Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A professor at a public university alleged that several university administrators violated his First Amendment rights. The professor, known for his outspoken criticism of university policies and administrators on social media and in public forums, claimed that university officials attempted to silence him. He asserted that they threatened his job security, pay, research opportunities, and academic freedom, and that a university employee requested police surveillance of his speech. The professor stated that these actions caused him to self-censor, including making his social media account private and ceasing to post, out of concern for potential retaliation.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas reviewed the case after the professor filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging both retaliation for protected speech and the existence of an unwritten speech code that chilled his speech. The district court dismissed the retaliation claim, finding that the professor had not sufficiently alleged an adverse employment action, and granted summary judgment on the chilled-speech claim for the same reason. The court also dismissed the claim regarding the unwritten speech code, concluding that the professor had not adequately alleged a facial or as-applied First Amendment violation. Additionally, the court resolved two discovery disputes in favor of the university.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that the professor had standing to bring his claims but could not prevail on the merits. The court determined that, under established Fifth Circuit precedent, a First Amendment retaliation claim requires an adverse employment action, which the professor did not experience. The court also found that the chilled-speech claim was not distinct from the retaliation claim and failed for the same reason. The court further held that the allegations regarding an unwritten speech code were too conclusory to state a plausible claim. The court upheld the district court’s discovery rulings, finding no abuse of discretion or prejudice. The judgment was affirmed. View "Lowery v. Mills" on Justia Law

After a series of chemical explosions at an industrial plant in Crosby, Texas, following Hurricane Harvey, property owners and lessees in the affected area experienced contamination and property damage. These individuals, including the appellants, initially participated in a federal class action seeking both injunctive and monetary relief for the harm caused by the explosions. The federal district court certified a class for injunctive relief but declined to certify a class for monetary damages. Subsequently, a class settlement addressed only injunctive relief, leaving monetary claims unresolved.Following the settlement, nearly 800 class members, including the appellants, filed individual lawsuits in Texas state court seeking monetary damages for their property-related claims. The appellants acknowledged that their claims accrued in September 2017 and were subject to a two-year statute of limitations, but argued that the pendency of the federal class action tolled the limitations period under Texas law. Arkema, the defendant, removed the cases to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas and moved to dismiss, asserting that Texas does not recognize cross-jurisdictional tolling—meaning a federal class action does not toll the state statute of limitations. The district court consolidated the cases and dismissed the claims as untimely, relying on Fifth Circuit precedent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that, under its binding precedent, Texas law does not permit cross-jurisdictional tolling of statutes of limitations based on the pendency of a federal class action. The court rejected the appellants’ arguments for exceptions to this rule and found no intervening Texas authority to the contrary. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the appellants’ claims as time-barred. View "Ackerman v. Arkema" on Justia Law

Legacy Housing Corporation purchased several hundred vacant lots in Horseshoe Bay, Texas, intending to develop manufactured housing. The lots were subject to zoning restrictions, including a cap on speculative housing permits, contractor requirements, utility hookup fees, and setback rules. Legacy also acquired adjacent land in the city’s extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) to build a road connecting the lots to a nearby highway, but this land was restricted to agricultural and residential use. Despite these limitations, Legacy constructed a road over the ETJ property, a greenbelt strip, and some development lots, advertising it as a shortcut and access to planned amenities. The City and other defendants opposed the road, citing violations of existing restrictions. Legacy alleged a conspiracy among the City, the property owners’ association (POA), and developers to prevent its development.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas addressed multiple claims and counterclaims. It denied Legacy’s motion to dismiss the City’s counterclaims, granted the City’s motion to dismiss most claims against it, and granted summary judgment to all defendants on the remaining claims, including regulatory takings, Section 1983 violations, civil conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and a strips and gores claim. Legacy’s own motion for partial summary judgment was denied, and final judgment was entered.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings, with one modification. The appellate court held that Legacy’s regulatory takings claim regarding the two-permit cap was not prudentially ripe and should be dismissed without prejudice. The court otherwise affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, finding no genuine dispute of material fact and concluding that Legacy did not have property rights to build the road, nor did the defendants breach any legal duties or restrictive covenants. View "Legacy Hsing v. City of Horseshoe Bay" on Justia Law

A group of voters in Tarrant County, Texas, challenged the county’s decision to redraw the boundaries of its four commissioners precincts in 2025, a process that occurred outside the usual post-census redistricting cycle. The new map, adopted by a narrow 3–2 vote, shifted a significant number of voters—disproportionately Black, Latino, and Democratic—into precincts that would not hold commissioner elections until 2028, effectively postponing their opportunity to vote for a county commissioner by two years. The plaintiffs, who are racially diverse, argued that the redistricting was intended to harm racial minorities and Democratic voters, and that the mid-cycle timing unlawfully disenfranchised certain residents.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction to block the use of the new map in the 2026 election. The district court dismissed the First Amendment claims as nonjusticiable under Supreme Court precedent, but allowed the race discrimination and vote postponement claims to proceed, ultimately finding that the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The Fifth Circuit held that claims of partisan gerrymandering are nonjusticiable in federal court, even when staggered elections result in some voters’ ballots being postponed. The court further held that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that race was a motivating factor in the adoption of the new map, applying the Arlington Heights framework and finding no clear error in the district court’s assessment of the evidence. Finally, the court concluded that postponement of voting opportunities due to redistricting in a staggered election system does not violate the Constitution, as there is no right to vote on a particular schedule. View "Jackson v. Tarrant County" on Justia Law

A natural gas pipeline company replaced three aging compressor units along its pipeline, which transports gas from Canada to the Pacific Northwest. The replacements used newer, higher-capacity compressors, but the company initially installed controls to limit their output to match the old units. After completing the replacements, the company sought federal approval to expand pipeline capacity by removing those restrictions and making other upgrades, securing long-term contracts for the added capacity with new customers. The company excluded the cost of the earlier compressor replacements from the expansion’s cost estimate, assuming those costs would remain allocated to existing customers.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved the compressor replacements under its automatic authorization regulation, finding no further environmental review was needed. Later, FERC issued a certificate for the expansion project under the Natural Gas Act, after preparing an environmental impact statement (EIS) as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). FERC declined to treat the compressor replacements as part of the expansion for environmental or rate-setting purposes and denied the company’s request for a “predetermination” that expansion costs could be rolled into existing rates in future proceedings. Multiple parties, including two states and environmental groups, sought rehearing and then judicial review, challenging FERC’s decisions on environmental review, rate allocation, and public need.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the consolidated petitions. The court held that the pipeline company had standing and its claims were ripe. On the merits, the court found FERC’s decisions were not arbitrary or capricious. FERC reasonably excluded the compressor replacements from the expansion’s environmental and rate analysis, applied its established policies for rate-setting and public need, and provided sufficient environmental review under NEPA. The court denied all petitions for review. View "Gas Transmission Northwest v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

George Jimenez was charged after sending sexually explicit messages and images to his girlfriend’s minor daughter, MV-1, and other minors, while pretending to be a thirteen-year-old boy. Over several weeks, Jimenez requested nude photographs from MV-1, specifically asking for images of her breasts and pubic area. The conduct was discovered when MV-1’s mother reported her suspicions to the FBI, who then obtained and searched both Jimenez’s and MV-1’s phones. A grand jury indicted Jimenez on multiple counts, but only the charge of coercing and enticing a minor to engage in sexual activity under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) proceeded to a stipulated bench trial.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held a one-day bench trial on Count One. Jimenez moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that his requests amounted to a “lascivious display” and that the statute only covered physical conduct. The district court denied the motion and found Jimenez guilty, sentencing him to 240 months in prison and 10 years of supervised release. Jimenez appealed, challenging the interpretation of “sexual activity” under § 2422(b) and the sufficiency of the evidence regarding lascivious exhibition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s judgment. The court held that “sexual activity” under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) includes nonphysical conduct, such as the solicitation of sexually explicit images, and is not limited to interpersonal physical contact. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to support that Jimenez attempted to coerce MV-1 to engage in the lascivious exhibition of her genitals or pubic area under 18 U.S.C. § 2256. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. View "USA v. Jimenez" on Justia Law

A Mexican citizen, whose legal permanent resident status in the United States had been revoked, was previously removed from the country multiple times following a criminal conviction. In August 2023, he entered the United States from Mexico by bus, intentionally seeking arrest in order to challenge his prior deportation and potentially regain legal status. Upon arrival at the port of entry in El Paso, he bypassed a pedestrian turnstile, was quickly apprehended by Customs and Border Protection officers, and admitted his intent to be arrested. He was indicted for illegal re-entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas conducted a jury trial. The defendant did not dispute the factual basis of his entry but argued that he was not “free from official restraint” and therefore had not “entered” the United States in the legal sense. He requested a jury instruction defining “official restraint,” which the district court denied, reasoning that the concept was not an additional element of the offense and that the pattern jury instructions sufficed. The jury found him guilty of illegal re-entry, and the court entered judgment for attempted illegal re-entry, sentencing him to 18 months’ imprisonment and supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in refusing the requested instruction. The Fifth Circuit held that while “freedom from official restraint” is part of the definition of entry for § 1326(a), the pattern jury instruction given was a correct statement of law and adequately covered the issues. The court found that the defendant was able to present his defense theory to the jury, and thus, the absence of the requested instruction did not constitute reversible error. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction but remanded for correction of a clerical error in the judgment. View "United States v. Hernandez-Adame" on Justia Law

Fifty-six Texas emergency-medicine physician groups provided out-of-network emergency care to patients insured by twenty-four Blue Cross Blue Shield-affiliated plans from outside Texas. The physician groups sought reimbursement for their services, relying on assignments of benefits obtained from patients during hospital registration. The Blue Plans paid only part of the billed amounts, and the physician groups pursued appeals through the provider appeals process, but often received generic or no responses. After partial payments and unsuccessful appeals, the physician groups filed suit, alleging underpayment for 290,000 claims. Following a settlement, most claims were dismissed, and the district court selected 182 representative bellwether claims for summary judgment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted summary judgment for the Blue Plans on all bellwether claims. The court found that the physician groups lacked standing due to issues with the assignments, such as ambiguous language, lack of written evidence for some claims, and anti-assignment provisions in the underlying plans. The court also held that the physician groups failed to exhaust administrative remedies, as they did not use the member appeals process specified in the plans, and dismissed some claims as time-barred. Final judgment was entered for the Blue Plans, and the physician groups appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment only for claims where no written assignment was produced, finding the physician groups’ evidence insufficient. For the remaining claims, the Fifth Circuit vacated summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that ambiguities in assignment language created factual disputes, that assignments of “all rights” could include the right to sue, and that the district court applied the wrong legal standard to estoppel regarding anti-assignment clauses and exhaustion of administrative remedies. The case was remanded for further evidentiary determinations. View "Angelina Emergency Medicine Associates PA v. Blue Cross" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with multiple counts of sex trafficking and coercion or enticement of prostitution, each count relating to one of four women he managed as a pimp over several years. The women testified that the defendant controlled their earnings, provided necessities, and used physical abuse, threats, and manipulation—including withholding drugs—to force or coerce them into commercial sex acts. Some victims also described having their identification taken and being compelled to travel interstate for sex work. The government’s case included testimony from the victims, law enforcement officers, and documentary evidence such as online advertisements and social media posts.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas presided over the trial. During the proceedings, the defense moved for a mistrial or to exclude certain witness testimony, arguing that the government failed to disclose text messages between an investigator and a victim, in violation of Brady v. Maryland and the Jencks Act. The district court denied these motions, allowed the contested testimony, and also denied the defendant’s motions for judgment of acquittal and a new trial. The jury convicted the defendant on all but one count, and the court sentenced him to 480 months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo and found it sufficient to support the convictions. The court held that the missing text messages were not material under Brady or the Jencks Act, as their content was cumulative of other impeachment evidence. The court also found no reversible error in the admission of certain testimony and Instagram posts, concluding that any evidentiary errors were either harmless or not present. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Carol Rose, a prominent figure in the American Quarter Horse industry, entered into a series of agreements with Lori and Philip Aaron in 2013. The Aarons agreed to purchase a group of Rose’s horses at an auction, lease her Gainesville Ranch with an option to buy, and employ her as a consultant. The relationship quickly soured after the auction, with both sides accusing each other of breaches. Rose locked the Aarons out of the ranch and asserted a stable keeper’s lien for charges exceeding those related to the care of the Aarons’ horses. The Aarons paid the demanded sum and removed their horses. Litigation ensued, including claims by Jay McLaughlin, Rose’s former trainer, for damages related to the value of two fillies.The bankruptcy filings by Rose and her company led to the removal of the ongoing state-court litigation to the United States Bankruptcy Court. After trial, the bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the Aarons on their breach of contract and Texas Theft Liability Act (TTLA) claims, awarding damages and attorneys’ fees, and in favor of McLaughlin on his claim. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas reversed the bankruptcy court’s rulings on the Aarons’ claims and McLaughlin’s claim, vacating the damages and fee awards.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s reversal of the damages award for the Aarons’ breach of contract claim, holding that the Aarons failed to prove damages under any recognized Texas law measure. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment on the TTLA claim, holding that Rose’s threat to retain the Aarons’ horses for more than the lawful amount could constitute coercion under the TTLA, and remanded for further fact finding on intent and causation. The court also reversed and remanded the judgment regarding McLaughlin’s claim, finding his damages testimony legally insufficient. The court left the issue of attorneys’ fees for further proceedings. View "Rose v. Equis Equine" on Justia Law