Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff alleged that government agents searched his cell phone at the border without a warrant on at least five occasions and that agents copied data from his cell phone at least once. Plaintiff sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the respective heads of each entity in their official capacity (collectively, the government), challenging the searches, as well as ICE and CBP policies regarding border searches of electronic devices. In the district court, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking, among other relief, a preliminary injunction preventing the government from searching his cell phone at the border without a warrant. The district court denied the preliminary injunction.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a substantial threat he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted. The court reasoned that Plaintiff has demonstrated that the ICE and CBP policies authorize warrantless searches. Further, the allegations in Plaintiff’s verified complaint are evidence of a pattern of warrantless searches of Plaintiff’s cell phone. However, Plaintiff has no additional evidence to establish that he will be stopped by border agents in the future and that the agents will search his cell phone without a warrant. View "Anibowei v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Texas and Missouri filed suit seeking to compel DHS to employ the $2.75 billion Congress allocated “for the construction of [a] barrier system along the southwest border” before those funds expire. The district court dismissed Texas for “claim splitting,” held that Missouri did not have standing to sue, and denied the States’ motion for a preliminary injunction as moot. The states appealed.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions for the district court to "expeditiously consider the States’ motion for a preliminary injunction." The court explained Texas should not have been dismissed for claim splitting because Texas’s Article III standing confers federal jurisdiction. In terms of causation, Texas needs only to have alleged facts showing the Federal Defendants’ conduct is a cause-in-fact of the injury that the State asserts. Here, Texas claimed that border barriers (i) reduce illegal entries in areas where constructed, and (ii) increase the rate at which illegal aliens are detected and apprehended.However, the court declined to order the states' requested remedy, instead remanding the case to the district court. View "State of Missouri v. Biden" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Baton Rouge police officer, sued Defendant, the organizer of a protest after Plaintiff was seriously injured by a protestor at a protest Defendant arranged. After a lengthy procedural history, the case came back to the Fifth Circuit after the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed that state law recognizes a negligence cause of action in the circumstances alleged in Plaintiff's complaint.In turn, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's order dismissing Plaintiff's negligence claim. Additionally, due to these developments, the district court also erred in failing to grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. Otherwise, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's other claims. View "Doe v. Mckesson, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of their complaint, alleging that the City of New Braunfels’s zoning regulation banning short-term rentals of residential properties in certain areas of the city is unconstitutional. The district court ordered dismissal.   The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that Plaintiffs are entitled to engage in discovery in an attempt to surmount the currently high bar for challenging local zoning ordinances under the Constitution. View "Marfil v. City of New Braunfels" on Justia Law

Congress assigned implementation of the PPP to the Small Business Administration (SBA). Potential borrowers must have answered “No” to whether “any individual owning 20% or more of the equity of the Applicant [was] subject to an indictment, criminal information, arraignment, or other means by which formal criminal charges are brought in any jurisdiction, or presently incarcerated, or on probation or parole.” When completing a PPP loan application on behalf of law firm Ramey & Schwaller, L.L.P., owner William Ramey answered “No” to that question. Zions Bancorporation, NA, doing business as Amegy Bank, approved the law firm’s application and disbursed a $249,300 loan. Later, the bank learned that Ramey had actually been subject to a criminal complaint accusing him of attempted sexual assault in Harris County, Texas. So the bank held the law firm in default and froze the firm’s accounts as an offset to the loan balance. The law firm then filed this action against the bank, seeking a declaratory judgment that Ramey did not answer the application question falsely. The bank alleged a counterclaim for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment to the bank and dismissed the law firm’s claims.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because Ramey was, at least, subject to “means by which formal criminal charges are brought” at the time he completed the Application, he answered Question 5 falsely on behalf of Ramey & Schwaller. Accordingly, the law firm was in default under the PPP loan documents, and the district court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of Amegy Bank. View "Ramey & Schwaller v. Zions Bancorp" on Justia Law

Petitioner, after waiving his right to appeal in his plea agreement, did not file a direct appeal of his 2015 Texas conviction. His 2017 application for state postconviction relief from that 2015 sentence was denied in 2018. In 2019, he filed this Section 2254 petition, which was denied as untimely. Petitioner contends the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez, and its extension in Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013), excuse his untimeliness.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Petitioner did not have a constitutional right to counsel in his state postconviction proceeding. Further, the court held that Martinez established a narrow, equitable exception to procedural default; it has no applicability to the statutory limitations period prescribed by AEDPA. View "Moody v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a convicted sexually violent predator, was held in the Lubbock County Detention Center as a pre-trial detainee for approximately one month from December 2017 to January 2018. Soon after his arrival, he was placed in administrative segregation away from the facility’s general population, where he was held for most of the remainder of his time there. He subsequently brought suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against Lubbock County and several law enforcement officials, asserting a series of claims regarding his alleged mistreatment there. The district court entered an order dismissing the claims against the county and all but one of the officials, which he now appeals in the first of the consolidated cases. Plaintiff challenged the process by which he was placed and remained in administrative segregation. After the district court subsequently dismissed the remaining named official, Plaintiff moved to reconsider that dismissal and the dismissal of several of his other claims. The district court rejected both motions for lack of new evidence, which Plaintiff appealed in the second of the consolidated cases. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding no reversible errors. View "Welsh v. Lubbock County" on Justia Law

The National Marine Fisheries Service promulgated a rule requiring shrimp trawlers 25 feet or longer operating in offshore waters from North Carolina to Texas to install turtle excluder devices (TEDs), subject to a few preconditions. In 2012, NMFS proposed a more restrictive rule requiring TEDs for skimmer trawlers. The Final Rule required TEDs on all skimmer trawlers over 40 feet, including those that operate inshore. Louisiana’s Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF) sued NMFS under the Administrative Procedure Act, challenging the Final Rule as arbitrary and capricious. Louisiana moved for summary judgment, focusing on the merits of its claims. NMFS opposed and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The district court granted NMFS’s motion, holding that Louisiana had not carried its summary judgment burden to establish standing.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that based on the record and procedural history of the case, the district court did not err in concluding that Louisiana failed to establish that it has standing to challenge the NMFS’s, Final Rule. The court reasoned that while the Final Rule’s EIS noted that the rule would adversely affect the shrimping industry across the Gulf of Mexico, Louisiana failed to provide evidence, particularly substantiating the rule’s impact on its shrimping industry or, ergo, “a sufficiently substantial segment of its population.” Nor does Louisiana’s invocation of the “special solicitude” afforded States in the standing analysis rescue this argument, or for that matter, the State’s other arguments. View "Louisiana State v. NOAA" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal from the denial of his application for cancellation of removal. He challenged the BIA decision on grounds that: (1) it was ultra vires because the order was signed by a temporary BIA member whose term had expired; (2) the BIA erred in finding that Petitioner lacked good moral character; and (3) the BIA erred in affirming the denial of voluntary departure.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed his petition in part and denied it in part. Petitioner contended that the two temporary BIA members who ruled in his case acted ultra vires because their terms had “terminated by automatic operation of law” on October 31, 2020, nearly six months before they ruled in his case. His argument hinges on whether the Attorney General properly delegated his renewal authority to the Director through regulation. But his argument collapses against the BIA members’ reappointment paperwork because that documentation substantiates the Government’s assertion that the temporary BIA members were reappointed by the Attorney General, not the Director.   Petitioner also contended that the BIA improperly relied on a 2019 decision by the then-Acting Attorney General (AAG) because it was issued without legal authority due to alleged defects in the AAG’s appointment. The court did not consider merits because Petitioner failed to brief the issue adequately. View "Medina Carreon v. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her employer Houston Independent School District (“HISD”), for retaliation and age discrimination. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failing to state a claim. Her amended complaint was also dismissed. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. To begin, the court explained that by applying amended Rule 3(c), it concludes that it has jurisdiction to review the final judgment. Under the new rule, a notice of appeal “encompasses the final judgment” if it designates “an order described in Rule 4(a)(4)(A).” Further, the court found that the district court applied the correct standard when assessing whether Plaintiff adequately pled sufficient facts to establish all the elements of her claims. Moreover, Plaintiff’s amended complaint brings three categories of claims. The first is a retaliation claim pursuant to Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and Section 21.055 of the Texas Labor Code. To state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) she was engaged in a protected activity; (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and adverse employment action.” Here, the court found that Plaintiff’s complaint is hard to understand, and parts of it fail even to establish the adverse action prong. For example, the complaint offers no specifics about the “forms of retaliation, harassment, taunting, and badgering” to which Plaintiff was allegedly subjected. It also provides little to nothing about what the positions actually were and what the ages and qualifications were of those who were given promotions. View "Norsworthy v. Houston Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law