Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs were a class of people who had been charged with misdemeanor and felony crimes in Dallas County and who were allegedly unconstitutionally incarcerated pretrial solely because they were financially unable to post required bail. While the case was arguably moot, the Fifth Circuit determined it had the discretion to determine whether a federal court should have proceeded to the merits of plaintiffs’ bail “reform” lawsuit in the first place.The court explained that Younger requires federal court abstention when three criteria are met: “(1) the federal proceeding would interfere with an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the state has an important interest in regulating the subject matter of the claim; and (3) the plaintiff has an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges. Finding all three prongs of Younger were met, the court overruled ODonnell I, ODonnell v. Harris Cnty., 882F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2018), holding against abstention in this matter. As an alternate holding, the court ultimately determined that the plaintiffs' case was moot. View "Daves v. Dallas County" on Justia Law

After the EEOC closed its investigation into Plaintiff’s charge of discrimination, the agency issued Plaintiff a right-to-sue notice. This notice, however, only reached Plaintiff’s attorney and not Plaintiff himself. The EEOC then sent a subsequent notice acknowledging that the first had not reached Plaintiff and advising him that his 90-day window in which to file suit began to run upon its—the second notice’s—receipt. Plaintiff filed his complaint 141 days after his attorney is presumed to have received the first notice and 89 days after Plaintiff and his attorney received the second. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s suit as untimely and held that equitable tolling was unavailable.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint. The court explained that Plaintiff’s case did not present the kind of exceptional circumstances that may warrant equitable tolling; the district court failed to consider controlling precedent from this court that tolling may be available when the EEOC affirmatively misleads a claimant about the time in which he must file his federal complaint. The court wrote that this was an abuse of discretion. Further, the court found that the district court did not proceed beyond this first prong of the tolling analysis the record at this motion to dismiss stage does not disclose whether Plaintiff diligently pursued his rights. View "Bernstein v. Maximus Federal Services" on Justia Law

A trusted prison inmate was working unsupervised in a hog barn when the ceiling collapsed, striking him in the head. He told the prison agricultural specialist that he needed medical attention. But the specialist thought the inmate looked no worse for wear and ordered him back to work. A short while later, the inmate asked another prison staffer for medical attention. The staffer radioed a supervisor. Based on the staffer’s report, the supervisor, too, thought nothing serious had happened and did not immediately grant the inmate’s request. The inmate’s condition later worsened. He was sent to the hospital and diagnosed with a traumatic brain injury. Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that prison staff violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by acting with deliberate indifference towards him. Under the Texas Tort Claims Act, Plaintiff alleged premises-liability claims. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants based on qualified immunity.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff failed to raise a factual dispute over whether the prison officials acted with deliberate indifference. But even if he had, he’d still need to show that his rights were “clearly established at the time of the violation.” The court explained that involves showing that “the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” It just isn’t enough to identify a right as “a broad general proposition.” The district court did not address qualified immunity’s second step. Further, the court agreed with Defendants that even assuming a violation, the law was not clearly established under this standard. View "Rogers v. Jarrett" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of one drug conspiracy count for each predicate drug. It also convicted Defendant of two additional counts for possession with intent to distribute hydrocodone and carisoprodol. The district court sentenced him to 151 months imprisonment, the low end of the applicable Guidelines range. On direct appeal, Defendant argued that errors in the district court’s jury instructions require his retrial. In the alternative, Defendant argued that the district court miscalculated his Sentencing Guidelines offense level.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even if idiosyncratic portions of the jury charge lacked clarity on Section 841(a)’s mens rea requirement, the adequate Section 846 mens rea instruction filled any gap by clearly requiring that the jury find that Defendant have understood the illegitimate nature of his conduct. Further, any error in Section 841(a) instruction was harmless. Moreover, the court wrote that here, the trial court’s remarks explained relevant, available inferences in conditional language but did not dictate that the jury reach any specific outcome. The trial court also emphasized to the jury that they should “not assume from anything I may have done or said during the trial that I have any opinion” concerning the case and that the jury must “arrive at your own verdict.” The court found that a review of the remainder of the trial record reveals no evidence of bias on the part of the trial judge. View "USA v. Ajayi" on Justia Law

Two outdoor-advertising companies filed applications with the City of Austin to digitize existing, traditional billboards and to upgrade signs with less sophisticated digitization. The City rejected their applications because the signs would advertise a business, service, or activity that was not located on the site where the sign was installed. The companies sued, arguing that the City’s Sign Code’s distinction between on-premises and off-premises signs violated the First Amendment. The district court upheld the Sign Code. When the case first came to this court, we reversed, holding that the on-premises/off-premises distinction was content-based and could not survive strict scrutiny. The U.S. Supreme Court, though, held that the City’s Sign Code was facially content neutral and, absent an impermissible purpose, would be subject to intermediate scrutiny. The court remanded.   The Fifth Circuit concluded, applying the Supreme Court’s new guidance, that the Sign Code survives intermediate scrutiny. The court explained that the effort to compare all billboards to all news racks fails. The Supreme Court could discern no meaningful difference between newspapers and commercial handbills. Both were sold on identical news racks and were equally responsible for the harm inflicted on public safety and aesthetics. In the context of sign regulations, by contrast, the court has discerned a meaningful difference between on-premises and off-premises signs. Further, the court found that municipalities have traditionally been given wide discretion in the domain of sign regulations, and Austin is entitled to that latitude. View "Reagan Natl Advtsng v. City of Austin" on Justia Law

Defendant, a criminal noncitizen with a burglary conviction and two subsequent illegal-reentry convictions, was convicted of illegal reentry for a third time. The district court characterized his burglary conviction as an aggravated felony. The district court also characterized his two prior illegal-reentry convictions as aggravated felonies under a statutory provision stating that illegal reentry is itself an aggravated felony when committed by someone previously deported following an aggravated felony conviction. The designation “aggravated felony” is significant because it subjects the alien to a maximum prison sentence of 20 years. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court mischaracterized his past offenses because, under an intervening Supreme Court case, his predicate burglary conviction no longer qualifies as an aggravated felony. He insists the district court erred in sentencing him under Section 1326(b)(2).   The Fifth Circuit reformed the judgment to reflect that Defendant was convicted and sentenced under Section 1326(b)(2) and affirmed the judgment as reformed. The court explained that Defendant was correctly sentenced under Section 1326(b)(2) because he was previously removed “subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony.” Defendant’s first illegal reentry, for which he was sentenced under Section 1326(b)(2), was an aggravated felony under Section 1101(a)(43)(O). View "USA v. Huerta-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted after a bench trial of possession of a firearm by a felon. On appeal, Defendant contended that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that the Sergeant had reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity in the alley. First, Defendant’s location and timing provide a strong foundation for finding reasonable suspicion. Second, Defendant’s emergence and subsequent actions similarly give rise to reasonable suspicion. Third, Defendant’s inconsistent and nonsensical answers to the Sergeant’s questions gave rise to reasonable suspicion. Further, the court explained that even if the Sergeant and officer realized in the course of the seizure that Defendant was not the individual in the photograph, there remained numerous articulable and suspicious facts supporting a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing sufficient to extend the seizure, namely Defendant’s actions and statements before the photograph’s arrival as well as his suspicious answers in response to questions generated by the picture itself. View "USA v. Roper" on Justia Law

Appellants are serving, respectively, a 1,111-month sentence and a 738-month sentence for multiple robberies and violations of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). Appellants brought successive 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motions, alleging United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), rendered their Section 924(c) convictions invalid. The district court dismissed their motions for lack of jurisdiction.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellants contend that even under the ‘more likely than not’ standard, their claims survive and should proceed to the merits. But they failed to prove it is more likely than not that the jury convicted them of Section 924(c) offenses based on predicate conspiracy offenses. Appellants next note each Section 924(c) count states that Appellants “did knowingly use and carry a firearm during and in relation to the commission of a crime of violence, namely: a robbery, which obstructed, delayed, and affected commerce, a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951, as alleged” in the immediately preceding, multiplicitous Hobbs Act counts. The court found that the verdict form could have been more clearly expressed. However, the court explained that on considering the trial record as a whole, including the oral jury instructions, the trial evidence, and the minimally useful post-conviction record, the jury convicted Appellants of actual robbery, not mere conspiracy. Accordingly, the court found that Appellants have not carried their burden to prove that it is more likely than not the jury convicted them of Section 924(c) offenses based on conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery. View "USA v. Diggs" on Justia Law

In May 2017, La’Shadion Shemwell was elected to the McKinney City Council. Shemwell’s term was cut short when the voters recalled him in November 2020. Shemwell claimed that the McKinney recall election procedures violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  Six months after dismissing his first lawsuit and two months before his recall election, Shemwell filed this suit on September 13, 2020. He asserted the same claims, this time with an additional Plaintiff— a Latina District 1 voter. The district court held the case moot, declined to apply the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception, and granted the City’s motion to dismiss. The sole issue on appeal is whether the November 2020 recall election mooted Plaintiffs’ claim for prospective declaratory relief.   The Fifth Circuit found that the November 2020 election mooted this case and held that Plaintiffs’ failed to satisfy the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” mootness exception. The court explained that Shemwell—in his official capacity—failed to claim or prove that he was likely to run again for District 1, win, and face the allegedly unlawful recall provisions. And Plaintiffs’—in their capacity as voters—failed to claim or prove that there was more than an “abstract or hypothetical” possibility that they would ever vote in another recall election of a District 1 Council Member. Thus, any judgment issued after the recall election would have been an impermissible advisory opinion. Further, Plaintiffs repeatedly abandoned their claims for injunctive relief—and never pursued expedited relief. View "Shemwell v. McKinney, Texas" on Justia Law

Defendant, a federal prisoner, appealed the denial of his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1). Defendant offered four reasons for his Section 3582(c)(1) motion. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that Defendant’s first three arguments are not cognizable bases for compassionate release and the fourth does not have merit.   Defendant argued that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective and that the Government breached his plea agreement. But because these claims are cognizable under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, they are not cognizable under 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c). Second, Defendant argued that he should get a sentence reduction because the First Step Act reduced the statutory minimums applicable to his offenses. But Congress did not make those reductions retroactive. And a prisoner may not leverage non-retroactive changes in criminal law to support a compassionate release motion because such changes are neither extraordinary nor compelling. Third, Defendant briefly suggested that an amendment to the United States Sentencing Guidelines favors his early release. Defendant did not adequately present this argument to the district court, however, so it is forfeited   Defendant’s fourth and final argument is the only one that states a possibly cognizable basis for compassionate release—namely, that COVID-19 constitutes an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for his release. To support this argument, Defendant suggested that his prior COVID-19 infection and general ill health place him at greater risk from COVID-19 relative to the broader population. The court wrote it has repeatedly denied relief in cases where prisoners sought compassionate release due to fear of communicable disease, even when those prisoners were in poor health. View "USA v. McMaryion" on Justia Law