Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Armando P. Ibanez, a Mexican-American male, was employed by Texas A&M University–Kingsville (TAMUK) as an Assistant Professor of Communications/Radio-Television-Film. After five years, he applied for tenure and promotion to associate professor. TAMUK's requirements included the completion of at least two juried creative activities. Ibanez produced several creative works, but only one, a film titled "Men of Steel," was labeled as juried. His application for tenure and promotion was initially recommended by his departmental committee but was subsequently denied by the department chair, college committee, college dean, and provost, who cited his failure to meet the minimum requirements for juried creative activities.Ibanez appealed the decision, and an advisory committee found a prima facie case for reconsideration. The tenure appeals committee supported him, but the promotion appeals committee did not. Ultimately, the university president denied his tenure and promotion based on the negative recommendations and perceived lack of scholarship. Ibanez then sued TAMUK, alleging racial and national origin discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of TAMUK, dismissing Ibanez’s claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that Ibanez failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he did not meet TAMUK’s baseline tenure requirements of two juried creative activities. Additionally, the court found no genuine dispute of material fact suggesting that Ibanez was denied tenure under circumstances permitting an inference of discrimination. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of TAMUK. View "Ibanez v. Texas A&M" on Justia Law

In the early morning hours of July 10, 2018, Trooper Kasha Domingue stopped a vehicle. After the driver and another passenger fled, Clifton Scott Dilley exited the vehicle from the driver-side rear seat. The events that followed are disputed, but it is undisputed that Domingue shot Dilley, paralyzing him from the waist down. The incident was partially captured by a nearby security camera, which lacked audio. The footage shows Domingue pulling over the SUV, the driver exiting and interacting with Domingue, and then fleeing. Dilley then exited the vehicle, and Domingue shot him in the back.The Louisiana Department of Public Safety terminated Domingue for her actions, citing her failure to use her body camera and her false statements about the incident. Domingue initially claimed she used a taser and later fabricated a story about her defensive posture during the shooting. The Louisiana State Use of Force Board found that Domingue violated multiple policies and committed criminal negligence. She was charged with aggravated second-degree battery and illegal use of weapons, to which she pleaded guilty in 2022.Dilley sued Domingue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for using excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana denied Domingue's motion for summary judgment, finding several disputes of material fact and denying her qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that officers cannot use deadly force against a fleeing suspect who poses no immediate threat. Given the numerous factual disputes, including Domingue's inconsistent statements and the video evidence, the court found that a jury could reasonably conclude that Domingue violated clearly established law by shooting an unarmed and nonthreatening Dilley in the back without warning. The denial of qualified immunity was affirmed. View "Dilley v. Domingue" on Justia Law

Hung Huu Quoc Nguyen challenged the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (USCIS) revocation of its approval of his EB-3 visa petition. An EB-3 visa allows noncitizens performing unskilled labor with a full-time job offer to work in the U.S. and potentially adjust their status to permanent resident. Nguyen’s employer, Muy Pizza Tejas, LLC, filed an I-140 petition on his behalf, which was later approved. However, after Muy Pizza sold the restaurant employing Nguyen to Ayvaz Pizza, USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Revoke the approval, citing concerns about Muy Pizza’s ability to pay Nguyen’s wages and the validity of the numerous I-140 petitions it had filed.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed Nguyen’s case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the claims amounted to a challenge of an unreviewable discretionary decision by USCIS. Nguyen appealed, arguing that his I-140 petition met the portability provision requirements under 8 U.S.C. § 1154(j), which should have prevented USCIS from revoking the petition. He also claimed that USCIS made procedural errors, including failing to make a successor-in-interest determination regarding Ayvaz Pizza.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the portability provision did not apply to Nguyen’s I-140 petition because it was invalid from the start due to Muy Pizza’s failure to prove its ability to pay Nguyen’s wages. Consequently, the court found that USCIS’s revocation of the petition was a discretionary decision not subject to judicial review. Additionally, the court determined that Nguyen did not establish any specific procedural errors by USCIS that would warrant judicial review. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Nguyen v. Jaddou" on Justia Law

Eileen Cure, a licensed investment advisor, entered into agreements with LPL Financial LLC (LPL) to act as a registered representative under LPL’s broker-dealer umbrella. These agreements included arbitration provisions. Cure, along with her companies, Cure & Associates, P.C. and Premier Wealth & Retirement Management, LLC, filed claims against LPL after LPL terminated its relationship with Cure, alleging she violated LPL’s policies. Cure’s companies, which were not signatories to the arbitration agreements, also alleged business disparagement and other claims against LPL.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted LPL’s motion to compel arbitration for Cure but denied it for her companies, stating that the companies were not signatories to the arbitration agreements. The court also denied LPL’s request to stay the litigation pending arbitration. LPL appealed, arguing that under California and Texas law, equitable estoppel principles should compel Cure’s companies to arbitrate their claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Cure’s companies, although nonsignatories, were bound by the arbitration provisions due to equitable estoppel. The court found that the companies received direct benefits from Cure’s agreements with LPL, making them subject to the arbitration clauses. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of LPL’s motion to compel arbitration for the companies and vacated the order denying a stay of the litigation. The case was remanded for the district court to compel arbitration of the companies’ claims and to stay the action pending arbitration. View "Cure & Associates, P.C. v. LPL Financial" on Justia Law

Crusader Gun Group, L.L.C. applied for a Federal Firearms License (FFL) in November 2020, with Alan Aronstein identified as the president and responsible person. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) denied the application, citing Aronstein's history of willfully violating federal firearms laws through his previous roles in other firearms businesses. These violations included over 6,000 recordkeeping errors, failure to report the theft or loss of firearms, and possession of unlawful machine guns. Crusader requested a hearing, but the ATF upheld its decision, leading Crusader to seek judicial review.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the ATF. The court found that the ATF was authorized to deny the application based on Aronstein's willful violations of federal firearms laws. Crusader's cross-motion for summary judgment was denied, prompting an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the ATF was authorized to deny Crusader's FFL application under 18 U.S.C. § 923(d)(1)(C) because Aronstein, as the responsible person, had willfully violated federal firearms laws. The court also rejected Crusader's due process claims, noting that adequate procedural safeguards were in place, including notice, a hearing, and the opportunity for judicial review. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to stay discovery, as the administrative record was sufficient for summary judgment. The court concluded that the ATF's denial of the FFL application was lawful and supported by substantial evidence. View "Crusader Gun Group v. James" on Justia Law

Ruel M. Hamilton, a real estate developer in Dallas, Texas, was involved in efforts to place a paid sick leave ordinance on the ballot. He was asked by Councilman Philip Kingston to speak with Councilman Dwaine Caraway to persuade the Mayor to put the ordinance on the City Council’s agenda. Unbeknownst to Hamilton, Caraway was cooperating with the FBI. During a recorded meeting, Hamilton offered to help Caraway financially, and Caraway mentioned needing $6,200. Hamilton then wrote Caraway a check for $7,000.A grand jury indicted Hamilton on four counts, including bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) and a Travel Act violation under 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3). The jury convicted Hamilton of the bribery charge but acquitted him of the Travel Act charge. Hamilton appealed, arguing that the jury should have been instructed that the bribery charge required proof of a quid pro quo bribe. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed, vacated the conviction, and remanded the case. The Government decided to retry the bribery charge, but Hamilton moved to dismiss, claiming double jeopardy and collateral estoppel. The district court denied his motion, stating that the two charges involved different conduct and elements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Hamilton did not meet the burden of proving that the jury in the first trial necessarily decided that the check was not a quid pro quo bribe. The court noted that the jury could have acquitted Hamilton on the Travel Act charge based on his lack of specific intent during the August 2 phone call, rather than on the nature of the check given on August 3. Therefore, the retrial of the bribery charge did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. View "United States v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Steve Winder became suicidal after discovering Facebook messages between his wife and her ex-husband. His wife, Latrisha, who was out of state, called her mother, Lou Anne, and the Young County Sheriff’s Department for a welfare check after Steve sent pictures of himself holding a gun to his head. Deputy Joshua Gallardo arrived at the scene, and after hearing Steve shout from within, opened the front door. Lou Anne indicated that Steve was armed. Deputy Gallardo then fatally shot Steve after ordering him to put the gun down.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the case at the 12(b)(6) stage. The court found that Steve’s suicidality and possession of a gun created exigent circumstances excusing the need for a warrant. It also ruled that an objectively reasonable officer in Deputy Gallardo’s position would not need to wait for Steve to point the gun at him before using deadly force, thus defeating the excessive force claim. Additionally, the court found no underlying constitutional violation to support claims for supervisory or Monell liability and ruled that Title II of the ADA does not support claims where police officers face exigent circumstances.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry and that Deputy Gallardo’s use of deadly force was reasonable under the circumstances. The court also found no basis for supervisory or Monell liability due to the absence of an underlying constitutional violation. Lastly, the court ruled that the ADA claims were foreclosed by the exigent circumstances and that there was no evidence that Steve was discriminated against by reason of his disability. View "Winder v. Gallardo" on Justia Law

Kenneth Bryan Ritchey, the defendant, operated Gulf Coast Pharmaceuticals Plus, LLC, a wholesale distributor of pharmaceutical products. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Ritchey directed his employees to acquire large quantities of personal protective equipment (PPE) and resell them at inflated prices to various healthcare providers, including the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The VA was charged significantly higher prices than the market value, resulting in Ritchey and his company receiving over $2 million, including more than $270,000 from the VA.Ritchey was charged with six counts, including conspiracy to defraud the United States. He pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 371, and the remaining counts were dismissed. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi calculated Ritchey’s offense level based on the estimated pecuniary loss caused by his actions, which included a significant enhancement for the amount of loss. The court determined the fair market value (FMV) of the PPE based on pre-pandemic prices and 3M’s pricing, leading to a higher offense level and a 60-month prison sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in calculating the FMV by relying on pre-pandemic prices and 3M’s pricing, which did not reflect the actual market conditions during the pandemic. The appellate court held that the district court’s method of determining the FMV was not based on a realistic economic approach. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit vacated Ritchey’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, emphasizing the need for a more accurate calculation of the FMV that reflects the market conditions at the time of the transactions. View "United States v. Ritchey" on Justia Law

Dr. Ronald S. Hines, a retired and physically disabled veterinarian licensed in Texas, provided online pet-care advice without physically examining the animals. Texas law requires veterinarians to establish a veterinarian-client-patient relationship (VCPR) through an in-person examination or a visit to the premises where the animal is kept before offering veterinary advice. Dr. Hines was penalized for violating this requirement, receiving probation, a fine, and being forced to retake a licensing exam. He challenged the law on First Amendment grounds, arguing that it unconstitutionally restricted his speech.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas initially dismissed Dr. Hines's First Amendment claim, but the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for further consideration in light of new Supreme Court precedent. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that the law regulated Dr. Hines's speech in a content-neutral way and survived intermediate scrutiny. Dr. Hines appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the physical-examination requirement primarily regulated Dr. Hines's speech rather than his conduct. The court found that the State failed to demonstrate that the harms it sought to address with the law were real and that the law alleviated these harms in a direct and material way. The court also concluded that the law was not narrowly tailored to serve the State's interests, as it burdened substantially more speech than necessary. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment for Dr. Hines, upholding his First Amendment rights. View "Hines v. Pardue" on Justia Law

Federal agents received a tip about methamphetamine being stored at a house in El Paso, Texas. An informant arranged a controlled buy with Carla Dominguez, who confirmed she had methamphetamine for sale. Dominguez and her husband, Samuel Crittenden, were observed by agents; Crittenden retrieved a bag from the house and handed it to Dominguez, who was later intercepted by police with ten pounds of methamphetamine. Crittenden admitted to storing items at the house and giving a bag to Dominguez, claiming he thought it contained marijuana. Additional drugs were found in the attic of the house.Crittenden and Dominguez were charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute methamphetamine and marijuana. The government raised a potential conflict of interest with Crittenden’s attorney, Leonard Morales, who also represented another individual involved in drug activities. The district court held a Garcia hearing, where Crittenden waived his right to conflict-free counsel. The court accepted the waiver, and the trial proceeded. Crittenden was convicted on all counts, but the district court later granted a new trial due to insufficient evidence. The Fifth Circuit reinstated the conviction for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and remanded for sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Crittenden’s appeal, where he argued that the district court erred in accepting his waiver of conflict-free counsel and in denying a lesser-included-offense instruction for simple possession. The Fifth Circuit found that Crittenden’s waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, and that the district court did not err in accepting it. The court also held that the evidence overwhelmingly indicated intent to distribute, making a lesser-included-offense instruction for simple possession inappropriate. The court affirmed the district court’s decisions and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Crittenden" on Justia Law