor of the ATF, as did a panel of Fifth Circuit judges. However, on rehearing en banc, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that "a plain reading of the statutory language, paired with close consideration of the mechanics of a semi-automatic firearm, reveals that a bump stock is excluded from the technical definition of 'machinegun' set forth in the Gun Control Act and National Firearms Act."The court went on to explain that, even if it determine the language to be ambiguous, it would apply the rule of lenity to interpret the statute against imposing criminal liability. Notably, three judges concurred with the court's opinion on lenity grounds, and the opinion also garnered a three-judge dissent. View "Cargill v. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff ACTGC brought federal antitrust and various state law claims in a suit concerning tours of two New Orleans cemeteries, Defendant New Orleans Archdiocesan Cemeteries d.b.a. New Orleans Catholic Cemeteries (“NOAC”)  and Defendant Cemetery Tours NOLA LLC (“CTN”). ACTGC also requested injunctive relief, which the district court denied, and ACTGC first appealed. The district court then dismissed ACTGC’s federal antitrust and state law claims, which ACTGC also appealed. Defendant NOAC then moved to dismiss the first appeal as moot.   The Fifth Circuit granted NOAC’s motion, dismissed the first appeal, and affirmed the judgment of the district court on all issues in the second appeal. The court agreed with NOAC and found that the first amended complaint is a legal nullity because it was not incorporated by the subsequent second amended complaint. Thus, because the first amended complaint is nullified, the court cannot consider—and thus must dismiss—an appeal of a denial of injunctive relief stemming from the complaint. Further, the court explained that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying ACTGC leave to amend its complaint to add affidavits that do not add additional evidence of irreparable harm and do not address the pleading deficiencies of its federal law claims.   Moreover, the court held that ACTGC has not pleaded a legally sufficient product market under either of its proffered definitions. If the relevant product market is cemetery tours, it has not identified or included reasonably interchangeable substitutes. And if the product market is cemetery tours of Nos. 1 and 2, such a market is unduly narrow. View "New Orleans Assoc v. New Orleans Arch" on Justia Law

The Port of Corpus Christi Authority of Nueces County, Texas (a governmental entity), sued The Port of Corpus Christi, L.P.(a private entity) and Kenneth Berry in state court. The claims were for trespass and encroachment on its submerged land that resulted from dredge operations occurring in a ship channel. Defendants removed the case, but the district court remanded, holding there was no basis for removal either under the federal officer removal statute or due to a federal question.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying removal on the basis of the federal officer removal statute. Further, the court explained that it agreed with the district court that the Port Authority’s complaint “disclaims any issue regarding permit compliance, stating its claim exclusively in terms of Texas state law: common law trespass.” The Port Authority did not allege a violation of either the Clean Water Act or the Rivers and Harbors Act. View "Port of Corpus v. Port of Corpus" on Justia Law

Plaintiff began working as an environmental, safety, and health specialist at Targa’s Venice, Louisiana plant. He alleged that Targa violated the Louisiana Environmental Whistleblower Statute (“LEWS”) by discharging him after he refused and reported a manager’s directive to dilute sewage samples. The district court denied Targa’s motion for summary judgment and, following a bench trial, rendered judgment for Plaintiff. Targa argues on appeal that Plaintiff’s report of the manager’s directive and refusal to comply do not constitute “protected activities” under LEWS.     The court certified questions to the Louisiana Supreme Court, explaining that certification is necessary because the court lacks clear guidance from the Louisiana Supreme Court on how to resolve these issues, and the outcome is determinative of the entire appeal. The certified questions are: (1) Whether refusals to engage in illegal or environmentally damaging activities are “disclosures” under the current version of the Louisiana Environmental Whistleblower Statute, La. Stat. Ann. 30:2027; and (2) Whether the Louisiana Environmental Whistleblower Statute affords protection to an employee who reports to his supervisor an activity, policy, or practice of an employer which he reasonably believes is in violation of an environmental law, rule, or regulation, where reporting violations of environmental law, rules, or regulations, is a part of the employee’s normal job responsibilities. View "Menard v. Targa Resources" on Justia Law

In a case involving the denial of coverage for an automobile accident, the Fifth Circuit addressed whether uninsured motorist coverage can be denied simply because the driver, who was the son of the insured, was not listed on the policy? The court answered that question “no.” The other is whether the policy can be voided because the insured committed a material misrepresentation by failing in her application for insurance to name, as required, those of driving age who lived in her household? The court answered that question, “yes.”   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling granting Viking Insurance’s motion for summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ suit seeking damages for a wrongful denial of benefits. The court concluded that if an insurer declines to exercise the greater power to void a policy, it still retains the lesser power to exercise a contractual right to deny coverage. The court explained that here, a knowing misstatement in the application about the drivers in the household was material if it would have caused Viking either not to issue the policy or to increase the premium. The court accepted that materiality is not affected by the relationship between the false statement and the specific coverage being sought in litigation. It is enough that the falsity was material to the decision of the company to issue the policy at the agreed price. Consequently, Viking could have voided the policy. By not voiding, Viking’s policy remained in effect. Accordingly, Viking had the right to deny Plaintiffs’ claim. View "Bradley v. Viking Insurance" on Justia Law

Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. (“ERCOT”) determines market-clearing prices unless otherwise directed by the Public Utility Commission of Texas (“PUCT”). ERCOT is the sole buyer and seller of all energy in Texas. According to the operative complaint, during winter storm Uri ERCOT and the PUCT allegedly “intervened in the market for wholesale electricity by setting prices [that were] orders of magnitude higher than what market forces would ordinarily produce.”   Just Energy, a retail energy provider, purports that after the storm, ERCOT “floored” it with invoices totaling approximately $335 million. Just Energy commenced bankruptcy proceedings in Canada and filed this Chapter 15 case in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. Just Energy challenges its invoice obligations. At the hearing on ERCOT’s motion to dismiss, the bankruptcy court stated that it would strike various language like, “subject to reduction only after a finding by the Court concerning a legally appropriate energy price per megawatt hour as proven by expert testimony, if appropriate, but in no event greater than the price per megawatt hour in effect after market forces took effect.” By striking this and similar language sprinkled throughout the complaint, the court concluded that “this change solves the abstention problem.”    The Fifth Circuit disagreed and vacated the bankruptcy court’s order and remanded with instructions to determine the appropriate trajectory of this case after abstention. The court explained that abstention under Burford6\ is proper because: (1) the doctrine applies in the bankruptcy context; and (2) four of the five Burford factors counsel in favor of abstention. View "Electric Reliability v. Just Energy" on Justia Law

Fourteen women (“Plaintiffs”) from seven states brought the present putative class action against Ashley Black and her companies (“Defendants”), alleging false and deceptive marketing practices. They take issue with various representations in Defendants’ ads about a product called the FasciaBlaster, a two-foot stick with hard prongs that is registered with the Food and Drug Administration as a massager. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims in their entirety.  Plaintiffs appealed the order striking the class allegations and the dismissal of individual claims.   The Fifth Circuit found that the district court correctly struck Plaintiffs’ class allegations and properly dismissed all but two of their claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the district court. The court explained that it agreed with the district court that Plaintiffs’ allegations suffer from a combination of defects, including a failure to plead adequately what representations were actually made when those representations were made, who made the representations, and where those representations occurred.   However, the court reversed the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ breach of express warranty under, respectively, California Consumer Code Sections 2313 & 10210, and Florida Statutes Sections 672.313 & 680.21. The court wrote that the district court did not apply the law of a specific jurisdiction when conducting its analysis. Plaintiffs on appeal cite various Fifth Circuit cases in addition to Texas and California state law precedents. Defendants proffer Fifth Circuit, California, and Florida precedents. Neither party, however, briefed what law should be applied to each claim. View "Elson v. Black" on Justia Law

Petitioners Shrimpers and Fishermen of the RGV, Sierra Club, and Save RGV from LNG (collectively, “Petitioners”) challenge the issuance of a Clean Water Act (“CWA”) permit by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”). Petitioners allege that the Corps’ permit issuance violated the CWA and its implementing regulations.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that the Corps approved the least environmentally damaging practicable alternative presented before it during the permitting process and did not act arbitrarily in its evaluation of pipeline construction impacts and mitigation efforts. The court explained Petitioners’ first set of arguments centers on the Corps’ estimation that restoration will occur within one year. They state that the Corps did not consider the full construction period when quantifying the duration of impacts, which they allege is improper. However, they supply no evidence that the construction period must be, or even that it typically is, included when assessing whether impacts are temporary.   Further, the Corps’ analysis also comports with the EIS, which estimates that herbaceous vegetation will regenerate “within 1 to 3 years.” The EIS estimation necessarily includes the finding that vegetation may revegetate in one year, as the Corps concluded. Finally, the EPA feedback Petitioners relied upon does not consider the approved compensatory mitigation plan or the special conditions of the permit because the comments are from 2015 and 2018— well before the current permit (and even the original permit) was approved. The Corps considered this feedback and aligned its ultimate approach with the EPA’s recommendations. View "Shrimpers v. United States Army Corps" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 45-year sentence for attempting to produce child pornography. The district court enhanced his sentence based on Defendant’s prior aggravated sexual assault of a child under Texas law. Defendant contested the enhancement because, while the Texas crime can be committed against minors up to 16 years old, he claims the federal predicate offense only includes victims younger than 16. Defendant’s basic argument is this: because the Texas statute applies to 16-year-old victims, it criminalizes more conduct than Section 2251(e), which he claims applies only to 15- year-old victims.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the federal enhancement statute at issue, 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(e), specifically allows increased sentences for state sex crimes against minors up to 17 years old. See 18 U.S.C. Section 2256(1). The court rejected Defendant’s argument explaining Section 2251(e) is located in Chapter 110 of Title 18. “For the purposes of [Chapter 110],” the term “‘minor’ means any person under the age of eighteen years.” Section 2256(1). So, it is not true that the Texas statute “sweeps more broadly” than Section 2251(e). To the contrary, it sweeps more narrowly. The Texas crime applies to victims who are 16 years old and younger, whereas the predicate federal offense extends to 17-year-old victims. Consequently, Defendant’s Texas conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child qualifies as an enhancing offense under Section 2251(e). View "USA v. Grzywinski" on Justia Law