Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Jefferson Parish School Board (JPSB) separately suspended two students for individually having a BB gun visible during virtual school. Each student’s family sued the school board, in part seeking a declaration that the school board’s virtual learning disciplinary policy is unconstitutional. Louisiana intervened, agreeing with the families on the constitutionality of JPSB’s policy and separately challenging JPSB’s disciplinary actions as ultra vires. JPSB settled with the families, ending the private suits. Louisiana wants to continue the case, citing its broad interest in compliance with its laws. The question before us is whether Louisiana has standing to do so. This case lies outside the limits of Article III standing. States undoubtedly have an interest in enforcing their laws. But when it comes to federal courts, Louisiana must claim an injury to a traditional, sovereign interest to invoke Article III jurisdiction. The state similarly fails to establish an injury to an established quasi-sovereign interest sufficient to show parens patriae standing. Louisiana’s claim of injury to a proprietary interest also falls short.   The Fifth Circuit remanded to the district court. The court concluded that t Louisiana does not have Article III standing. The court explained that this case is the same “(non) controversy” that the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have held falls outside of our Article III power. The court explained that federal courts do not sit to resolve intramural disputes among state officials over the bounds of their authority under state law. Louisiana stands fully capable and ready to enforce its laws, and it can do so in its courts, which “are not bound to adhere” to Article III’s requirements. View "LA State v. Jefferson Parish Sch" on Justia Law

Defendants, game wardens with the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, appealed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against them.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and rendered judgment for Defendants. The court concluded that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Defendant violated his constitutional rights. The court explained that because Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants knowingly withheld relevant, material information from the grand jury, he has not shown that the independent intermediary’s deliberations or decisions were tainted. Accordingly, the independent-intermediary doctrine defeats Plaintiff’s allegations that there was no probable cause to prosecute him and insulates Defendants from liability. The court wrote that this conclusion applies with equal force to Plaintiff’s claims for both retaliatory prosecution and prosecution without probable cause. View "Trevino v. Iden" on Justia Law

The property owners (doing business as Re-Mart Investment), and St. Maron Properties— brought Section 1983 claims against the City under the Takings Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause, as well as state law tort and statutory claims. The district court dismissed the state law claims as barred by sovereign immunity. It also dismissed the Section 1983 claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to satisfy the requirements for municipal liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the state law claims. But reversed the dismissal of the Section 1983 claims. The court explained that under Monell, a Section 1983 plaintiff may not proceed against a municipality unless the injury was caused by an official policy of the municipality. But here, the property owners allege that city officials violated their rights at the specific direction of the Mayor and the City Council. That is enough to establish liability under Monell. Accordingly, the court held that the property owners are entitled to proceed against the City on their federal claims. View "St. Maron v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

This False Claims Act case involves Medicare reimbursements to Stone County Hospital (SCH), a critical access hospital in Wiggins, Mississippi. At trial, the Government proved that Appellants (a corporate management company, company owner, corporate executives, and SCH) defrauded Medicare out of millions over the span of twelve years by overbilling for the owner’s and his wife’s compensation despite little or no reimbursable work. The district court’s judgment in favor of the Government included an order barring Appellants from dissipating their assets. Almost two years later, the district court issued a temporary enforcement order that specifically barred Appellants from selling a piece of real property. Appellants separately appealed the enforcement of this post-judgment injunction.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court explained that Appellants’ arguments on appeal fail to undercut the jury’s verdict. But the Government’s dilatory conduct over the protracted procedural history of this case gives pause, even if the Government largely prevails today. When Appellants interposed the statute of limitations because of the Government’s dawdling, the Government maintained its claims were timely. It does the same on appeal. But the Government’s own sealed extension request memoranda, which remains sealed to this day, demonstrate otherwise. Further, the court explained that contrary to Appellants’ frequent reference to “nonparties” in their briefing, Defendants in fact own, or control the property in question, albeit through indirect corporate entities. At the end of the day, the only ownership interests beyond Defendants in any of the relevant entities are held by trusts for Defendants’ children. View "Aldridge v. Corporate Management" on Justia Law

Louisiana State University (“LSU”) (collectively “the Professors”) appealed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity after Plaintiff alleged that they violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by conspiring to prevent his continued enrollment in Louisiana State University’s (“LSU”) theatre program.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s determination that they were not entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims. The court held that the Professors lacked adequate notice that their conduct was violative of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and because they did not have this notice, they are entitled to qualified immunity. The court explained that the clearly established standard requires more than that—there must be a “high degree of specificity” between the alleged misconduct and the caselaw purporting to clearly establish the violation. Without it, the requisite “fair warning” required under the clearly established inquiry is absent. View "Babinski v. Sosnowsky" on Justia Law

Nine female detention service officers sued Dallas County, alleging that this sex-based scheduling policy violates Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination. Constrained by our decades-old, atextual precedent, a panel upheld the dismissal of the officers’ complaint, ruling that the discriminatory scheduling policy did not amount to an “ultimate employment decision.”   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that a plaintiff plausibly alleges a disparate-treatment claim under Title VII if she pleads discrimination in hiring, firing, compensation, or the “terms, conditions, or privileges” of her employment. She need not also show an “ultimate employment decision,” a phrase that appears nowhere in the statute and that thwarts legitimate claims of workplace bias. Here, giving men full weekends off while denying the same to women—a scheduling policy that the County admits is sex-based—states a plausible claim of discrimination under Title VII. View "Hamilton v. Dallas County" on Justia Law

AKD Investments, LLC (AKD), filed for bankruptcy. At that time, Magazine Investments I, LLC (Magazine), held the notes on AKD’s main asset, a building on Magazine Street in New Orleans, Louisiana. After Magazine resumed foreclosure proceedings, AKD sought permission from the bankruptcy court to obtain financing to pay off Magazine’s notes and thereby avoid the looming foreclosure sale of the building. In a February 2015 order, the bankruptcy court authorized the transaction, and the parties performed under the order. The bankruptcy court confirmed AKD’s reorganization plan in April 2017. In August 2020, AKD brought this action against Magazine as a core proceeding within the still-open bankruptcy case. AKD alleged that it had overpaid Magazine in 2015 and sought to recoup the overpayment. But the bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to Magazine. AKD contends that the bankruptcy court erred in applying the law-of-the-case doctrine because the 2015 order did not actually decide the amount AKD owed Magazine.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the bankruptcy court’s 2015 Order is internally contradictory. Its meaning is, therefore, ambiguous as to the question at hand: Whether the Order actually decided the correct amount that AKD owed to Magazine. Accordingly, we defer to the bankruptcy court’s reasonable interpretation of its Order—that it did—and affirm its invocation of the law-of-the-case doctrine to grant Magazine summary judgment as to AKD’s claim here. View "AKD Invsts v. Magazine Invsts I" on Justia Law

The Satanic Temple and one of its members sued the Texas Health and Human Services Commission (“THHSC”), its Executive Commissioner, and the Planned Parenthood Center for Choice, Inc., seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against several Texas abortion laws.Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and a preliminary injunction against the Commissioner; the district court denied the motion. The Satanic Temple appealed.While the appeal was pending, the litigation continued in district court. Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the suit without prejudice but without leave to replead.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court had jurisdiction to proceed on the merits of the case. An appeal from a grant or denial of a preliminary injunction does not divest the district court of jurisdiction or restrain it from taking other steps in the litigation. The district court, therefore, had jurisdiction to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims despite the pending appeal. Thus, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Satanic Temple v. TX Hlth and Human" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress on two grounds: (1) that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop of his vehicle, and (2) that Defendant did not voluntarily consent to the search of his home and truck during the stop. Defendant also appealed his sentencing, arguing that the district court erred in relying on the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) to sentence him under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) rather than any evidence required by Shepard v. United States 544 U.S. 13 (2005).The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress but reversed the district court’s application of the ACCA, vacated his sentence, and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that the Shepard-documents do not conclusively show that Defendant’s predicate offenses occurred on three separate occasions. Thus, the district court’s error affected a substantial right, and the court wrote that it must vacate the sentence. Further, given the fact that Wooden was decided after the notice of appeal was filed, the court remanded the case for a full resentencing, at which time the Government may introduce any additional Shepard evidence into the record. View "USA v. Alkheqani" on Justia Law

Defendant a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of this 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion alleging breach of his plea agreement based on serious allegations against Assistant U.S. Attorneys and ineffective assistance of counsel.   The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s application of the procedural bar to the breach-of-plea agreement claim and reversed and remanded but affirmed its disposition of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court explained that further factfinding is necessary to decide whether Defendant was prejudiced. To show prejudice, “the petition must show ‘not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.’” Here, the court explained that the government argues that Defendant cannot establish prejudice because the Louisiana USAO did not breach the plea agreement and because Defendant would have pled guilty even if he knew of the second indictment. The court reasoned that the district court is in the best position to determine the veracity of these claims. But the district court grounded its ruling on the cause and never addressed the arguments regarding prejudice. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court with instructions to determine (1) whether Defendant or his counsel knew or should have known of the Texas indictment before Defendant’s sentencing and (2), if not, whether Defendant was prejudiced. View "USA v. Cuff" on Justia Law