Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals
by
The Insureds filed suit against Mid-Continent alleging that it failed in its obligation to defend them when it refused to pay the fees of the Insureds' chosen attorney who represented them in an underlying lawsuit brought against them by KFA. On appeal, the Insureds challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Mid-Continent. The court concluded that the district court did not err because no disqualifying conflict of interest existed under Texas law, and Mid-Continent fulfilled its duty to defend the Insureds by tendering its chosen attorney. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Partain, et al. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co." on Justia Law

by
The principal issue in this case was whether, after an automatic stay in bankruptcy has been lifted and a creditor was permitted to foreclose on real property, federal or state law governed an oversecured creditor's recovery of attorneys' and other fees from the sale proceeds. A corollary issue was whether the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over the sale proceedings for purposes of determining the creditor's right to recover attorneys' fees and the Deed of Trust trustee's right to recover a contractually specified commission for conducting the non-judicial foreclosure sale. The bankruptcy court held that it had jurisdiction but the district court reversed. The court reversed, concluding that federal law governs what is to be distributed to a secured claimant that is oversecured. The court discerned no intent from 11 U.S.C. 506(b) that oversecured creditors who are permitted to foreclose are to be treated differently from oversecured creditors whose claims are satisfied within the bankruptcy proceeding. In this instance, the bankruptcy court's order lifting the stay allowed Wells Fargo to foreclose on the property in accordance with state law foreclosure procedures. It did not give the Deed of Trust any further authority and did not have the effect of insulating the debtor or any of the creditors from the reach of section 506(b). Lifting the automatic stay to allow Wells Fargo to foreclose was not tantamount to an abandonment of the property. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court was within its discretion in finding that there was no documentation of the time that was spent and no testimony as to what was a reasonable fee. Based on this record, the court could not say that the bankruptcy court erred in finding under section 506(b) that the amount of attorneys' fees Wells Fargo sought was not substantiated and therefore was not shown to be reasonable. Even under Texas law, Wells Fargo would bear the burden of demonstrating that the fees it requested were reasonable. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al. v. 804 Congress, L.L.C." on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs filed suit claiming denial of medical insurance, Medicare premiums, and deductible reimbursements. The district court held that the pension plan benefit plan was a "governmental plan" exempt from the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., and granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court vacated and remanded, concluding that the district court employed the wrong procedural mechanism for analyzing this case. Because a federal district court has jurisdiction to decide whether or not a plan is an ERISA plan as claimed by plaintiffs, the court concluded that, under Supreme Court precedent and ACS Recovery Services, Inc. v. Griffin, the proper procedural vehicle to raise the question of whether a purported ERISA plan is a "governmental plan" is either Rule 12(b)(6) or, if factual information outside the pleadings is needed, Rule 56. View "Smith, et al. v. Regional Transit Auth., et al." on Justia Law

by
Anticipating that W&T, an energy exploration and development company, would seek recovery for its Removal of Debris (ROD) expenses as a result of Hurricane Ike under its Umbrella Policies, Underwriters sought a declaratory judgment that they were not liable for W&T's ROD damages. Because W&T's underlying insurance was admittedly exhausted by claims not covered by the Umbrella Policies, the insurers argued that they have no liability. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Underwriters, holding that the plain terms of the Umbrella Policies stated that it only takes effect if the underlying policies were exhausted by claims that would be covered under the Umbrella Policies themselves. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that a careful reading of the contract unambiguously precluded Underwriters' interpretation. W&T's interpretation fits neatly with (1) the plain text of the Coverage provision, (2) the definition of a Retained Limit, and (3) other contract provisions relating to coverage and payment. View "Indemnity Ins. Co., et al. v. W & T Offshore, Inc." on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff, a large Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., provider, sought a declaration that defendants, three independent, non-ERISA insurance providers, were bound by the terms of the ERISA plan and primarily liable for injuries sustained by individuals covered by the parties. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that the Central States have failed to state a claim for equitable relief as required by Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA; there was no gap in ERISA's enforcement scheme requiring a federal common law claim for unjust enrichment; and Count I does not adequately state a claim for equitable relief under ERISA 502. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Central States, SE and SW Areas Health and Welfare Fund v. Health Special Risk, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

by
Defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting bank robbery. On appeal, defendant challenged his conviction, sentence, and various rulings by the district court. The court concluded that the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress his interrogation video where his confession was knowing and voluntary; the court rejected defendant's allegation that an off-the-record conversation occurred "in open court" between the government and the district court where the government stated that it would indict Teddy Rogers, who the government did not charge with aiding and abetting bank robbery, if he testified for the defense where there was no causal nexus between the alleged government action and Roger's decision to not testify; the court addressed defendant's evidentiary challenges and rejected them on the merits; the prosecutor's improper comment does not necessitate reversal of defendant's conviction; and the cumulative error doctrine was inapplicable in this case. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Anderson" on Justia Law

by
Pursuant to protective orders entered ten years ago, Ford produced a number of Volvo documents that it designated as confidential. After objecting to the confidential status of these documents, plaintiffs distributed and used them in litigation against Ford competitors. Ford moved to protect these documents and the magistrate judge found the documents to be protected by the agreed orders. The court agreed with the magistrate judge's holding that the Protective Orders did not require Ford to seek a protective order until the parties' own negotiations failed to resolve the dispute. The court concluded that the magistrate judge's finding that Ford did not waive the protection of the Protective Orders was plausible and supported by the record and was not clearly erroneous. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to depose Ford's corporate representative. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's affirmance of the magistrate judge. View "Moore, et al. v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

by
Petitioner, a national of Eritrea, requested asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner claimed that he fled Eritrea to escape an assignment within the country's National Service program, which he asserts is a program of human trafficking and not a legitimate program of military conscription. The IJ denied petitioner's application for asylum and withholding of removal, but granted his application for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The BIA affirmed. The court recognized that the evidence indicated the practices of the Eritrean government in enforcing its program of National Service were coercive and disturbing; the court noted that some of the evidence submitted in support of petitioner's motion to remand indicated that refusal to participate in National Service may be imputed as political opposition to the Government; but, however, the court could not say that the IJ's finding was unsupported by substantial evidence, nor could the court say that the BIA's denial of the motion was irrational or arbitrary. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Milat v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

by
Petitioner, a native of Mexico and a lawful permanent resident, sought review of the BIA's order finding her inadmissible for having committed a crime involving moral turpitude and thus ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court denied relief because DHS may rely on subsequent convictions to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard in proving that a returning alien is applying for admission. View "Munoz v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

by
Defendant appealed the district court's remand to state court. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the case. At issue was whether the district court has jurisdiction over an inventorship dispute where the contested patent has not yet been issued. The court concluded that, regardless of whether the removed complaint included an inventorship dispute, that dispute was inadequate to establish the district court's jurisdiction because the allegations indicated that no patent had issued; by raising a timely objection to removal, plaintiff properly preserved its jurisdictional argument; and because removal was improper and the case had not yet been tried on the merits, binding precedent dictated that the court remand the case to state court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's remand order as amended and dismissed plaintiff's motion and cross-motion. View "Camsoft Data Sys., Inc. v. Southern Electronics Supply, et al." on Justia Law