Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was detained beyond the expiration of his sentence. After his release, he sought redress for this violation of his rights by bringing a lawsuit against various Louisiana officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Louisiana state law. The district court dismissed most of Plaintiff’s claims but allowed a supervisory liability claim against Department Secretary James LeBlanc to proceed by denying qualified immunity. Secretary LeBlanc appealed the denial of qualified immunity, arguing that his conduct wasn’t objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law.   The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court reasoned that the right to timely release is clearly established. But Plaintiff failed to adequately brief—and has thus forfeited—any meritorious argument that Secretary LeBlanc’s behavior was objectively unreasonable in light of that right. The court explained that to the extent that Plaintiff argues the merits, it’s inadequately briefed. Plaintiff’s entire presentation on the issue of objective unreasonableness amounts to just this single conclusory statement: “It is inherently unreasonable for the secretary . . . to fail to enact policies and procedures to ensure the prompt release of inmates who have served their sentences in accordance to the law.” A single, unsupported sentence isn’t enough to adequately brief the issue. View "Taylor v. LeBlanc" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty without a plea agreement to being unlawfully present in the United States after removal. The district court sentenced Defendant within the Guidelines range to 27 months of imprisonment and imposed a three-year term of supervised release. The district court imposed a special condition of supervised release requiring that Defendant be surrendered to immigration officials for deportation proceedings after his release from confinement and that, if officials decline to take custody of Defendant, he immediately depart the United States and return to Mexico.   On appeal, Defendant argued that the judgment should be amended to exclude the “self-deport” condition because the district court lacked the authority to impose this condition under 18 U.S.C. Section 3583(d). The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment in part and remanded for the entry of a new written judgment without the special condition requiring that Defendant departs from the United States. The court held that here, the district court exceeded its authority by ordering Defendant to self-deport as one of his conditions of supervised release. View "USA v. Villanueva-Cardenas" on Justia Law

The decedent committed suicide in his cell. On behalf of her minor child, Plaintiff sued the warden at Ouachita Correctional Center (“OCC”) and the sheriff of Ouachita Parish in their official capacities; she also purports to have sued them in their individual capacities. All federal claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for violations of the decedent’s Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiff additionally sued under related state laws for negligence and vicarious liability. The district court granted summary judgment.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained the warden cannot be sued in his official capacity. Official-capacity suits may be brought only against an official acting as a policymaker. Further, although the sheriff can be sued in his official capacity, those claims also fail. The Sheriff, as the final policymaker in the Parish, does satisfy the second requirement of the analysis and can be sued in his official capacity, assuming Plaintiff provides evidence that the conduct prong is met. However, Section 1983 does not allow recovery under a theory of respondeat superior; a plaintiff must show that the local government’s policy or custom violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Moreover, the court explained that even if Plaintiff adequately pleaded her individual-capacity claims, she has not alleged a genuine dispute as to any material fact to hold defendants responsible under a supervisory-liability theory. View "Guillot v. Russell" on Justia Law

This appeal concerns an alleged international bribery scheme between U.S.-based businesses and Venezuelan officials. On Defendants’ motions, the district court dismissed all counts charged against them and suppressed statements made during an interview. The government timely appealed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed. First, the court held that because extraterritoriality concerns the merits of the case, not the court’s power to hear it, the district court erred in concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over these counts. Further, Defendants’ contention that the indictment does not sufficiently allege that they are agents of a domestic concern does not lend itself to the conclusion that the indictment is inherently insufficient. Moreover, the term “agent” is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Defendants. Additionally, the court wrote that the allegations that Defendants engaged in conduct that occurred in part in the Southern District of Texas satisfy the money-laundering statute’s extraterritorial provision. The district court erred in concluding otherwise. Finally, the environment in which the agents questioned Defendant, wherein his attorney could safeguard against police coercion, does not present the same inherently coercive pressures as the station-house questioning at issue in Miranda. The district court’s order suppressing the statements, then, was erroneous. View "USA v. Murta" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a lawsuit in Texas state court against several officials at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, where he remains an inmate. He alleged violations of his First and Eighth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 arising out of a housing transfer and subsequent physical altercation. According to Plaintiff, he had previously been sexually harassed and threatened by inmates in boot camp housing; after asking the sergeant for a transfer to the main building on account of the harassment and threats, he was assigned housing in the main building. Defendants removed the case to federal court, whereupon the district court granted their motion to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims except for two: his First Amendment retaliation and Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims. The district court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s remaining claims with prejudice, and he appealed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed the district court’s summary judgment dismissal of Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim. The court reasoned that the facts are consistent with Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant transferred Plaintiff back to boot camp housing to teach him a lesson about seeking housing transfers from other officials, knowing that he faced a substantial risk of being assaulted by the inmates who he had previously reported to prison officials during the officer protection investigation. The court concluded that this statement is sufficient to create a genuine material factual dispute. However, the court did not decide whether, given this factual dispute, Defendant violated clearly established law. View "Luna v. Davis" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Cameroon. He applied for admission to the United States in 2019 and was subsequently charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). On November 13, 2019, he appeared and admitted that he was removable but applied for asylum or withholding of removal based on his political opinion and sought protection under the CAT. Petitioner's claim was based on the allegations that the Cameroon government was killing “English-speaking Cameroonians” such as himself.The Immigration Judge denied Petitioner's request, finding that his testimony was too vague to be credible, noting that there were likely documents that were not presented that could have corroborated his claims. In front of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), Petitioner claimed that the Immigrations Judge erred in its credibility assessment. The BIA denied relief.On appeal, The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, finding no grounds to reverse the BIA's decision. View "Mohndamenang v. Garland" on Justia Law

This case concerns attorney misconduct in the Court-Supervised Settlement Program established in the wake of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil rig disaster. Appellant, a Louisiana attorney representing oil spill claimants in the settlement program, was accused of funneling money to a settlement program staff attorney through improper referral payments. In a disciplinary proceeding, the en banc Eastern District of Louisiana found that Appellant’s actions violated the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct and suspended him from practicing law before the Eastern District of Louisiana for one year. Appellant appealed, arguing that the en banc court misapplied the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct and abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sanction.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the en banc court’s order suspending Appellant from the practice of law for one year each for violations of Rule 1.5(e) and 8.4(a). The court affirmed the en banc court’s holding that Appellant violated Rule 8.4(d). Finally, the court remanded to the en banc court for further proceedings, noting on remand, the court is free to impose on Appellant whatever sanction it sees fit for the 8.4(d) violation, including but not limited to its previous one-year suspension. The court explained that the en banc court misapplied Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(e) and 8.4(a) but not Rule 8.4(d). Additionally, the en banc court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a one-year suspension on Appellant for his violation of 8.4(d). View "In re Jonathan Andry" on Justia Law

This case arises from major flooding events in the Houston area in 2016 and 2017. Local political subdivisions sued the United States Army Corps of Engineers, seeking compliance with alleged regulatory obligations. The district court dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The fundamental issue in the case is whether the Corps has violated any enforceable, legal obligation in the management of the relevant dams and reservoirs. A potential source for obligations imposed on the Corps is the 2012 Water Control Manual (“WCM”) adopted by the Corps for flood control in the relevant watershed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that Section 702 of the APA has been satisfied in that the complaint alleges Plaintiffs have been aggrieved by agency action, that the suit is not one for money damages, and that the injury arises from an officer or employee who has acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of law. Further, the court held that the Tucker Act does not provide an “adequate remedy” to the County’s claims within the meaning of Section 704. Further, the court wrote that since the regulation does not specify when such conditions require the Corps to update a WCM, the Corps must exercise discretion in deciding when updating a WCM is necessary. Such discretion is antithetical to a mandatory duty. Thus the court concluded there is no discrete, mandatory duty to revise. View "Ft Bend Cty v. US Army Corps" on Justia Law

Defendant brought a facial challenge to Section 922(g)(8). The district court and a prior panel upheld the statute, applying the Fifth Circuit’s pre-Bruen precedent. Defendant filed a petition for rehearing en banc; while the petition was pending, the Supreme Court decided Bruen. The prior panel withdrew its opinion and requested a supplemental briefing on the impact of that case on this one.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and vacated Defendant’s conviction. The court held that Bruen requires the court to re-evaluate its Second Amendment jurisprudence and that under Bruen, Section 922(g)(8) fails to pass constitutional muster. The court explained that the Government failed to demonstrate that Section 922(g)(8)’s restriction of the Second Amendment right fits within the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Government’s proffered analogues falter under one or both of the metrics the Supreme Court articulated in Bruen as the baseline for measuring “relevantly similar” analogues: “how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense.” As a result, Section 922(g)(8) falls outside the class of firearm regulations countenanced by the Second Amendment. View "USA v. Rahimi" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted in 2015 of possessing child pornography and sentenced to an 86-month term of imprisonment and six years of supervised release. In 2019, Defendant violated the conditions of his supervised release, and the district court sentenced him to fifteen more months of imprisonment to be followed by five years of supervised release. After starting his second term of supervised release, Defendant again violated its conditions. The district court revoked Defendant’s supervised release and sentenced him to eighteen more months of imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that his constitutional rights were violated at his preliminary revocation hearing, that the district court erred in detaining him pending the final revocation hearing, and that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence upon revocation.   The Fifth Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court reasoned that because it is impossible to say how the district court would have sentenced Defendant if it had known that the Guidelines range was nine months total and that the total statutory maximum sentence was twenty-four months, not nine months per violation, the court cannot resolve whether the district court’s error affected Defendant’s prison sentence. The district court may have varied or departed upwards and imposed the same eighteen-month sentence or a longer one, up to the twenty-four-month statutory maximum. Or, as evinced by the district court’s desire to follow the Guidelines, the district court may have imposed a more modest upwards variance or departure than eighteen months. Thus, the district court’s misunderstanding of its authority to sentence Defendant was not harmless. View "USA v. Greer" on Justia Law