Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs sued Defendants GEICO Advantage Insurance Company and its related entities. Each Plaintiff possessed a vehicle that was subject to a private passenger auto insurance policy with a different Defendant (collectively, the “Policies”). Each Plaintiff’s vehicle was involved in an auto collision while insured under one of the Policies. Plaintiffs sought to represent a class of insureds claiming that GEICO failed to fully compensate them for the total loss of their vehicles under their respective insurance policies. The district court held that Plaintiffs had standing to sue on behalf of the proposed class and subsequently granted class certification. GEICO appealed both holdings.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote it is clear that each Plaintiff individually satisfies the less stringent class certification approach. Indeed, there is no dispute that each Plaintiff alleges that he or she has suffered some injury; the disagreement between the parties concerns how those injuries relate to those of the class. Further, the court wrote it disagreed with the contention that Plaintiffs have alleged three separate injuries. GEICO’s failure to remit any of the three Purchasing Fees amounts to the same harm—a breach of the Policies. The court also concluded that the strategic value of these claims’ waiver is considerably greater than their inherent worth. It was accordingly within the district court’s discretion to rule that Plaintiffs are adequate class representatives. Moreover, the court wrote that GEICO’s arguments against class certification for this claim largely track its arguments opposing certification of Plaintiffs’ other claims. The district court’s analysis meets the requisite rigor when read in the broader context of its decision. View "Angell v. GEICO Advantage Ins" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury on five counts arising from a series of armed robberies of cell phone stores. He appealed his convictions and sentence. Defendant contends that he suffered a Speedy Trial Act violation because he was indicted more than thirty days after his arrest.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant does not dispute that the continuance satisfies the statutory language for exclusion. He contends instead that the extended time should nonetheless not be excluded because his counsel did not consult with him before filing the motion to continue. The court explained that this contention runs counter to the statutory text of the Speedy Trial Act, which expressly carves out delays resulting from continuances sought “at the request of the defendant or his counsel.” The text does not require that counsel obtain her client’s consent to seek a continuance.   Defendant also argued that the district court erred in its jury instructions on his Section 924(c) charges. He contends that the court erroneously defined the predicate offense, a “crime of violence,” as including attempted Hobbs Act robbery. The court held that because Defendant has not shown that his substantial rights were affected by the erroneous jury instruction, he fails plain-error review. Even if the error affected his substantial rights, the court would not exercise its discretion to correct the error because the error here did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the proceeding. View "USA v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of William Marsh Rice University d/b/a Rice University (hereinafter, “Rice” or “the University”) dismissing his claims under Title IX of the Educational Amendments Act of 1972 (“Title IX”) as well as his state law breach-of-contract claims.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim but reversed its summary judgment in favor of the University with respect to Plaintiff’s Title IX claims and remanded. The court explained that Plaintiff has not alleged any breaches of the University’s Code or associated policies. Moreover, as the district court accurately observed in evaluating Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim, the Code expressly provides that “[t]he procedures used . . . by SJP are not those used in court cases and are not intended to create contractual rights[.]” In the absence of contractual rights and the University’s intent to be bound, the court held that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law with respect to Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim. Moreover, the court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the University on the grounds that the record clearly indicates that material fact issues remain in dispute as to whether Plaintiff has successfully advanced a Title IX claim against the University. View "Doe v. William Marsh" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm after law enforcement officers discovered a gun in his jacket during a warrantless search. The sole question on appeal is whether, by tossing his jacket over a fence onto his mother’s property, Defendant forfeited his property or privacy interest in the jacket, thereby freeing officers to seize and search the jacket heedless of Fourth Amendment constraints.   The Fifth Circuit vacated Defendant’s conviction and sentence, as well as the denial of his motion to suppress, and remanded. The court held that Defendant did not abandon his jacket by tossing it over his mother’s fence because he did not thereby manifest an intent to discard it. The Government elected to rely exclusively on its abandonment theory, expressly waiving alternative grounds for affirmance at oral argument. The court explained that the district court relied on Colbert to conclude that Defendant abandoned his jacket, and therefore retained no reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents, by tossing it over his mother’s fence. But the court explained that it does not think it can fairly be said that Ramirez manifested an intent to disclaim ownership in his jacket simply by placing it on the private side of his mother’s fenced-in property line. View "USA v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm after law enforcement officers discovered a gun in his jacket during a warrantless search. The sole question on appeal is whether, by tossing his jacket over a fence onto his mother’s property, Defendant forfeited his property or privacy interest in the jacket, thereby freeing officers to seize and search the jacket heedless of Fourth Amendment constraints.   The Fifth Circuit vacated Defendant’s s conviction and sentence, as well as the denial of his motion to suppress, and remanded. The court held that Defendant did not abandon his jacket by tossing it over his mother’s fence because he did not thereby manifest an intent to discard it. Further, the court wrote that he put it for safekeeping where he knew he could find it again and where he could trust that strangers—if acting lawfully—would be unable to get at it. And so, Defendant’s jacket enjoyed Fourth Amendment protection under Jones’s property-rights formulation too. The Government elected to rely exclusively on its abandonment theory, expressly waiving alternative grounds for affirmance at oral argument. View "USA v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

The Jackson-Medgar Wiley Evers International Airport is a major airport located in Jackson, Mississippi. Since 1960, the airport has been operated by the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority, whose five commissioners are selected by the city government. In 2016, the Mississippi legislature passed, and the governor signed into law SB 2162, which abolishes the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority and replaces it with a regional authority composed of nine commissioners, only two of whom are selected by Jackson city government.   A Jackson citizen filed a suit seeking to enjoin the law. The mayor, the city council, the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority, its board of commissioners, and the commissioners in their individual capacities intervened in that lawsuit. The intervenors contend that SB 2162 violates the Equal Protection rights of the citizens of Jackson by eliminating the locally controlled Jackson Municipal Airport Authority for racially discriminatory reasons. The intervenors served subpoenas on eight nonparty state legislators who participated in SB 2162’s drafting and passage. The Legislators refused to comply with Request #3 in the subpoena, which sought documents and communications related to SB 2162, asserting that any responsive discovery would either be irrelevant or protected by legislative privilege. The magistrate judge, and later the district court, rejected this position.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the Legislators to produce a privilege log. But the district court erred in broadly holding that legislative privilege was automatically waived for any documents that have been shared with third parties. View "Jackson Muni Airport v. Harkins" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and a change of venue for his tax appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that the United States Courts of Appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of the Tax Court. 26 U.S.C. Section 7482(a)(1). As such, absent certification under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) or a separate Rule 54(b) type order, an order disposing of fewer than all parties or claims in an action is unappealable, subject to exceptions not applicable here, as is the case here. Since no certification under Section 1292(b) or a separate Rule 54(b) type order exists, and Petitioner’s pleading is still pending before the Tax Court, the court held that it lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. View "Pejouhesh v. CIR" on Justia Law

Allied World Specialty Insurance Company issued a WaterPlus Package Insurance Policy to the Windermere Oaks Water Supply Corporation. That policy includes coverage for Public Officials and Management Liability. But it also includes various exclusions from coverage. At issue in this appeal is the exclusion of contractual liability.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment granting summary judgment in favor of the insured. The court held that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is not a claim for breach of contract and is, therefore, not subject to exclusion from coverage under a contractual liability exclusion. The court explained that under the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act, Tex. Ins. Code Section 542.060, an insurer’s breach of the duty to defend constitutes a per se violation View "Windermere Oaks v. Allied World" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, is a Mississippi state inmate. Defendant is a physician and at relevant times was the medical director at the state facility where Plaintiff was housed. Because Plaintiff suffers from a complex psychiatric profile, Plaintiff’s cell was inside the facility’s medical unit. As a result of Plaintiff’s incitement, other prisoners, many of whom were also psychiatric patients, began to act similarly. Defendant went to the scene, as did as many as nine other staff members. There, Defendant asked Plaintiff to desist several times. Plaintiff did not. Defendant then ordered that Plaintiff receive two injections: Haldol, an antipsychotic, and Benadryl, an antihistamine intended as a prophylactic against any complication from Haldol. Plaintiff went to sleep following the injections, and nearby inmates quieted down. Afterward, Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 suit alleging that Defendant’s decision to forcibly medicate Plaintiff violated Plaintiff’s civil rights. The district court, relying on Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process jurisprudence and out-of-circuit opinion, agreed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court held that the district court erred when it declined to apply an Eighth Amendment framework to Plaintiff’s dispute over medical treatment. And, even if a Fourteenth Amendment framework were apposite, Plaintiff received all the process he was due. The court explained that it’s not as if Defendant suddenly and arbitrarily injected Plaintiff. Rather, Defendant injected him only after Plaintiff precipitated a disturbance that subjectively appeared imminently dangerous, only after multiple rounds of verbal persuasion failed, and only after a licensed medical professional determined that medication was appropriate. View "Pinkston v. Kuiper" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an inmate in a Texas state prison. He was treated at a prison clinic and then discharged after the nurses told Plaintiff they believed he was "faking" his symptoms. Plainitff later experienced a brain stem stroke. Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 claim, asserting prison staff denied him access to emergency medical treatment. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's claim.On appeal, Plaintiff claimed that the district court (1) erred in resolving disputed facts during screening; (2) erred in concluding that he failed to state a claim; (3) erred in determining that the warden and medical director were not liable as supervisors; and (4) abused its discretion in failing to rule on pending motions. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that Plaintiff's claim was not a constitutional tort, but instead a medical malpractice claim. View "Thompson v. TDCJ" on Justia Law