Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

El Paso appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the IRS, denying El Paso's tax refund claim. El Paso contended that the IRS, in settling a tax dispute with El Paso involving a refund and set-off, failed to adhere to the assessment and collection procedures provided by the Internal Revenue Code when setting off El Paso's deficiency against its refunds. El Paso contended that this failure barred the IRS from collecting unpaid taxes from El Paso. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the suit where it was unwilling to apply the variance doctrine to deprive the taxpayer from asserting federal court jurisdiction over the suit for refund. On the merits, the court held that, where the IRS and a taxpayer enter into a closing agreement, which sets out the liabilities and overpayments of the taxpayer, the IRS could comply with the mitigation provisions of the Code by "assessing and collecting" any net deficiency from the years covered by the closing agreement, or by "refunding or crediting" any net overpayment for those years. This case involved "refunding" an overpayment and the Government refunded El Paso's net overpayment within one year of the execution of the Closing Agreement. The "refunding" thus occurred within the applicable statutory period of limitations as per the mitigation provisions. The IRS acted within its authority in applying El Paso's deficiencies to offset its overpayment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "El Paso CGP Co., et al. v. United States" on Justia Law

BNSF filed suit seeking refunds of certain taxes that it, and its predecessor companies, paid under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act (RRTA), 26 U.S.C. 3201 et seq. The court concluded that, at least as applied to Non-Qualified Stock Options (NQSOs), the term "compensation", as used and defined by the RRTA, was inherently ambiguous; the IRS's definition was reasonable as applied to the NQSOs; although RRTA "compensation" may exclude certain in-kind benefits such as free rail passes that would otherwise be compensation under section 3121, the court concluded that NQSOs were properly included as "compensation" under the RRTA as interpreted by Treasury Regulation 31.3231(e)-1; the court's conclusion found firm support in the purpose, structure, and legislative history of the RRTA; and therefore, NQSOs were properly taxed as compensation under the RRTA. The court also concluded that, although the informal claims that BNSF filed for the employee tax paid on moving-expense benefits in 1996 and 1997 may satisfy the informal clams doctrine, it was undisputed that BNSF failed to perfect those claims prior to filing the present suit. Accordingly, BNSF's refund claims for those years must be dismissed. The court further concluded that a more reasonable interpretation of section 3231(e)(1)(iii) permitted exclusion of payments to employees for traveling expenses and bona fide and reasonable expenses related to travel, an interpretation harmonizing section 3231(e)(1)(iii) and section 3231(e)(5) as required by the specific-general canon and the rule against superfluities. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "BNSF Railway Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence for unlawfully reentering the United States. Defendant argued that the district court erred in applying a 12-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2. The court affirmed the sentence, concluding that defendant's prior New Mexico conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon was a crime of violence within the meaning of U.S.S.G. 2L1.2. View "United States v. Carrasco-Tercero" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's sua sponte dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit as frivolous, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and for want of prosecution. Plaintiff filed suit claiming that the shower floor of the "C Dorm" was slippery and unsafe, and that he received inadequate medical care. Plaintiff had fallen three times and sustained a fractured hip as a result. The court held that plaintiff did not state a claim under the Eighth Amendment with the contention that a slippery shower condition may inflict cruel and unusual punishment. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claims against Defendants Sweetin, Oliver, Cowan, and Brown where prisoner slip-and-fall claims almost never serve as the predicate for constitutional violations as a matter of law. The court also concluded that Defendants Erwin and Fisher ignored plaintiff's complaints and pleas for help. Therefore, the court reversed the dismissal of these defendants and remanded for further proceedings. With regard to Defendant Lamb, however, the mere allegation that plaintiff complained of his pain and lack of official response during a disciplinary proceeding Lamb conducted on an entirely different matter did not suffice for Eighth Amendment purposes. Plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to raise the possibility of Defendant Hough's deliberate indifference to plaintiff and the court reversed the dismissal of Hough and remanded. Because the record was devoid of material delay or contumacious conduct, the court reversed the dismissal of Defendant McManus and remanded. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part. View "Coleman v. Sweetin, et al." on Justia Law

Brain Harris's surviving children filed suit against the city and police officers for excessive force after the officers shot and killed Harris. Officers arrived at Harris's home after his former wife called 911 when she feared that he was attempting suicide. After breaching the barricaded door to Harris's bedroom, officers saw that Harris was holding a knife in a stabbing position and fatally shot him. The court concluded that the district court properly held that under the circumstances, the officers reasonably feared for their safety at the moment of the fatal shooting; the court need not reach plaintiffs' alternate argument regarding whether Harris's possible suicide attempt constituted exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry into his bedroom because officers had consent to enter; and since plaintiffs failed to show that there was a constitutional violation in this case, the district court properly dismissed the Monell claims against the city. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the officers based on qualified immunity and affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claim against the city. View "Harris, et al. v. New Orleans Police Dept., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to drug offenses. The court concluded that the district court did not err by imposing a two-level enhancement to defendant's sentence under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(5) for the importation of methamphetamine. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court because the methamphetamine defendant possessed was imported from Mexico and the enhancement was properly applied. View "United States v. Foulks" on Justia Law

Defendant is a Texas law firm engaged in an advertising campaign to solicit former dental patients from Kool Smiles dental clinics as potential clients. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of its Texas anti-SLAPP motion brought under the Texas Citizen's Participation Act (TCPA), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 27.001-27.011, to dismiss a claim brought by Kool Smiles. The court held that it had jurisdiction to interlocutorily consider the denial of a TCPA anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss; because Kool Smiles waived its argument that the TCPA was a procedural law that conflicted with the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, the court assumed that it did not; and the Supreme Court of Texas would most likely hold that defendant's ads and other client solicitations were exempted from the TCPA's protection because defendant's speech arose from the sale of services where the intended audience was an actual or potential customer. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's anti-SLAPP motion. View "NCDR, L.L.C., et al. v. Mauze & Bagby, P.L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Bailey in Texas state court, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation claims under state law. Plaintiff then filed an amended petition in state court, adding claims for racial discrimination and retaliation under federal laws. Plaintiff then removed the case to federal court based on the newly asserted federal-law claims. The district court granted Bailey's motion to dismiss. The court held that the Texas statute applied here to determine whether plaintiff's amended petition filed in state court related back to the date of his original petition. In this case, the amended petition did not relate back under the Texas statute because the claims set forth in plaintiff's original petition were barred when filed. Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that the claims asserted therein were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Taylor v. Bailey Tool & Manufacturing Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a Jones Act suit alleging that EBI was negligent in the construction and/or maintenance of the LC-400 shipyard crane. A jury concluded that plaintiff was a Jones Act, 33 U.S.C. 902(3), seaman and that EBI's negligence caused his injury from the crane, awarding him past and future physical pain and suffering, past and future mental pain and suffering, and future lost wages. EBI appealed. The court concluded that the evidence supported the jury's finding that plaintiff was a seaman under the Jones Act; because the district court's seaman status instruction was clear and consistent with the usual articulation, the court concluded that the district court did not err in its instruction on the issue of seaman status; the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of negligence; and because the court could not discern to what extent plaintiff's award for emotional suffering was based upon the non-compensable harm caused by a relative's death, his awards were tainted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court as it related to liability but vacated the judgment as it related to damages, remanding for further proceedings. View "Naquin, Sr. v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, injured while employed by GC, filed suit against GC alleging that he was working as a seamen at the time of his accident and sought damages under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, for GC's negligence. Travelers, which provided coverage to GC at the time of plaintiff's accident, moved to intervene. In this appeal, the court held that an insurer who makes voluntary Longshore Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. 901-950, payments to an injured employee on behalf of the employer acquires a subrogation lien on any recovery by the employee in a Jones Act suit against the employer based on the injuries for which the insurer has already compensated him. Therefore, Travelers was entitled to the disputed funds in the district court's registry, and Travelers could intervene for the purpose of collecting these funds. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of the motion to intervene filed by Travelers and remanded with instructions. View "Chenevert v. Travelers Indemnity Co." on Justia Law