Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs brought multiple claims against various defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. As relevant here, they asserted two general categories of claims—that the officers used excessive force in executing the search warrant and that the search and seizure were unlawful. As against the individual officers, Plaintiffs asserted both direct claims and claims premised on failure to intervene. And as against Lieutenants, Plaintiffs asserted that the two lieutenants are directly liable for excessive-force and search-and-seizure and liable on a failure to supervise theory. Finally, Plaintiffs also asserted wrongful death and survival as separate “causes of actions,” in their words. Several of the officers moved to dismiss, asserting qualified immunity.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part. The court affirmed the aspects of the judgment denying the motions to dismiss the excessive-force claims asserted against several co-Defendants and denying one Lieutenant’s motion to dismiss as to Plaintiffs’ excessive force and search-and-seizure claims premised on a failure-to-supervise theory.   The court reversed the district court’s ruling denying the Lieutenant’s motion to dismiss the excessive force and search-and-seizure claims based on direct liability. The court concluded that this was error because the Lieutenant was not personally involved in obtaining the search warrant or in effectuating the search. “Personal involvement is an essential element” of demonstrating liability under Section 1983. View "Tuttle v. Sepolio" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was arrested for driving while intoxicated. She sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and related state laws. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, dismissing all of Plaintiff’s claims. On appeal, Plaintiff contests the summary judgment for the Section 1983 claims of false arrest and excessive force along with the state law claims of false arrest, excessive force, negligence, and vicarious liability.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for driving while intoxicated. The court explained that the following facts are confirmed: (1) A witness reported to the police that Plaintiff was driving in a dangerous manner;(2) there is video footage of Plaintiff’s car swerving out of the lane and recorded audio of the officers noting the swerve, and (3) The officers could not conclusively determine that she had not taken drugs. Those facts alone are sufficient to give rise to probable cause that Plaintiff was driving while intoxicated. Further, the court found that the officer’s limited use of force (in such a short time frame) to restrain Plaintiff and place her in handcuffs as a response to Plaintiff’s perceived resistance does not amount to excessive force.   Moreover, the court found that the officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for driving while intoxicated, and accordingly, there was no false arrest. Finally, because Plaintiff’s underlying state law claims were properly dismissed, there is no basis for her vicarious liability claim against the municipal Defendants. View "Scott v. City of Mandeville, et al" on Justia Law

Gold Coast Commodities, Inc. makes animal feed using saponified poultry and plant fats at its Rankin County, Mississippi facility. Because its production process involves, among other things, old restaurant grease and sulfuric acid, Gold Coast is left with about 6,000 gallons of oily, “highly acidic,” and “extremely hot” wastewater each week. The City of Brandon, Mississippi, told a state agency that it believed Gold Coast was “discharging” that “oily, low-pH wastewater” into the public sewers. As a result, the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality launched an investigation. Two months before the Department’s investigation, Gold Coast purchased a pollution liability policy from Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance Company. After the City filed suit, Gold Coast—seeking coverage under the provisions of its Policy—notified the insurer of its potential liability. But Crum & Forster refused to defend Gold Coast. The insurer insisted that because the Policy only covers accidents. The district court agreed with Crum & Forster—that the City wasn’t alleging an accident.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that here, the Policy is governed by Mississippi law. In Mississippi, whether an insurer has a duty to defend against a third-party lawsuit “depends upon the policy's language.” The district court found that the “overarching” theme of the City’s complaint, regardless of the accompanying “legal labels,” is that Gold Coast deliberately dumped wastewater into the public sewers. The court agreed with the district court and held that Gold Coast isn’t entitled to a defense from Crum & Forster. View "Gold Coast v. Crum & Forster Spclt" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of raping a 17-year-old girl, assaulting a 16-year-old girl with a hammer, and raping and murdering a 20-year-old woman. The present appeal involves only Petitioner’s conviction for raping the 17-year-old girl. Petitioner directly appealed his rape conviction in state court and almost succeeded in getting a new trial: The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. Petitioner next filed a habeas petition in federal district court, raising thirteen claims. The district court denied Petitioner’s petition but granted him a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on all thirteen claims. Petitioner timely appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the district court that the state court could’ve reasonably found the Ake claim unpreserved. Petitioner’s trial counsel withdrew his Ake motion, so the trial court never ruled on it. Petitioner must thus show that every fair-minded jurist would conclude that this is the extraordinary instance where an unpreserved claim was stronger than the preserved claims and that appellate counsel’s failure to press the unpreserved Ake claim was tantamount to providing no appellate counsel at all. Here, Petitioner cannot come close to that showing.  Further, the court wrote that Petitioner cannot surmount AEDPA’s relitigation bar. Contrary to Petitioner’s suggestion, every fair-minded jurist would not think that the absence of an expert for an insanity defense is per se error. Finally, the court held that law and justice do not compel issuance of the writ in the absence of factual innocence, and Petitioner can’t make the required showing. View "Crawford v. Cain" on Justia Law

This qualified immunity case arises from the death of a man who was shot and killed by officers of the Stratford Police Department when he attempted to evade arrest by fleeing in a stolen car. Plaintiffs, the man’s minor child and his estate appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the district court. The court explained that the officer would have been put on notice that his conduct violated the man’s constitutional rights. The court explained that Plaintiffs have not pointed to sufficient authority clearly establishing that the officer’s conduct violated the law under the specific circumstances he was facing, and thus he is entitled to qualified immunity. However, the court held that it is not convinced that the degree of force used was objectively reasonable. A jury could reasonably find that Defendants violated the man’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. View "Baker v. Coburn" on Justia Law

Petitioner, Mississippi prisoner # 145868, was arrested on December 21, 2006. Eight months later, he was indicted by a grand jury on charges of aggravated assault with a firearm and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. In January 2009, he was tried in state court, and a jury found him guilty on both counts. Sentenced as a habitual offender, he received two concurrent life sentences without the possibility of parole. Petitioner unsuccessfully pursued post-conviction relief in state court. After exhausting state-court review, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition, which the district court granted. The State appealed that ruling.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and rendered judgment in favor of the State on Petitioner’s petition for federal habeas relief. The court considered Petitioner’s federal habeas claims that his conviction violated his right to a speedy trial and that his public defenders provided ineffective assistance of counsel. While two state courts rejected these claims, the federal district court disagreed and held that relief was warranted. The court held that the lack of deference to the state court’s determination constituted “an improper intervention in state criminal processes,” such that the district court erred in granting Petitioner’s habeas application on the speedy-trial issue. View "Russell v. Denmark" on Justia Law

After the Texas Legislature amended the Election Code in 2021, the United States and others sued, alleging the changes were racially discriminatory. When Plaintiffs sought discovery from individual, nonparty state legislators, those legislators withheld some documents, citing legislative privilege. The district court largely rejected the legislators’ privilege claims, and they filed this interlocutory appeal.   The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court explained that for their part, the legislators rely on the privilege for each of the disputed documents. Plaintiffs, too, do not argue that the documents are non-legislative. Instead, they argue only that the privilege either “was waived” or “must yield.” The court wrote that the legislators did not waive the legislative privilege when they “communicated with parties outside the legislature, such as party leaders and lobbyists.” The district court’s contrary holding flouts the rule that the privilege covers “legislators’ actions in the proposal, formulation, and passage of legislation.” Finally, the court reasoned that Plaintiffs’ reliance on Jefferson Community Health Care Centers, Inc. v. Jefferson Parish Government is misplaced. That decision stated that “while the common-law legislative immunity for state legislators is absolute, the legislative privilege for state lawmakers is, at best, one which is qualified.” But that case provides no support for the idea that state legislators can be compelled to produce documents concerning the legislative process and a legislator’s subjective thoughts and motives. View "LULAC Texas v. Hughes" on Justia Law

This qualified immunity case arises from the death of a man who was shot and killed by officers of the Stratford Police Department after he attempted to evade arrest while fleeing in a stolen car. Plaintiffs, the man’s minor child and his estate appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the district court. The court explained that Plaintiffs have not pointed to sufficient authority clearly establishing that the officer’s conduct violated the law under the specific circumstances he was facing, and thus he is entitled to qualified immunity. Further, the court explained that here there are significant factual disputes about the manner in which the incident took place. If the facts are as the officers alleged them—that the man drove straight at the officer and missed, deadly force may well be reasonable. However, at the summary stage, the court must draw all inferences in favor of Plaintiffs’ version of facts. The district court did not address whether the man’s rights with respect to the second round of shots were clearly established. The court reversed the district court’s opinion granting summary judgment as to the second round of shots and remanded to the district court. View "Baker v. Coburn" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was detained beyond the expiration of his sentence because Department officials gave him credit for time served in pre-trial detention but only for one (rather than both) of his two consecutive sentences. That was the right thing to do under the law, then in effect. But Plaintiff was entitled to the more generous provision in effect at the time his sentence was entered. As a result, he served over a year longer than he should have. After his release, Plaintiff brought suit against various Louisiana officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, among other claims. This appeal concerns only one of those claims: Plaintiff’s claim against the head of the Department, Secretary James LeBlanc (“Defendant”). Defendant appealed the denial of qualified immunity, arguing that his conduct wasn’t objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law.   The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court explained that while the right to timely release is clearly established, Plaintiff does not show how Defendant’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. Plaintiff contends that Defendant was objectively unreasonable because he failed to assign the task of calculating release dates to an attorney. But nothing in the Constitution requires that such actions be undertaken by a member of the bar. View "Taylor v. LeBlanc" on Justia Law

Varco, L.P. (“Varco”), an oil and gas drilling company, purchased the assets of another drilling company, including U.S. Patent No. 5,474,142 (the “’142 Patent”). Varco’s parent company, Varco International, Inc., and a competitor, National Oilwell, Inc., completed a merger to form National Oilwell Varco, Inc. It was understood that Varco, as Varco International, Inc.’s operating company, would transfer its assets to the newly formed entity’s operating company: Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant National Oilwell Varco, L.P. (“NOV”).  NOV filed an action in district court alleging that Defendant-Appellant/CrossAppellee Auto-Dril, Inc. (“Auto-Dril”) infringed the ’142 Patent (the “Underlying Action”). Auto-Dril and NOV entered into a confidential settlement agreement that was intended to end their litigation over the ’142 Patent (the “Settlement Agreement”). The parties appealed various holdings that both preceded and followed a trial regarding their 2011 Settlement Agreement.   The Fifth Circuit held that it lacks jurisdiction over Auto-Dril’s counterclaim for being fraudulently induced into entering the Settlement Agreement. The court reversed the ruling granting summary judgment for NOV on Auto-Dril’s claim for breach of the Settlement Agreement. The court reversed the dismissal of NOV’s claim for breach of the Settlement Agreement and remanded NOV’s JMOL motion for reconsideration. The court explained that here, NOV’s conduct did not rise to the level of a fraud on the court. Specifically, there is no clear and convincing evidence that NOV was cognizant that it did not own the ’142 Patent while it was litigating the Underlying Action. View "National Oilwell Varco v. Auto-Dril" on Justia Law