Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Pro se Plaintiffs-Appellants Alejandro Hernandez and his wife, Edith Schneider-Hernandez, appeal the dismissal of their claims against Defendant-Appellees West Texas Treasures Estate Sales, L.L.C., Linda Maree Walker, and Aaron Anthony Enriquez (jointly, the “Defendants”) arising from an encounter they had at an estate sale.   The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the district court abused its discretion. The court explained that construing all reasonable inferences in the Plaintiffs’ favor, they may be able to supply additional allegations to support a plausible claim. The district court’s opinion essentially concedes that it could have benefited from more detailed pleadings, specifically about the severity of Plaintiff’s asthma and the impact of PTSD on the Plaintiffs’ daily activities. However, the district court did not address the Plaintiffs’ request for an opportunity to amend their Complaint. Thus, the basis for its decision not to allow leave to amend is unknown. View "Hernandez v. West Texas Treasures" on Justia Law

Defendant, a corporal with the Shreveport Police Department, shot Plaintiff four times. Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 suit against Defendant. After a bench trial, the district court ruled that Defendant was protected by qualified immunity. Plaintiff’s estate filed a motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, a new trial. The district court denied the motion without explanation. Plaintiff’s estate timely appealed. Plaintiff’s estate contests the district court’s factual finding that Defendant could not see Plaintiff’s left hand when he opened fire because “Defendant has no credibility.”   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that when considering qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage, the prior panel of the Fifth Circuit court affirmed that the video potentially supported a finding that Defendant could see that Plaintiff was unarmed, but that panel agreed that the video did not require such a finding. The court explained that given its deferential standard of review, it declines to disturb the district court’s factual determination on that point. The court wrote that based on the district court’s finding that Defendant reasonably believed that Plaintiff was reaching for a weapon, the district court properly held that Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. View "Creech Poole v. City of Shreveport" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of thirteen financial crimes. Defendant filed a series of pro se motions for compassionate release. This appeal arises from Defendant's third such motion. Defendant asked to be released based on the dangers posed by the pandemic, his close confinement with other prisoners, his age, and his preexisting heart condition. He also states that his wire fraud conviction was wrongful because it was predicated on a purely intrastate wire transmission and that a wrongful conviction is an extraordinary and compelling reason justifying relief. The motion was denied in a brief order shortly after being filed.   The Fifth Circuit ordered a limited remand for the district court to explain its reasons. The court explained that the district court’s order does not tell us that the court based its decision on Section 3553(a) factors. It states only that the court “considered Defendant’s motion and the applicable law” and determined that the motion should be denied. The court explained that, therefore, it has no reliable indication of the reason for the court’s decision to deny relief. View "USA v. Stanford" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is the former Chief Financial Officer of the Cypress Bayou Casino. The Casino is owned by the Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana. The Chitimacha Tribe is one of four federally recognized Indian tribes in Louisiana. According to the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, the Chitimacha tribal council authorized Spivey (as CFO of the Casino) to make a $3,900 bonus payment to the then-newly elected chairman of the tribal council. Plaintiff claimed that several members of the tribal council turned around and reported the bonus payment to federal and state law enforcement. Plaintiff initially sued the Tribe, the Casino, and four tribal council members in federal court under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1985 and Louisiana tort law. The district court, over Plaintiff’s objections, again adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations, denied Plaintiff’s remand motion, and dismissed all Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded to state court. The court first wrote that when a district court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a removed case, it must remand. The court held, in accordance with the statute’s plain text and the great weight of authority from across the country, that Section 1447(c) means what it says, admits of no exceptions, and requires remand even when the district court thinks it futile. Moreover, the court held that such a dismissal should be made without prejudice. View "Spivey v. Chitimacha Tribe" on Justia Law

After slipping on a puddle of water in a Wal-Mart store, Plaintiff sued Defendant Wal-Mart Inc. and Wal-Mart Louisiana, L.L.C. in federal district court. The district court granted summary judgment for the Defendants, and Plaintiff appealed.   The court reversed and remanded because Plaintiff has raised genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. The court explained that at least two Wal-Mart employees were in the area who reasonably could have seen the puddle. Another shopper notified one Walmart employee in the area, who was bringing a wet floor sign. After the shopper returned to the area of the puddle and before Plaintiff slipped, the video surveillance shows another Wal-Mart employee walk past the puddle, looking in its direction. The shopper testified the puddle was visible, glimmering and reflecting light. Moreover, it was raining, and this area—known as “action alley”—was high-traffic, which, like in Courville, reduced the amount of time necessary to put Wal-Mart on notice. The court explained that Plaintiff has provided direct evidence that the puddle existed for “some period of time.” Under these circumstances and on summary judgment, Plaintiff has presented enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that the period of time the puddle existed was sufficient to place the Defendants on notice of its existence. View "Flowers v. Wal-Mart" on Justia Law

The district court dismissed with prejudice a suit brought by Plaintiff against the Louisiana Twenty-First Judicial District and its former Chief Judge Robert Morrison, concluding that: (1) the Twenty-First Judicial District lacked the capacity to be sued; (2) McLin failed to plausibly allege that she was treated differently from anyone else; and, (3) Chief Judge Morrison was entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in dismissing her Section 1981 and Title VII claims.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff sought to meet the racial causation element with the comments made by Brumfield that her “hands are tied” as well as the Chief Judge’s tone and comment stating, “in today’s world that we live in, I have no other choice but to terminate you. You need to watch what you say and do.” The court wrote that these speculative allegations do not carry the day. Plaintiff issued the public statement “#IWillrunYouOver” in reference to driving her truck over peaceful protestors. Taking all the factual allegations as true, a more reasonable and obvious interpretation than the one put forth by Plaintiff is that her termination had to do with her public threat to run over people. While the district court erred in requiring Plaintiff to make allegations that satisfy the McDonnell Douglas standard, Plaintiff still failed to plead one ultimate element a plaintiff is required to plead: that the termination was taken against her because of her protected status. The court concluded that Plaintiff has not asserted plausible facts meeting the elements of this claim. View "McLin v. Twenty-First Judicial Dist" on Justia Law

On a  Mesa Airlines flight from Birmingham to Dallas Fort Worth International Airport, a flight attendant grew concerned about two passengers, Plaintiffs.  She alerted the pilot, who, despite the reassurance of security officers, delayed takeoff until the flight was canceled. The passengers were told the delay was for maintenance issues, and all passengers, including the two in question (Plaintiffs), were rebooked onto a new flight that reached DFW. After learning the real reason behind the cancellation, Plaintiffs sued Mesa under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The airline countered that it had immunity under 49 U.S.C. Section 44902(b) and 49 U.S.C. Section 44941(a).     Given the unusual facts that all passengers had their flight canceled, the primary issue on appeal whether such conduct constitutes disparate treatment under Section 1981, whether a Section 1981 claim can exist without a “breach” of contract, and whether Section 44902(b) grants immunity to airlines for allegedly discriminatory decisions, thereby negating Section 1981’s application against airlines in this context.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Section 1981 prohibits discrimination in contracting. Section 44902(b) provides immunity to airlines in their decision to remove passengers they feel are “inimical to safety.” There is a straightforward way to reconcile these two statutes: If a passenger’s protected status is the but-for cause of the airline’s decision to remove them (such that the passenger has made out a Section 1981 claim), then Section 44902(b) does not grant immunity to the airline because the decision is not based on a fear that the passenger was inimical to safety. View "Abdallah v. Mesa Air Group" on Justia Law

Prisoner, DefendanDefendant, a prisoner, brought an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. His claims rest on the argument that his sentence for the latter offense should have been adjusted to reflect the 13 months he had already spent in prison for his first conviction. Defendant brought this 2255 petition in the Northern District of Texas, faulting his trial counsel for failing to adequately advocate for “back time” at sentencing and faulting his appellate counsel for not raising the issue on appeal. The magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied. The district judge (the same judge who sentenced Defendant in the Northern District) adopted the recommendation, dismissed the claims, and denied a certificate of appealability.   The Fifth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability and affirmed. The court explained that it is true that the Sentencing Guidelines call for credit for time served if there are two related offenses. Both parties agree the offenses are related here. Yet the Guidelines are not obligatory, and the judge in the Northern District of Texas instead sentenced Defendant under U.S.S.G. Section 5G1.3(d). Thus, Defendant’s sentences were treated as concurrent from the day of the second sentencing but did not account for the 13 months of back time. None of this means that Defendant’s lawyers were constitutionally deficient. Defendant’s trial counsel argued for the application of U.S.S.G. Section 5G1.3(b) in a memorandum and noted the argument in open court; he was not constitutionally obliged to do more. Defendant’s appellate counsel was not deficient for failing to raise the issue because the district court did not contravene any binding case law. View "USA v. Massey" on Justia Law

The United States Food and Drug Administration approved mifepristone for use in 2000 under the brand name Mifeprex. FDA approved a generic version in 2019, and in 2021, FDA announced that it would not enforce an agency regulation requiring mifepristone to be prescribed and dispensed in person. The agency moved that requirement from mifepristone’s conditions for use. The subject of this appeal is those four actions: the 2000 Approval, the 2016 Amendments, the 2019 Generic Approval, and the 2021 Non-Enforcement Decision. Plaintiffs, Medical Organizations and Doctors contend that FDA overlooked important safety risks in approving mifepristone and amending its restrictions. The Medical Organizations and Doctors moved for preliminary injunctive relief. The district court granted the motion but stayed the effective date of each of the challenged actions under 5 U.S.C. Section 705. FDA appealed, as did Intervenor Danco Laboratories, LLC.     The Fifth Circuit vacated in part and affirmed in part. The court vacated in part and concluded that the Medical Organizations and Doctors’ claim as to the 2000 Approval is likely barred by the statute of limitations. Thus, until final judgment, Mifeprex will remain available to the public under the conditions for use that existed in 2016. The court also vacated the portion of the order relating to the 2019 Generic Approval because Plaintiffs have not shown that they are injured by that particular action. The generic version of mifepristone will also be available under the same conditions as Mifeprex. The court affirmed the components of the stay order that concern the 2016 Amendments and the 2021 Non-Enforcement Decision. View "Alliance Hippocratic Medicine v. FDA" on Justia Law

Cenikor Foundation brought an interlocutory appeal challenging the district court’s determination that collective action of its drug rehabilitation patients may proceed under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA” or “the Act”).  Cenikor argued that the district court applied the wrong legal standard to determine whether Cenikor’s patients were FLSA “employees.” Appellees argue that the district court properly applied binding Supreme Court precedent to the facts of this case in finding that the employment question may be decided on a collective-wide basis.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because the district court utilized Alamo in reaching its decision, it relied on the appropriate legal standard. Its threshold determination that the rehabilitation patients constitute “employees” under the Act because they worked in expectation of compensation was not an abuse of discretion. Further, the court wrote that the district court needed to consider the evidence relating to this threshold question in order to determine whether the economic-realities test could be applied on a collective basis. The court wrote that the district court properly did so based on ample evidence in the record from preliminary discovery. View "Klick v. Cenikor Foundation" on Justia Law