Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

the Biden Administration issued an executive order that re-established an interagency working group (“Working Group”) to formulate guidance on the “social cost of greenhouse gases.” That order directed the Working Group to publish dollar estimates quantifying changes in carbon, methane, and nitrous oxide emissions (collectively, “greenhouse gases”) for consideration by federal agencies when policymaking. Working Group has since published “Interim Estimates” based largely on the findings of its predecessor working group. The Plaintiffs-States (“Plaintiffs”) challenge E.O. 13990 and the Interim Estimates as procedurally invalid, arbitrary and capricious, inconsistent with various agency-specific statutes, and ultra vires. They obtained a preliminary injunction in the district court. Defendants appealed, and the Fifth Circuit panel stayed the injunction.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed this action because Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to prove standing. Plaintiffs’ allegations of “injury in fact” rely on a chain of hypotheticals: federal agencies may (or may not) premise their actions on the Interim Estimates in a manner that may (or may not) burden the States. Such injuries do not flow from the Interim Estimates but instead from potential future regulations, i.e., final rules that are subject to their own legislated avenues of scrutiny, dialogue, and judicial review on an appropriately developed record. View "State of Louisiana v. Biden" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, his wife, and his three children are Libyan citizens who have resided lawfully in the United States for over a decade. Plaintiff filed an I-140 petition seeking a waiver of the labor-certification requirement of his visa because he is a “professional holding an advanced degree whose work is in the national interest of the United States.” While the petition was pending, Plaintiff and his family filed I-485 applications for status adjustment to legal permanent residents (“LPRs”) under 8 U.S.C. Section 1255(a). Section 1255 grants the Attorney General the discretion to adjust the status of certain aliens to LPR status if they have met certain statutorily specified conditions. The USCIS granted the family’s I-485 petitions prematurely. The district court found that it had no subject matter jurisdiction to review the original denial of the I-140 because Plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the order of dismissal. The court held that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction to review a status-adjustment decision by the USCIS under either the APA or the INA because the alien retains the right to de novo review of that decision in his final removal proceedings. Thus, the court found that Plaintiffs have not yet exhausted administrative remedies and the court may not exercise jurisdiction. View "Elldakli v. Garland" on Justia Law

Appellant Southern Orthopaedic Specialists, L.L.C. (“Southern Orthopaedic”) sued its insurer, State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (“State Farm”), to recover business interruption losses caused by covid-related shutdowns. It also claims that State Farm negligently misrepresented the scope of the policy’s coverage. The district court dismissed these claims as foreclosed by the policy and Louisiana law.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Southern Orthopaedic’s pleadings fall short. They do not allege that covid caused “tangible or corporeal” property damage. Nor do they allege that the presence of covid particles required physically repairing or replacing any part of Southern Orthopaedics’s property. Nor do they claim that the presence of covid necessitated lasting alterations to the property. Without allegations of this nature, Southern Orthopaedic cannot meet the requirement of pleading an “accidental direct physical loss” under the policy. View "S Orthopaedic Spclt v. State Farm Fire" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cactus Canyon Quarries, Inc. (“Cactus Canyon”) appeals a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (“Commission”). In 2020, Cactus Canyon was issued three citations by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA).   The Fifth Circuit denied Cactus Canyon’s petition, holding that the ALJ properly interpreted Section 56.14101(a)(3) to include the low brake pressure alarm as a component of the truck’s “braking system.” Cactus Canyon contends that the alarm is not such a component because it has no effect on the braking system’s ability to stop and hold equipment. But the plain language and purpose support the inclusion of the alarm in the “braking system.” The court concluded that the braking standard unambiguously supports the Government’s interpretation. Since a “system”—by definition at the time of the standard’s passage—is composed of parts, the Section’s reference to “braking systems” extends to its related components, including those that do not simply function to stop and hold the vehicle. View "Cactus Canyon Quarries v. MSHR" on Justia Law

In 2019, after a nine-day jury trial, Defendants C.M. and D.P. were convicted on several counts related to their involvement in a drug trafficking organization. On appeal, C.M. challenged only her kidnapping conviction, while D.P. raised several challenges to each of his convictions.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that it was not an error for the district court to instruct the jury that the offender’s own interstate or foreign travel could supply the jurisdictional hook. However, in instructing the jury, the district court did not clarify that the offender’s travel must be “in committing or in furtherance of the commission of the offense.” Nonetheless, the court found that this error does not warrant a plain error reversal. Further, the court found that the same evidence supporting D.P.’s conspiracy conviction supports his possession conviction on an aiding and abetting theory of liability. From that evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that, by calling in the car so that the sham cocaine could be seized and the real drugs successfully sold, D.P. associated and participated in the drug trafficking venture in a way calculated to bring about its success. Moreover, here, D.P.’s arguments as to his motion for a new trial are essentially the same as those raised in his sufficiency challenge. Thus, the court found the evidence sufficient to support each of his convictions. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying D.P.’s motion for a new trial. View "USA v. Polanco" on Justia Law

Direct Biologics, LLC (“DB”) brought claims for breach of covenant to not compete and misappropriation of trade secrets against Adam McQueen, DB’s former employee, and Vivex Biologics, Inc. (“Vivex”), McQueen’s new employer. After granting DB a temporary restraining order based on its trade secret claims, the district court denied DB’s application for a preliminary injunction. Finding that DB’s claims were subject to arbitration, the district court also dismissed DB’s claims against McQueen and Vivex and entered final judgment.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s orders denying DB’s motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissing DB’s claims and remanded. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to presume irreparable injury based on McQueen’s breach of his non-compete covenants. The court held that remand is thus proper to allow the district court to make particularized findings regarding irreparable harm; specifically, the likelihood of misuse of DB’s information and the difficulty of quantifying damages should such misuse occur. View "Direct Biologics v. McQueen" on Justia Law

In 2019, after a nine-day jury trial, Defendants C.M. and D.P. were convicted on several counts related to their involvement in a drug trafficking organization. On appeal, C.M. challenged only her kidnapping conviction, while D.P. raised several challenges to each of his convictions.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that it was not an error for the district court to instruct the jury that the offender’s own interstate or foreign travel could supply the jurisdictional hook. However, in instructing the jury, the district court did not clarify that the offender’s travel must be “in committing or in furtherance of the commission of the offense.” Nonetheless, the court found that this error does not warrant a plain error reversal. Further, the court found that the same evidence supporting D.P.’s conspiracy conviction supports his possession conviction on an aiding and abetting theory of liability. From that evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that, by calling in the car so that the sham cocaine could be seized and the real drugs successfully sold, D.P. associated and participated in the drug trafficking venture in a way calculated to bring about its success. Moreover, here, D.P.’s arguments as to his motion for a new trial are essentially the same as those raised in his sufficiency challenge. Thus, the court found the evidence sufficient to support each of his convictions. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying D.P.’s motion for a new trial. View "USA v. Meyer" on Justia Law

The United Auto Workers union (“UAW”) and three pro-union Tesla employees filed multiple charges with the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) alleging unfair labor practices against Tesla. An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Tesla had committed most of the alleged violations, and the NLRB issued an order largely affirming the ALJ. Both Tesla and the UAW filed petitions for review, and the NLRB filed a cross-application to enforce its order. Tesla and the UAW each challenged two of the NLRB’s findings through this appeal.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petitions for review. The court held that the NLRB’s findings were supported by substantial evidence, and it did not abuse its broad remedial discretion in declining to issue a notice-reading remedy. The court explained that the UAW cited no authority mandating a notice reading to remedy repeated violations in the absence of intervening cease-and-desist orders. And, as Tesla emphasizes, the company at most continued to commit violations after having a complaint filed against it, not after being ordered to cease its conduct. Moreover, given the deferential standard of review and the “special respect” given to the NLRB’s choice of remedy in light of its policy expertise and its broad, discretionary remedial powers, the court declined to disturb the NLRB’s order in this regard. View "Tesla v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Forensic Laboratory, Inc., KHS, the KISD Police Department, the KISD Board of Trustees (“KISD Board”), and a number of KHS, KISD, and KISD Police Department employees in their individual and official capacities. That suit was filed in the state district court in Fort Bend County, Texas. McClelland alleged (1) violations of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; (2) violations of his procedural and substantive due process rights; and (3) various state law claims, including defamation, spoliation, and civil conspiracy. The district court granted Defendants motion to dismiss and denied several other pending motions.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court correctly analyzed Plaintiff’s void-for-vagueness claim and did not err in dismissing it. It is well settled, in the educational context, that a plaintiff must allege a protected property interest. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is devoid of any such allegations. And, even if he had alleged lack of participation on the football team or team captainship in connection with vagueness, he still would not prevail. Further, the court wrote that the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s substantive and procedural due process claims because Plaintiff did not allege the deprivation of his property or liberty interests. View "McClelland v. Katy Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a Houston lawyer who has appeared before Judge Newman, a former probate judge in Harris County. It is undisputed that Judge Newman used his private Facebook account to support his campaign for reelection as well as share news about his personal and family life with the public. Plaintiff commented on three of Judge Newman’s posts that related to his campaign for reelection. The comments accused Judge Newman of having “court cronies” and doing “favors for them at the expense of other litigants.” He also commented that he would not vote for Judge Newman and accused him of favoritism. Judge Newman deleted the comments and blocked Plaintiff’s account. Plaintiff sued Judge Newman under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that he violated his First Amendment rights. The district court denied his motion to amend his complaint and granted Judge Newman’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that he failed to plead facts sufficient to show that Judge Newman acted under the color of state law as required by Section 1983.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that because Judge Newman was not acting under the color of state law when he blocked Plaintiff and deleted his comments, the court held that Plaintiff has not met his burden under Section 1983. The court further held that the way in which Plaintiff sought to amend the complaint would not overcome its deficiencies. View "Kallinen v. Newman" on Justia Law