Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two outdoor-advertising companies filed applications with the City of Austin to digitize existing, traditional billboards and to upgrade signs with less sophisticated digitization. The City rejected their applications because the signs would advertise a business, service, or activity that was not located on the site where the sign was installed. The companies sued, arguing that the City’s Sign Code’s distinction between on-premises and off-premises signs violated the First Amendment. The district court upheld the Sign Code. When the case first came to this court, we reversed, holding that the on-premises/off-premises distinction was content-based and could not survive strict scrutiny. The U.S. Supreme Court, though, held that the City’s Sign Code was facially content neutral and, absent an impermissible purpose, would be subject to intermediate scrutiny. The court remanded.   The Fifth Circuit concluded, applying the Supreme Court’s new guidance, that the Sign Code survives intermediate scrutiny. The court explained that the effort to compare all billboards to all news racks fails. The Supreme Court could discern no meaningful difference between newspapers and commercial handbills. Both were sold on identical news racks and were equally responsible for the harm inflicted on public safety and aesthetics. In the context of sign regulations, by contrast, the court has discerned a meaningful difference between on-premises and off-premises signs. Further, the court found that municipalities have traditionally been given wide discretion in the domain of sign regulations, and Austin is entitled to that latitude. View "Reagan Natl Advtsng v. City of Austin" on Justia Law

Defendant, a criminal noncitizen with a burglary conviction and two subsequent illegal-reentry convictions, was convicted of illegal reentry for a third time. The district court characterized his burglary conviction as an aggravated felony. The district court also characterized his two prior illegal-reentry convictions as aggravated felonies under a statutory provision stating that illegal reentry is itself an aggravated felony when committed by someone previously deported following an aggravated felony conviction. The designation “aggravated felony” is significant because it subjects the alien to a maximum prison sentence of 20 years. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court mischaracterized his past offenses because, under an intervening Supreme Court case, his predicate burglary conviction no longer qualifies as an aggravated felony. He insists the district court erred in sentencing him under Section 1326(b)(2).   The Fifth Circuit reformed the judgment to reflect that Defendant was convicted and sentenced under Section 1326(b)(2) and affirmed the judgment as reformed. The court explained that Defendant was correctly sentenced under Section 1326(b)(2) because he was previously removed “subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony.” Defendant’s first illegal reentry, for which he was sentenced under Section 1326(b)(2), was an aggravated felony under Section 1101(a)(43)(O). View "USA v. Huerta-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted after a bench trial of possession of a firearm by a felon. On appeal, Defendant contended that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that the Sergeant had reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity in the alley. First, Defendant’s location and timing provide a strong foundation for finding reasonable suspicion. Second, Defendant’s emergence and subsequent actions similarly give rise to reasonable suspicion. Third, Defendant’s inconsistent and nonsensical answers to the Sergeant’s questions gave rise to reasonable suspicion. Further, the court explained that even if the Sergeant and officer realized in the course of the seizure that Defendant was not the individual in the photograph, there remained numerous articulable and suspicious facts supporting a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing sufficient to extend the seizure, namely Defendant’s actions and statements before the photograph’s arrival as well as his suspicious answers in response to questions generated by the picture itself. View "USA v. Roper" on Justia Law

Appellants are serving, respectively, a 1,111-month sentence and a 738-month sentence for multiple robberies and violations of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). Appellants brought successive 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motions, alleging United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), rendered their Section 924(c) convictions invalid. The district court dismissed their motions for lack of jurisdiction.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellants contend that even under the ‘more likely than not’ standard, their claims survive and should proceed to the merits. But they failed to prove it is more likely than not that the jury convicted them of Section 924(c) offenses based on predicate conspiracy offenses. Appellants next note each Section 924(c) count states that Appellants “did knowingly use and carry a firearm during and in relation to the commission of a crime of violence, namely: a robbery, which obstructed, delayed, and affected commerce, a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951, as alleged” in the immediately preceding, multiplicitous Hobbs Act counts. The court found that the verdict form could have been more clearly expressed. However, the court explained that on considering the trial record as a whole, including the oral jury instructions, the trial evidence, and the minimally useful post-conviction record, the jury convicted Appellants of actual robbery, not mere conspiracy. Accordingly, the court found that Appellants have not carried their burden to prove that it is more likely than not the jury convicted them of Section 924(c) offenses based on conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery. View "USA v. Diggs" on Justia Law

In May 2017, La’Shadion Shemwell was elected to the McKinney City Council. Shemwell’s term was cut short when the voters recalled him in November 2020. Shemwell claimed that the McKinney recall election procedures violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  Six months after dismissing his first lawsuit and two months before his recall election, Shemwell filed this suit on September 13, 2020. He asserted the same claims, this time with an additional Plaintiff— a Latina District 1 voter. The district court held the case moot, declined to apply the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception, and granted the City’s motion to dismiss. The sole issue on appeal is whether the November 2020 recall election mooted Plaintiffs’ claim for prospective declaratory relief.   The Fifth Circuit found that the November 2020 election mooted this case and held that Plaintiffs’ failed to satisfy the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” mootness exception. The court explained that Shemwell—in his official capacity—failed to claim or prove that he was likely to run again for District 1, win, and face the allegedly unlawful recall provisions. And Plaintiffs’—in their capacity as voters—failed to claim or prove that there was more than an “abstract or hypothetical” possibility that they would ever vote in another recall election of a District 1 Council Member. Thus, any judgment issued after the recall election would have been an impermissible advisory opinion. Further, Plaintiffs repeatedly abandoned their claims for injunctive relief—and never pursued expedited relief. View "Shemwell v. McKinney, Texas" on Justia Law

Defendant, a federal prisoner, appealed the denial of his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1). Defendant offered four reasons for his Section 3582(c)(1) motion. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that Defendant’s first three arguments are not cognizable bases for compassionate release and the fourth does not have merit.   Defendant argued that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective and that the Government breached his plea agreement. But because these claims are cognizable under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, they are not cognizable under 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c). Second, Defendant argued that he should get a sentence reduction because the First Step Act reduced the statutory minimums applicable to his offenses. But Congress did not make those reductions retroactive. And a prisoner may not leverage non-retroactive changes in criminal law to support a compassionate release motion because such changes are neither extraordinary nor compelling. Third, Defendant briefly suggested that an amendment to the United States Sentencing Guidelines favors his early release. Defendant did not adequately present this argument to the district court, however, so it is forfeited   Defendant’s fourth and final argument is the only one that states a possibly cognizable basis for compassionate release—namely, that COVID-19 constitutes an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for his release. To support this argument, Defendant suggested that his prior COVID-19 infection and general ill health place him at greater risk from COVID-19 relative to the broader population. The court wrote it has repeatedly denied relief in cases where prisoners sought compassionate release due to fear of communicable disease, even when those prisoners were in poor health. View "USA v. McMaryion" on Justia Law

Plaintiff suffers from a condition that causes her to faint from positional changes, particularly in hot weather. Plaintiff sometimes utilizes a wheelchair. She was doing so in September 2019 when she went to her local Office of Motor Vehicles (OMV) to have her address changed on her driver’s license. Because Plaintiff was in a wheelchair, OMV employees asked that Plaintiff have her doctor fill out the entirety of a short medical form regarding possible conditions related to her ability to drive. Plaintiff later sued the State of Louisiana, the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, the Office of Motor Vehicles, and Secretary James LeBlanc, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections. In her amended complaint, Plaintiff claimed that OMV violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act by (1) determining that she required additional screening before renewing her license solely because she was in a wheelchair and (2) failing to offer her reasonable accommodation. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim at the summary judgment stage.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the scope of the ADA is broad, but it is not so broad as to encompass Plaintiff’s claims here, where she was asked to endure a minimal—at most—burden to ensure safety on the public roadways. The court, having found that the State’s request that Plaintiff has her physician fill out the medical form did not violate the ADA via disparate treatment or failure to accommodate, similarly found as a matter of law that the State did not act with “something more than deliberate indifference” toward Plaintiff’s disability. View "Clark v. State of LA, Dept of Pub Sfty" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissal of Petitioner’s appeal from the immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his application for relief from removal. Because the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was not supported by evidence in the record, the court determined that the BIA erred in affirming it and remanded the case to the BIA. Petitioner filed a timely application for attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA).   The Fifth Circuit found that Petitioner is entitled to attorneys’ fees under the EAJA and awarded $56,169.79. The court found that the government’s position was not substantially justified at each stage of this litigation. Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs under the EAJA. The court found that the EAJA statutory rate, adjusted for regional cost of living increases, adequately compensates counsel for the work performed. Petitioner also sought fees for work performed by a paralegal. The court wrote that a review of district court cases analyzing the prevailing rate for paralegals in Louisiana under the EAJA reveals a range of $75/hr to $100/hr. In light of the paralegal’s experience,the court found that a rate of $100/hr appears appropriate. View "Nkenglefac v. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, in this case, are a group of Mississippi municipalities and associations harmed and threatened by this turn of events. They sued the Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”) under Administrative Procedure Act (APA) Section 706(1) for the Corps’ refusal to prepare a supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) as assertedly required by NEPA and accompanying regulations. Invoking the federal government’s sovereign immunity, the Corps moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The parties agreed on the legal question at issue—namely, whether NEPA and related regulations impose on the Corps a discrete duty to act that a federal court can compel it to honor under APA Section 706(1)—but disagreed on the answer to the question.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment to the Corps. The court explained that because the Corps has no duty to prepare the supplemental EIS the plaintiffs seek, Plaintiffs have no APA claim for unlawful agency inaction, and the Corps is immune from their suit claiming otherwise. For better or worse, Congress and the Corps have authority to act on Plaintiffs’ dire environmental concerns. The federal courts do not. View "Harrison County, MS v. U.S. Army Corps" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant for three years between 2017 and 2020. Initially, he was paid hourly and received overtime compensation, but in March 2018, despite no change in job responsibilities, Defendant converted him to a salaried position. In March 2020, Plaintiff gave his two-week notice to Defendant that he would be resigning. Three days later, Defendant terminated him.Plaintiff sued, claiming that Defendant failed to pay him overtime compensation in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 207(a). Defendant sought summary judgment, claiming Plaintiff was exempt from overtime compensation requirements under the Motor Carrier Act exemption as a “mechanic.” The district court agreed, granting summary judgment in Defendant's favor. Plaintiff appealed.Generally, the FLSA requires an employer to pay overtime compensation to any employee working more than forty hours in a workweek. However, as relevant here, under the MCA exemption, the overtime compensation requirement does not apply if “the Secretary of Transportation has [the] power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service” for the employee. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that the Motor Carrier Act exemption applied due to Plaintiff's position as a mechanic. View "Cunningham v. Circle 8 Crane Services" on Justia Law