Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A federal jury convicted a former law enforcement officer (Defendant) of multiple counts of falsifying government documents, obstruction of justice, perjury, and property conversion. Defendant was sentenced to 160 months in prison. He appealed his convictions and sentence.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained Defendant’s two document-falsification counts were supported by sufficient evidence. First, Defendant argued that his misrepresentations on the forms were immaterial to the DEA’s administration. The court disagreed, citing the relevant statute, 18 U.S.C. Section 1519, which contains no “materiality” element. Moreover, the prosecution produced evidence that Defendant knowingly gave the DEA false information, concealing that he seized the informant’s truck outside of his jurisdiction and that he instructed the informant to purchase the truck. An expert testified at trial that, had it known these details, the DEA would not have approved the seizure. Additionally, the court explained that the record is replete with evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that Defendant used the confiscated property for his own use. Defendant also contested both enhancements by pointing to Section 1B1.5(c). Even if the district court erred in applying these two enhancements, the error was harmless. The district court carefully explained that it would have imposed the same 160-month sentence for the same reasons even if it erred in calculating Defendant’s offense level. View "USA v. Scott" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon. He challenged his sentence on several grounds, particularly the district court’s imposition of a four-level enhancement for use or possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense. The linchpin of this case is whether Defendant’s repeated instances of being a felon in possession of a firearm were relevant conduct justifying the enhancement.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court thoroughly analyzed the factors for relevant conduct— similarity, regularity, and temporal proximity—and concluded the evidence weighed in favor of the Government. Here, Defendant was sentenced to 70 months—well below the 10-year statutory maximum. The district court committed no error, clear or otherwise, in its analysis. Further, the court explained that the Sentencing Guidelines do not generally prohibit double counting. The Guidelines permit the district court to consider a defendant’s prior felony convictions in calculating both his offense level under Section 2K2.1(a) and his criminal history category. Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not err in calculating Defendant’s sentence on this basis. View "USA v. Lopez" on Justia Law

In 2005, Petitioner, a native and citizen of Brazil, was ordered removed in absentia. In 2018, he moved to reopen and rescind the removal order, and an immigration judge (IJ) denied his request. He appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and the BIA dismissed his appeal. He petitioned for a review of that dismissal. He contends that the BIA and the IJ lacked jurisdiction over his removal proceedings because the record does not show that his notice to appear (NTA) was ever filed with the immigration court, as required by 8 C.F.R. Section 1003.14(a).   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court reasoned that it has previously explained that Section 1003.14 “is not jurisdictional” but is “a claim-processing rule.” Thus, Petitioner’s jurisdictional challenge fails. Further, Petitioner argued that the BIA erred by relying on a reconstructed record that did not contain his NTA. The court explained that it discerned nothing in the record to suggest that Petitioner’s Form I-213 “is incorrect or was obtained by coercion or duress,” the BIA could thus properly rely on it as “inherently trustworthy and admissible as evidence” that Petitioner received notice of his removal hearing. Though Petitioner presented his own sworn declarations challenging his understanding of the translator’s statements, documents he may have signed, and his need to attend a removal hearing, he failed to present such compelling evidence that no reasonable factfinder could conclude against it. The BIA thus did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Petitioner’s appeal from the denial of his motion to reopen. View "Alexandre-Matias v. Garland" on Justia Law

Governor Abbott filed suit on January 4, 2022. He alleged that the military vaccine mandate is arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). He also alleged that all but one of the Government’s planned enforcement measures violates the Constitution. For relief, Governor Abbott sought an order declaring the vaccination requirement and the challenged enforcement measures unlawful, Guardsmen. He also requested costs, attorneys’ fees, and any other relief the court deems proper. Governor Abbott then moved for an order preliminarily enjoining the defendants from enforcing the vaccine mandate against members of the Texas militia not in federal service. The district court denied the motion. The Governor appealed under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(a)(1).   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying Governor Abbott’s motion for a preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that the Government conceded that its erstwhile vaccine mandate is unnecessary to military readiness by repealing it. The question, therefore, is whether the President can punish non-federalized Guardsmen in Texas who refused to get COVID injections before the President and Congress deemed such injections unnecessary. The court held that the Constitution’s text, history, and tradition foreclose the President’s efforts to impose such punishments. View "Abbott v. Biden" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for Defendant Huntington Ingalls (formerly “Avondale”) as a shipyard electrician from February 1969 to June 1977. In March 2020, Plaintiff was diagnosed with mesothelioma. Following his diagnosis, he filed a state-law tort suit in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, alleging that Avondale, among other defendants, caused Plaintiff to contract mesothelioma by exposing him to asbestos in a negligent manner. Because Plaintiff primarily worked on United States Navy ships when he was exposed, Avondale removed the case to the federal district court under the federal officer removal statute. Plaintiff never claimed benefits under the LHWCA, which provides a no-fault compensation remedy to injured workers. Avondale moved for summary judgment. The district court held that the claims are preempted.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held express preemption does not apply. Despite the clear proclamation of exclusivity in the LHWCA’s text that prohibits any liability “at law or in admiralty” for injuries covered by the Act, there is no express preemption here. The court wrote that its conclusion that conflict preemption does not apply is supported by the existence of concurrent jurisdiction and the acceptable incongruity inherent therein, the Supreme Court’s consistent rejection of arguments resisting that regime, the LHWCA’s role of supplementing rather than supplanting state law, the limited category of claims at issue here, and the similarity between these claims and those the Supreme Court has already permitted in Hahn. View "Barrosse v. Huntington Ingalls" on Justia Law

This case involves a contract dispute between an automobile-product manufacturer and one of its distributors. The distributor, Plaintiff Wesden, LLC, appealed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of its fraud claim and summary-judgment dismissal of its breach-of-contract claim against the manufacturer, Defendant Illinois Tool Works, Inc. d/b/a ITW Evercoat (“ITW”).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the issue here reduces to the plausibility of Wesden’s fraud claim. Construing the complaint in Wesden’s favor, the claim is that, at the September 2018 meeting, ITW promised Wesden that it could sell Auto Magic products through online marketplaces like Amazon and that ITW would not stop Wesden from doing so or otherwise appropriate those online markets for itself. The court concluded that Wesden’s complaint does not permit a reasonable inference of fraud. Wesden’s alleged facts do not allow us to reasonably infer that, in September 2018, ITW had “no intention” of adhering to its promise to permit Wesden’s sales on Amazon and similar marketplaces.   Further, ITW has invoked the statute of frauds to assert that the parties’ agreement is unenforceable. The court explained that a requirements contract still must satisfy the statute of frauds, which demands a written quantity term. Wesden has identified no written term either specifying a quantity of goods or stating that Wesden will buy all of its requirements from ITW. The contract thus fails to satisfy the statute of frauds and is therefore unenforceable. View "Wesdem v. Illinois Tool Works" on Justia Law

The City of Balch Springs Police Department hired an officer who a jury later convicted of murdering a teenage boy while on duty. Plaintiff (the boy’s father) sued the City under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the department’s use-of-force policy was constitutional and also that Plaintiff’s training, supervisory, and disciplinary theories of liability lacked factual support.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ultimate judgment. Plaintiff argued that the City’s policy is facially unconstitutional because it contains “no immediacy requirement necessary to justify an officer’s use of deadly force” and because it calls “for an officer to use the officer’s own subjective beliefs in determining whether deadly force was justified.” The court explained that a local government’s official, written policy is itself unconstitutional only if it affirmatively allows or compels unconstitutional conduct. The City’s policy passes muster under that standard. It does not affirmatively allow officers to use deadly force absent an immediate threat, and it does not affirmatively allow officers to rely on subjective factors when evaluating whether to use deadly force. Likewise, the prior constitutional violations that Plaintiff relies on are too dissimilar and generalized to establish a pattern. For that reason, Plaintiff cannot show that the City’s training, supervisory, and disciplinary failures (if any) arose from deliberate indifference. In turn, he cannot satisfy Monell’s third element. View "Edwards v. Balch Springs, Texas" on Justia Law

Petitioner came to the United States from El Salvador as a teenager. While in high school, he inappropriately touched his younger female relative and was later charged under Texas Penal Code Section 22.04(a) with injuring a child by omission. That conviction spawned immigration proceedings in which he was found removable by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Petitioner sought review of that decision. An Immigration Judge (IJ) held a hearing and found that Petitioner was subject to removal. Petitioner then applied for asylum, withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and cancellation of removal. Petitioner then appealed to the BIA and argued that (1) Texas Penal Code Section 22.04(a) is indivisible, and even if divisible, it is overbroad and does not fit the generic federal definition of child abuse; (2) his conviction does not qualify as a CIMT; and (3) the IJ erred in denying his applications for asylum and relief under the CAT.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court held that Petitioner’s argument that the statute is indivisible is now foreclosed by Monsonyem. Petitioner was convicted under the portion of Section 22.04(a) relating to child abuse, and the BIA properly concluded he was removable based on that conviction. Further, the court held that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that Texas “would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of child abuse.” None of Petitioner’s proffered cases demonstrates that Texas would apply Section 22.04(a) to crimes that do not align with the BIA’s definition of child abuse. View "Ponce v. Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant, his wife, and another were indicted for mail fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit mail fraud. The parties jointly owned Seven Arts Pictures Louisiana, LLC (Seven Arts), through which they purchased a dilapidated mansion at 807 Esplanade Avenue in New Orleans with the goal of converting it into a film postproduction facility. To offset the costs of the project, Seven Arts applied for film infrastructure tax credits offered by the State of Louisiana. The Government alleged that the parties “submitted fraudulent claims for tax credits, mostly by (1) submitting false invoices for construction work and film equipment or (2) using “circular transactions” that made transfers of money between bank accounts look like expenditures related to movie production.” The jury convicted Defendant on all charged counts. Defendant moved for a new trial as well as for a judgment of acquittal. The district court denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial but partially granted his motion for acquittal. Specifically, the court entered judgments of acquittal for Hoffman on five counts of wire fraud.   The Fifth Circuit held that the panel does not agree with the judgment that should be rendered in this case. Judge Jolly would affirm the district court’s judgment in its entirety. Chief Judge Richman would dismiss the appeal, concluding the notice of appeal was not timely. Judge Dennis would remand for an evidentiary hearing and resentencing. The net effect is that the sentence imposed by the district court stands, and the case is not remanded to the district court. The district court’s judgment is affirmed by an equally divided court. View "USA v. Hoffman" on Justia Law

On emerging from Chapter 11 reorganization effective February 9, 2021, Chesapeake Energy Corporation tested the limits of the bankruptcy court’s post-confirmation jurisdiction by asking it to settle two prebankruptcy purported class actions covering approximately 23,000 Pennsylvania oil and gas leases. The Fifth Circuit consolidated the Proof of Claim Lessors’ appeal from the preliminary approval order with the appeal from the final approval order. At issue is whether the bankruptcy and district courts had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1334 to hear and decide these “class” claims.   The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded the bankruptcy and district court judgments with instructions to dismiss. The court explained that no proofs of claim were filed for class members, and every feature of the settlements conflicts with Chesapeake’s Plan and Disclosure Statement. Handling these forward-looking cases within the bankruptcy court, predicated on 28 U.S.C. Section 1334(a) or (b), rather than in the court where they originated, exceeds federal bankruptcy post-confirmation jurisdiction. View "Sarnosky v. Chesapeake" on Justia Law