Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against WAF and RMS, alleging breach of a reverse mortgage agreement and fraudulent inducement. Plaintiff primarily argued that the property’s foreclosure could have been avoided if WAF had not issued a Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (a HECM) in violation of the United States Housing and Urban Development (HUD) guidelines. The court held that HUD regulations govern the relationship between the reverse-mortgage lender and HUD as insurer of the loan. HUD regulations do not give the borrower a private cause of action unless the regulations are expressly incorporated into the lender-borrower agreement. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment dismissal, holding that plaintiff cannot assert a claim against defendants for breach of HUD regulations, there was no breach of contract, and no valid fraudulent inducement claim. View "Johnson v. World Alliance Fin. Corp." on Justia Law

In this appeal stemming from a failed real estate investment, plaintiffs challenged the district court’s judgment confirming the arbitration award in favor of the Rainier parties involved in marketing the investment. The real estate transactions underlying this appeal have already been described in greater depth in Rainier DSC 1, L.L.C. v. Rainier Capital Management, L.P., 546 F. App’x 491, 492–93 (5th Cir. 2013). The court affirmed the district court's judgment confirming the arbitration award, concluding that plaintiffs have not identified any basis for vacating the arbitration award. View "Rainier DSC 1, LLC v. Rainier Capital Mgmt." on Justia Law

In this appeal stemming from a failed real estate investment, plaintiffs challenged the district court's judgments in favor of the non-arbitrating defendants. The real estate transactions underlying this appeal have already been described in greater depth in Rainier DSC 1, L.L.C. v. Rainier Capital Management, L.P., 546 F. App’x 491, 492–93 (5th Cir. 2013). The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, concluding that plaintiffs have not shown that the district court erred in not staying the litigation of the non-arbitrating parties during the arbitration or in granting summary judgment in favor of FSA and the physicians. View "Rainier DSC 1, LLC v. Rainier Capital Mgmt." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Fannie Mae, seeking to quiet title on the ground that Wells Fargo waived its right to foreclose by accepting payments for sixteen months after the initial default, so it could not sell the property at issue to Fannie Mae. The court concluded that Wells Fargo engaged only in conduct that was contemplated by the DOT’s non-waiver provisions and thus was entirely consistent with its intent to preserve the right to accelerate and foreclose. Therefore, plaintiff failed to allege any facts that would make his claim to relief plausible. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of his suit. View "Martin v. Federal National Mtge Assoc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed that it acquired title to the foreclosed property at issue by a tax sale and filed suit to quiet title in state court. Defendant removed the action to federal court and counter-claimed for declaratory relief. The district court dismissed the suit and found that the tax sale was void, quieting title in favor of defendant. The court determined that the district court properly concluded that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s suit. A quiet title action against the federal government must be brought in federal court, and when the state court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, no jurisdiction is added by removal to federal court. The court also concluded that in the absence of consent from the federal government, the sale of the property under state law was invalid. While the statute preserves local “power to tax,” it does not permit local governments to seize and sell federal government property. Therefore, the tax sale of federally owned real estate was null and void, and the district court rightly quieted title in favor of the Secretary. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Equity Trust Co. v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against BOA and Wells Fargo alleging, among other claims, that BOA had violated Section 51.002(d) of the Texas Property Code and the Texas Debt Collection Act (TDCA), Tex. Fin. Code Ann. 392.301(a)(8), 392.303(a)(2), and 392.304(a)(8). On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment for BOA. The court concluded that, even if section 51.002(d) authorizes a private cause of action, plaintiff fails to state a claim because she did not allege that BOA attempted to send her a timely notice of sale or to initiate foreclosure. Further, the court concluded that, irrespective of any statutory notice requirements, BOA did not violate section 392.301(a)(8) of the TDCA by threatening to foreclose; plaintiff failed to allege a violation of section 392.303(a)(2); and plaintiff failed to establish any of the elements required by section 392.304(a)(8). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Rucker v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

After plaintiffs defaulted on their residential mortgage loan, they sought to enjoin BNY from foreclosing by claiming that the assignment of the deed of trust (DOT) to BNY was void. Plaintiffs also filed a false-lien claim under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code 12.002 against BNY and MERS. The district court granted BNY's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that plaintiffs lack standing to challenge BNY’s efforts to foreclose on the ground that MERS’s assignment to BNY was void for violating the PSA. Because plaintiffs have failed to plead facts showing BNY’s lien was in fact fraudulent, plaintiffs have failed to state a false lien claim under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code 12.002. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Ferguson v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law

This case concerns a plan to replace public housing units destroyed by Hurricane Ike in part by redeveloping on two of the sites destroyed by Ike. At issue are questions concerning the scope of standing to sue under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.; whether Congress intended by that Act to abrogate States' sovereign immunity; and whether defendants can avail themselves of a safe harbor provision in the United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended by the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, 42 U.S.C. 1437 et seq. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the dismissal of the Individual Plaintiffs and GOGP because they did not appeal; plaintiff has Article III standing to bring her claim that the planned redevelopment will deprive her of the social and economic benefits that result from living in an integrated community; Congress did not make clear an intent to abrogate States’ Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from suits brought under the Fair Housing Act, a conclusion reached by other courts considering the issue; and the district court properly granted summary judgment to the remaining defendants on plaintiff’s Fair Housing Act claim, concluding that plaintiff's claim was precluded by a safe harbor provision found at 42 U.S.C. 1437p(d). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "McCardell v. HUD" on Justia Law

The Counties filed suit against defendants, alleging that defendants violated Texas Local Government Code 192.007 and Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code 12.002, and, alleging claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and unjust enrichment. The court agreed with the district court's holding that it had no authority to grant the requested relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201, because the Texas Legislature did not create a private right of action to enforce section 192.007. The court also agreed with the district court's holding that even if there were a right of action, section 192.007 does not impose a duty to create and record assignments of deeds of trust when an interest in the related promissory note is transferred. Dallas County's common law claim for fraudulent misrepresentation failed based upon the reliance and injury elements. Finally, the unjust enrichment claim failed because any benefit from recording a mortgage was derived not from the county clerk, but from Texas law recognizing lien priority. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of all of the Counties' claims. View "Dallas County, TX v. MERSCORP, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1990, property encumbered by a deed of trust held by the RTC was foreclosed upon and sold to a third party in a tax sale, purportedly extinguishing the RTC’s lien. Two years ago, CAP Holdings, the alleged current holder of the deed of trust for the property, filed suit against the current owners of the property seeking a declaration that the foreclosure and resulting sale were void for violating 12 U.S.C. 1825(b)(2). Section 1825(b)(2) prohibits “property of the” RTC from being foreclosed upon or sold “without the consent of” the RTC. The court vacated and remanded because the court's precedent dictates that, if the sale was conducted in violation of section 1825(b)(2), then it indeed is entirely void, and because the district court failed to consider whether the sale’s being void would render the defendants without standing under Texas law to assert a limitations defense. View "CAP Holdings, Inc. v. Lorden" on Justia Law