Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, a putative class of former Guaranty stockholders whose equity interests were wiped out when Guaranty failed, filed suit alleging federal securities law claims against four former Guaranty executives. Plaintiffs alleged that the executives made materially false and misleading statements regarding Guaranty’s assets. The district court dismissed the claims. The court concluded that, under a holistic review, the Second Amended Complaint confirms that plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead facts that raise a strong inference of scienter. Because plaintiffs have not raised a strong inference of scienter as to any defendant, the court need not reach the issue of loss causation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Owens v. Jastrow" on Justia Law

Pilgrim's Pride was the successor-in-interest to Pilgrim's Pride Corporation of Georgia f/k/a Gold Kist, Inc., which was the successor-in-interest to Gold Kist, Inc. In 1998, Gold Kist sold its agriservices business to Southern States Cooperative, Inc. To facilitate the purchase, Southern States obtained a bridge loan that was secured by a commitment letter between Southern States and Gold Kist. The letter permitted Southern States to require Gold Kist to purchase certain securities from Southern States. In early 2004, Gold Kist and Southern States negotiated a price at which Southern States would redeem the securities. Gold Kist’s Board of Directors, instead of accepting the offer, decided to abandon the securities for no consideration. The issue this case presented for the Fifth Circuit's review centered on whether whether Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation's loss from its abandonment of securities was an ordinary loss or a capital loss. The Tax Court (in what appeared to be the first ruling of its kind by any court) ruled that 26 U.S.C. 1234A(1) applied to the abandonment loss and required that it be classified as capital. However, the Fifth Circuit disagreed. Because section 1234A(1) only applied to the termination of contractual or derivative rights, and not to the abandonment of capital assets, the Court reversed the Tax Court and rendered judgment in favor of Pilgrim's Pride. View "Pilgrim's Pride Corporation v. CIR" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's judgment imposing liability on him for violations of the Louisiana Securities Law, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 51.701 et seq. The court denied plaintiffs' motion to dismiss defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction; plaintiffs' argument that defendant should be held liable under federal law are not properly before the court because they failed to file a cross-appeal; the district court erred in requiring the jury to find the elements of a Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Ac tof 1934, 15 U.s.C. 78j(b), claim to impose liability under Section 712 of the Louisiana Securities Law, but this error was committed at defendant's insistence and his complaints are foreclosed; defendant's claim that the evidence does not support the district court's judgment of liability under Louisiana Securities Law fails; whether or not plaintiffs are correct that the jury found the requisite elements to hold defendant liable under Rule 10b-5, this argument is not properly before the court; as a codefendant was liable to plaintiffs as a seller of securities under Section 714(A), defendant should have been held jointly and severally liable for the total damages award under Section 714(B); but, because plaintiffs have not cross-appealed, they are without jurisdiction to correct this error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Heck v. Triche" on Justia Law

An employee of Halliburton, Anthony Menendez, submitted a complaint to management about the company's questionable accounting practices and also filed a complaint with the SEC. The Review Board subsequently determined that Halliburton's disclosure to Menendez's colleagues of his identity as the SEC whistleblower who had caused an official investigation, resulting in Menendez's workplace ostracism, constituted illegal retaliation under section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), 18 U.S.C. 1514A(a). The court held that to maintain an antiretaliation claim under SOX, as in these circumstances here, the employee must prove that his protected conduct was a contributing factor in the employer's adverse action. The court rejected Halliburton's argument that the Review Board committed legal error by failing to require proof that the company had a wrongful motive. The court rejected Halliburton's contention that the damages awarded to Menendez for emotional distress and reputational harm are not noneconomic compensatory damages available under SOX. The court agreed with the Tenth Circuit that the plain language of SOX's text relating to remedies for retaliation affords noneconomic compensatory damages and this conclusion comports with the decisions of the Seventh and Eighth Circuits respecting essential identical statutory text in the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733. The court concluded that Halliburton failed to show that the Review Board's decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Halliburton, Inc. v. Administrative Review Board, Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Amedisys and others, alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(b)(4). Plaintiffs claimed that Amedisys defrauded investors by concealing a Medicare fraud scheme. The district court granted a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and dismissed the suit with prejudice. Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration but the district court denied the motion. The court concluded that the motion to dismiss should be denied as to the element of loss causation. The district court's application of the "actual fraud" standard to the partial disclosures at issue, and when viewed against the stark results of Amedisys's second quarter of 2010 earnings report, requires reversal and vacating the prior dismissal. View "Bach, et al. v. Amedisys, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the receiver for the Stanford entities, filed suit seeking to recover funds that were paid to defendants, purchasers of certificate of deposits from Standard International Bank (SIB) as part of a Ponzi scheme. The court concluded that the district court properly applied the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA), Tex. Bus. & Com. Code 24.010, to the receiver's claims; the receiver has standing to bring the TUFTA claims on behalf of the Stanford entities; and the receiver's claims are not barred by the statute of limitations. On the merits, the court concluded that the receiver established that the Stanford principles transferred monies to the investor-defendants with fraudulent intent; unlike interest payments, it is undisputed that the principal payments were payments of an antecedent debt, namely fraud claims that the investor-defendants have as victims of the Stanford Ponzi scheme; the district court did not err in denying an exemption under Texas Property Code 42.0021(a) where investor-defendants have offered no evidence that they have a legal right to the funds despite those funds being the product of a fraudulent transfer; and the court declined to reach the investor-defendants' argument that certain factual issues remain. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of the receiver's motion for summary judgment.View "Janvey, et al. v. Brown, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, investors, alleged that they purchased defendants' stock in reliance of defendants' material misrepresentations. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that plaintiffs have sufficiently pled their claims for securities fraud in accordance with the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. 78u-4 and 78u-5; the court need not consider the parties' arguments as to whether the district court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs' request to amend their complaint; and, therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.View "In Re: Houston Amer. Energy Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, members of a certified class of securities fraud plaintiffs whose certification order was vacated in 2004 (the Drnek action), filed a class action in 2009 reciting the same claims previously outlined in the Drnek action. The district court concluded that plaintiffs' claims have been extinguished because they filed their class action more than five years after the Drnek court vacated its certification order. The court held that the Drnek court's vacatur of certification caused American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah tolling to cease and the statute of repose to resume running. Because plaintiffs brought this action after the statute of repose expired, their claim has been extinguished. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Hall, et al. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against GE Energy, alleging violations of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h) (the "whistleblower-protection provision", because GE Energy terminated him after he made an internal report of a possible securities law violation. The court concluded that the plain language of section 78u-6 limited protection under the whistleblower provision to those individuals who provided information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the SEC. In this instance, plaintiff did not provide any information to the SEC and, therefore, he did not qualify as a "whistleblower" under Dodd-Frank. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of his claim. View "Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C." on Justia Law

A putative class of plaintiffs sought to recover damages from defendants for securities fraud under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b). This litigation arose out of alleged misrepresentations by Halliburton concerning three primary aspects of its operations. Based on its finding that common issues predominated and that the other Rule 23 class prerequisites were satisfied, the district court certified the class. The court agreed with the district court that defendants were not entitled to use evidence of no market price impact to rebut the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance at class certification. The court concluded that Halliburton's price impact evidence did not bear on the question of common question predominance, and was thus appropriately considered only on the merits after the class had been certified. The court rejected the Fund's waiver challenge. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., et al" on Justia Law