Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Louisiana passed the Truth in Labeling of Food Products Act (the “Act”) to “protect consumers from misleading and false labeling of food products that are edible by humans.” The Act bars, among other things, the intentional “misbranding or misrepresenting of any food product as an agricultural product” through several different labeling practices. Turtle Island Foods, S.P.C. (d/b/a Tofurky), markets and sells its products in Louisiana. Tofurky believes it operates under a constant threat of enforcement. Tofurky sued Louisiana’s Commissioner of Agriculture and Forestry, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district court sided with Tofurky. It held that Tofurky had standing to challenge the Act and that the statute was an unconstitutional restriction on Tofurky’s right to free speech. The State appealed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court explained that nothing in the statute’s language requires the State to enforce its punitive provisions on a company that sells its products in a way that just so happens to confuse a consumer. The State’s construction limits the Act’s scope to representations by companies that actually intend consumers to be misled about whether a product is an “agricultural product” when it is not. This interpretation is not contradictory to the Act, and the court thus accepted it for the present purposes of evaluating Tofurky’s facial challenge. The district court erred in ignoring the State’s limiting construction and in implementing its own interpretation of the Act. View "Turtle Island Foods v. Strain" on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of Texas Government Code Section 808. He contends that Section 808’s divestment requirement violates the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause. The district court concluded that Plaintiff lacked standing and dismissed his claims against the Texas Comptroller and the Texas Attorney General (collectively, “Defendants”).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote it agreed with the district court that Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue his claims. Article III grants jurisdiction to federal courts only over actions involving an “actual case or controversy.” The court concluded that Plaintiff’s alleged injury is—at most—speculative; he has wholly failed to allege that any risk of economic harm is “certainly impending.” Because Plaintiff cannot show how any investment or divestment decisions will affect his future payments, he cannot show that he has suffered an injury. Further, the court found that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that Section 808 causes him an injury by violating his own personal Fourteenth or First Amendment rights. View "Abdullah v. Paxton" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a native and citizen of El Salvador who entered the United States in 1997. Later that year she was detained and subsequently ordered removed in absentia. Petitioner applied for Temporary Protected Status ("TPS"), but under a different name. Petitioner was granted TPS in 2003 under that different name and continued to renew her TPS using that information.Since obtaining TPS, Petitioner has departed the United States only on one occasion, but she was out of the country for 111 days. At the time, she had considered seeking permission from immigration officials to leave the United States but decided not to do so because her TPS was not in her own name. Upon her return, Petitioner was apprehended by Border Patrol Agents. The Department of Homeland Security initiated formal removal proceedings against her. At her hearing before the IJ, Petitioner conceded to being removable as charged but sought TPS relief.The IJ determined that she was ineligible for TPS because her 111-day absence disrupted her continuous physical presence in the United States. The IJ and BIA denied relief. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the BIA's denial of Petitioner's petition, finding that her 111-day absence was not “brief, casual, and innocent” under 8 U.S.C. 1254a(c)(4). View "Tobar v. Garland" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty, Defendant was convicted of one count of coercion and enticement, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2422(b), and one count of sexual exploitation of children, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and (e). Defendant's presentence investigation report (“PSR”) recommended a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2G2.1(b)(2)(A), because the offense “involved the commission of a sexual act or sexual contact” based on video evidence that Defendant masturbated on video with a minor. The court sentenced Defendant accordingly, and Defendant appealed.On appeal,. Defendant challenged the district court's application of the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2G2.1(b)(2)(A). Agreeing with the four other circuits that have weighed in on the issue, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that an act of masturbation constitutes "sexual contact" under 18 U.S.C. 2246(3). View "USA v. Butler" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of depriving two persons of their constitutional rights under color of law in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 242. The district court sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of 12 and 360 months of imprisonment and ordered Defendant to pay $10,000 in restitution to one of the victims. Defendant appealed, arguing that the government failed to disclose impeachment evidence in violation of the Brady rule, and he sought a new trial on that basis.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the withheld evidence was not material. The court explained that there is no reasonable probability that if the government had disclosed the evidence of the victim’s arrest and pending criminal case, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Further, the court wrote that Defendant’s theory of how he would have used evidence of the victim’s arrest and pending criminal case to impeach the victim rests on speculation. Defendant does not point to any evidence that federal prosecutors could have influenced the Texas prosecutor’s conduct before the grand jury or the grand jury’s findings.   Moreover, the court concluded that Defendant is incorrect in sentencing him the district court “drew an adverse inference” from his silence that “may have resulted in added imprisonment.” Defendant does not point to any specific foundation in the record for his claim that the district court relied on his lack of remorse in determining his sentence. Any inferences the district court drew from Defendant’s refusal to comment at the sentencing hearing did not adversely impact his sentence and did not burden his Fifth Amendment privilege. View "USA v. Sepulveda" on Justia Law

A Texas jury convicted Defendant of murder and sentenced him to death. After his direct appeal and habeas petitions were both denied in state court, Defendant raised 31 claims in a federal habeas petition. The district court denied all his claims and also denied a certificate of appealability (COA). Defendant asked the Fifth Circuit to issue a COA on eight of those claims, which he presents as posing five distinct legal issues.   The Fifth Circuit denied Defendant a COA on all of his claims. The court first found that it is beyond debate that Defendant’s claim would still be unexhausted for failing to fairly present the Confrontation Clause claim to the state habeas court. Further, the court explained that the state court concluded that Defendant’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to use a peremptory strike against these jurors. Defendant has not identified any clearly established federal law that would allow reasonable jurists to debate this conclusion. Moreover, the court wrote that Defendant failed to rebut the prosecution’s fifth stated reason for striking a juror at all. Therefore, the district court’s rejection of Defendant’s Batson claim is not debatable. Next, the court found that the habeas court conducted an extensive argument-by-argument review of Defendant’s comparative juror analysis argument. It considered each argument that Defendant said should have been raised. It found that each of these arguments was meritless and that, as a result, Defendant’s appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise them. View "Harper v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

the Biden Administration issued an executive order that re-established an interagency working group (“Working Group”) to formulate guidance on the “social cost of greenhouse gases.” That order directed the Working Group to publish dollar estimates quantifying changes in carbon, methane, and nitrous oxide emissions (collectively, “greenhouse gases”) for consideration by federal agencies when policymaking. Working Group has since published “Interim Estimates” based largely on the findings of its predecessor working group. The Plaintiffs-States (“Plaintiffs”) challenge E.O. 13990 and the Interim Estimates as procedurally invalid, arbitrary and capricious, inconsistent with various agency-specific statutes, and ultra vires. They obtained a preliminary injunction in the district court. Defendants appealed, and the Fifth Circuit panel stayed the injunction.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed this action because Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to prove standing. Plaintiffs’ allegations of “injury in fact” rely on a chain of hypotheticals: federal agencies may (or may not) premise their actions on the Interim Estimates in a manner that may (or may not) burden the States. Such injuries do not flow from the Interim Estimates but instead from potential future regulations, i.e., final rules that are subject to their own legislated avenues of scrutiny, dialogue, and judicial review on an appropriately developed record. View "State of Louisiana v. Biden" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, his wife, and his three children are Libyan citizens who have resided lawfully in the United States for over a decade. Plaintiff filed an I-140 petition seeking a waiver of the labor-certification requirement of his visa because he is a “professional holding an advanced degree whose work is in the national interest of the United States.” While the petition was pending, Plaintiff and his family filed I-485 applications for status adjustment to legal permanent residents (“LPRs”) under 8 U.S.C. Section 1255(a). Section 1255 grants the Attorney General the discretion to adjust the status of certain aliens to LPR status if they have met certain statutorily specified conditions. The USCIS granted the family’s I-485 petitions prematurely. The district court found that it had no subject matter jurisdiction to review the original denial of the I-140 because Plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the order of dismissal. The court held that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction to review a status-adjustment decision by the USCIS under either the APA or the INA because the alien retains the right to de novo review of that decision in his final removal proceedings. Thus, the court found that Plaintiffs have not yet exhausted administrative remedies and the court may not exercise jurisdiction. View "Elldakli v. Garland" on Justia Law

Appellant Southern Orthopaedic Specialists, L.L.C. (“Southern Orthopaedic”) sued its insurer, State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (“State Farm”), to recover business interruption losses caused by covid-related shutdowns. It also claims that State Farm negligently misrepresented the scope of the policy’s coverage. The district court dismissed these claims as foreclosed by the policy and Louisiana law.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Southern Orthopaedic’s pleadings fall short. They do not allege that covid caused “tangible or corporeal” property damage. Nor do they allege that the presence of covid particles required physically repairing or replacing any part of Southern Orthopaedics’s property. Nor do they claim that the presence of covid necessitated lasting alterations to the property. Without allegations of this nature, Southern Orthopaedic cannot meet the requirement of pleading an “accidental direct physical loss” under the policy. View "S Orthopaedic Spclt v. State Farm Fire" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cactus Canyon Quarries, Inc. (“Cactus Canyon”) appeals a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (“Commission”). In 2020, Cactus Canyon was issued three citations by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA).   The Fifth Circuit denied Cactus Canyon’s petition, holding that the ALJ properly interpreted Section 56.14101(a)(3) to include the low brake pressure alarm as a component of the truck’s “braking system.” Cactus Canyon contends that the alarm is not such a component because it has no effect on the braking system’s ability to stop and hold equipment. But the plain language and purpose support the inclusion of the alarm in the “braking system.” The court concluded that the braking standard unambiguously supports the Government’s interpretation. Since a “system”—by definition at the time of the standard’s passage—is composed of parts, the Section’s reference to “braking systems” extends to its related components, including those that do not simply function to stop and hold the vehicle. View "Cactus Canyon Quarries v. MSHR" on Justia Law