Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The State filed a class action suit against several insurers to recover on the homeowner insurance policies purchased by individual Louisiana citizens but assigned by the respective policy holders to the State in return for State financial assistance in repairing and rebuilding their homes in the wake of the hurricanes. Defendants removed to federal court. The State eventually dropped its class allegations and severed this individual action from the original class action case. At issue was whether there was federal jurisdiction over these individual cases, once part of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2), class action. The court held that the general rule regarding federal jurisdiction over a removed case controlled; jurisdictional facts were determined at the time of removal, not by subsequent events; because at the time of removal CAFA supplied federal subject matter jurisdiction over these cases, the court held that CAFA continued to provide jurisdiction over these individual cases notwithstanding their severance from the class. View "State of Louisiana v. American National Property and Casualty Co., et al." on Justia Law

SHA appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. The district court concluded that SHA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in terminating plaintiff's rental assistance benefits under the Housing Choice Voucher Program (Section 8) for failure to attend an annual recertification meeting. The court held that plaintiff followed SHA's requirements - including contacting SHA within three days of her receipt of SHA's notice and attempting to reschedule due to her mother's recent death - and that SHA's contrary decision was arbitrary and capricious. Because this conclusion disposed of the case, the court did not address the parties' remaining contentions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Cooley v. Housing Auth. of the City of Slidell" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 application challenging his convictions for various sexual assault offenses. The district court denied petitioner's motions for a COA. Subsequently, in light of the new rule announced in Trevino v. Thaler, the Supreme Court granted petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the district court's prior order, and remanded to the district court to reconsider his petition for COA. The district court found that, under Trevino, it may be possible for the district court to hear at least some of petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel which would otherwise be procedurally defaulted, to the extent petitioner either lacked counsel or had ineffective counsel in his initial collateral review proceeding in state court. However, the court was unable to determine from the record which, if any, of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be preserved for review under Trevino. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court for reconsideration of petitioner's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in accordance with Trevino and Martinez v. Ryan. View "Neathery v. Thaler" on Justia Law

Defendants Garner and Shoemaker were charged with various federal crimes arising from a bribe and kickback scheme involving a community hospital. In No. 12-60754, the Government appealed the district court's judgments of acquittal and grants of new trials for defendants. In No. 12-60791, Defendant Shoemaker appealed the district court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal or new trial on the remaining counts, of which he alone was convicted. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions under Count One, conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. 666 by committing federal program bribery; Count Two, federal program bribery in violation of section 666; Count Four, the conspiracy to pay kickbacks to Shoemaker; and Count Five, healthcare fraud in violation of 32 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(b)(2)(B). Because the district court has no power to grant a new trial under Rule 33 on a basis not raised by the defendant, the district court abused its discretion in granting a new trial on these grounds. Because the jury instructions adequately explained all requisite elements of liability under section 1320a-7b(b)(2)(B), and because the evidence did not preponderate heavily against the verdict, the interest of justice did not require a new trial. Because the court concluded that sufficient evidence supported Shoemaker's remaining convictions, and otherwise found no errors warranting reversal or a new trial, the court affirmed Shoemaker's convictions on Counts Three and Counts Six through Twelve. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's grants of defendants' motions for judgment of acquittal and new trial; affirmed Shoemaker's other convictions; and remanded for reinstatement of the jury verdict and for sentencing. View "United States v. Shoemaker, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their conviction and sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, 50 grams or more of cocaine base, and 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of a Secret Service agent regarding the meaning of code words used by the conspirators on wiretapped recordings; the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of a DEA Group Supervisor concerning the interpretation of coded drug slang; the evidence was sufficient to convict defendants; the district court did not err in assigning Defendant Edwards an aggravating-role sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(b) and for firearm possession under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(1); the district court did not err in applying a career offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 to Defendant Gage's sentence; in Defendant Atkins' case, any error committed by the sentencing judge in looking to the higher crack cocaine calculation of 280 grams was harmless; the sentencing judge did not violate United States v. Booker in sentencing Defendant Perkins; and Akins' argument that the district court violated Apprendi v. New Jersey by increasing his maximum sentence based on his two prior felony drug convictions was foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions and sentences. View "United States v. Akins, et al." on Justia Law

Vista, plaintiff's employer, appealed the district court's denial of Vista's motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff's on-the-job injury claim. The court held that even if the Benefit Plan and the Arbitration Agreement were properly considered as part of a single contract, the termination provision found in the Benefit Plan did not apply to the Arbitration Agreement. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Arbitration Agreement was not illusory under Texas law because Vista's power to terminate the Arbitration Agreement was properly constrained. The court reversed and remanded for the district court to enter an order compelling arbitration. View "Lizalde v. Vista Quality Markets" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The court found that the Government initially breached the express terms of the plea agreement by objecting to the original PSR on the basis that U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)(C) should have applied. However, this breach was sufficiently cured by the withdrawal and the actions of the district court. Further, the court found that the Government did not implicitly breach the plea agreement by advocating for the U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a) adjustment. Accordingly, the court found that the appeal waiver was still applicable and barred plaintiff's appeal. View "United States v. Purser" on Justia Law

OAK made a request for attorney's fees in an underlying bankruptcy case for legal services it provided when representing debtors in Chapter 11 proceedings. OAK sought review of the district court's order vacating in part and remanding in part the bankruptcy court's decision to award only a portion of OAK's overall attorney's fees request. The court dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction under the court's well-established principle that a district court order was not final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 158(d) when that order reverses an order of the bankruptcy court and remands the case for significant further proceedings on the very issue the parties sought to address on appeal. View "Okin Adams & Kilmer, L.L.P. v. Hill" on Justia Law

The district court held that ICP had proven that defendants' allocation of Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) in Dallas resulted in disparate impact on African-American residents under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3604(a) and 3605(a). At issue was the correct legal standard to be applied to disparate impact claims under the FHA. The court adopted the HUD burden-shifting approach found in 24 C.F.R. 100.500 for claims of disparate impact under the FHA and remanded to the district court for application of this standard in the first instance. View "Inclusive Communities Project v. TX Dept. of Housing, et al." on Justia Law

Flex Frac petitioned for review of an order by the NLRB holding that Flex Frac's employee confidentiality policy is an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158. The NLRB cross-petitioned for enforcement. The ALJ found that although there was no reference to wages or other specific terms and conditions of employment in the confidentiality clause, the clause nonetheless violated Section 8(a)(1) because it was overly broad and contained language employees could reasonably interpret as restricting the exercise of their Section 7 rights. The NLRB affirmed. As an initial matter, the court declined to address the merits of Flex Frac's constitutional argument regarding the NLRB's authority to render the decision currently before the court and instead held that Flex Frac waived its constitutional challenge by failing to raise it in its initial brief. The court concluded that Flex Frac's contention that the NLRB's interpretation of the confidentiality clause was unreasonable was without merit and rejected Flex Frac's remaining arguments. Accordingly, the court rejected Flex Frac's petition for review and enforced the NLRB's order. View "Flex Frac Logistics, L.L.C., et al. v. NLRB" on Justia Law