Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a petition for damages in the 19th Judicial District Court in East Baton Rouge Parish. Plaintiff totaled his car in an accident and alleged that GoAuto, his car insurance carrier, paid less in policy benefits than his policy and Louisiana law required. GoAuto filed its notice of removal, Plaintiff received permission from the Louisiana court to amend his complaint again and, as accepted on appeal, filed the amended complaint. This amendment changed the definition of the class from class “residents of Louisiana” to class “citizens of Louisiana.” After removal, the parties filed several competing motions disputing which complaint controlled and the sufficiency of GoAuto’s notice of removal.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order remanding the case to state court, finding that Defendant is a citizen of Louisiana and thus the suit lacks the minimal diversity necessary to vest a federal court with jurisdiction. The court declined Defendant’s request to disregard the Louisiana state court’s pre-removal procedural rulings applying Louisiana law and substituted its own Erie guesses at how a Louisiana court ought to rule on a motion to amend a pleading.   Further, in regards to Defendant’s argument that it is plausible that some class members are not citizens of Louisiana, the court held that none of these individuals, assuming they had relocated to Colorado, Texas, or Florida before the filing of the complaint, qualify as citizens of Louisiana. Finally, the court held that Defendant points to nothing in the text of the statute that would bar Plaintiff’s class definition. View "Turner v. GoAuto Insurance" on Justia Law

A fifteen-year-old boy was shot and killed by Defendant, a then-officer responding to a 911 call about possible underage drinking. The boy’s family and friends sued Defendant and the City of Balch Springs alleging excessive force. Later, Defendant was separately convicted of murder. The district court denied Defendant’s summary judgment motion claiming qualified immunity.On appeal, Defendant argued that the facts at the moment of the threat are undisputed and urged the court to exercise jurisdiction over the case on the issue of materiality. The court found that the resolution of this factual dispute is material because it affects both whether Defendant’s use of force was reasonable and whether the force he used violated clearly established law. The court found that if a jury accepts Plaintiffs’ version of the facts as true, particularly as to what occurred in the moments before Defendant shot at the car, the jury could conclude that the officers violated Plaintiffs’ clearly established right to be free from excessive force. Thus, because the factual dispute is material, the court ruled that it lacks jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the summary judgment denial. The court dismissed Defendant’s interlocutory appeal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Edwards v. Oliver" on Justia Law

Defendant is an elected constable in Harris County, Texas. Plaintiff is his counterpart in adjoining Waller County. After a 911 caller reported that Plaintiff had aimed a gun at him on a local tollway in Harris County, Defendant’s deputies stopped and questioned Plaintiff, then released him minutes later.Plaintiff sued Defendant, who asserted qualified and statutory immunities. Defendant argued that the stop was lawful, Defendant wasn’t present at the time, and state law shields him from the tort claims. But the district court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss.At issue is whether Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and if Texas law immunizes Defendant from Plaintiff’s tort claims. The court found that because reasonable suspicion supported the investigatory stop, Plaintiff did not adequately plead an unreasonable seizure. Further, Plaintiff failed to plead a colorable constitutional violation. Thus, absent constitutional violation, Defendant can’t be liable for supervising one, ratifying one, or failing to train his deputies to avoid one.Next, as for the state claims, Plaintiff sued Defendant for defamation and IIED. The court found that the critical issue is whether Defendant’s actions are linked to his job responsibilities. Here, the connection exists, therefore Defendant is entitled to dismissal and his immunities bar all claims against him. View "Smith v. Heap" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs' son was killed when he attempted to drive through a low water crossing in Camp Bullis, a military training base outside San Antonio, Texas. As Plaintiff's son navigated the crossing, water swept across the road, ultimately resulting in his death.Plaintiffs filed suit against the United States, claiming the government failed to inspect the low water crossing, failed to warn approaching motorists about the dangers of flooding, and failed to install guard rails that may have prevented water from accumulating on the road. The district court granted summary judgment to the United States, finding the discretionary exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") applied.The Fifth Circuit reversed. Under the FTCA, the federal government waives sovereign immunity for actions based on the negligence of federal employees who are acting within the scope of their employment. However, immunity is not waived if the federal employee is carrying out a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency. To be discretionary, an action must involve some element of judgment or choice.Here, the relevant regulation states that "[a]ll Range/Control Area/Impact Area gates will either be locked or guarded by the unit using the area." A natural reading of the regulation imposed an obligation on the officers who were on-site to lock the gate. Thus, the discretionary exception to the FTCA did not apply. View "Barron v. USA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured while she, her father, and others were tracking a wounded deer at night in the woods. Her father’s Remington Model 710 rifle accidentally discharged and injured her. Plaintiff and her family members filed suit in the district court.At issue before the circuit court is whether the district court erred when it held that Section 60 of the LPLA did not bar her from bringing a claim under Section 56 of the LPLA, which is a general section applicable to design-defect claims.The LPLA “establishes the exclusive theories of liability for manufacturers for damage caused by their products.” LA. STAT. ANN. Sec. 9:2800.52. The court found is that Section 60(B) unambiguously bars design defect claims. Plaintiff argues that because Section 60(C) precludes claims against manufacturers for improper use of firearms, that part of the statute is superfluous if Section 60(B) had already precluded all non-Section 55 manufacturing-defect claims against manufacturers.The court found Section 60(C) precludes claims based on conduct by a broader category of actors than Section 60(B). Further, the court disagreed with plaintiff’s argument that Remington’s interpretation would render Section 60(D) Section 60(E) superfluous. Section 60(B) does not block all failure-to-warn claims but only those based on harm resulting from a shooting injury by a specific actor subset. Finally, the court found that the plain text leads to preventing a meaningful category of potential claims against the manufacturers of firearms. The court reversed and rendered judgment for defendant. View "Seguin v. Remington Arms" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when a gun manufactured by the defendant accidentally discharged. Plaintiff and her family filed several claims in the district court. The district court dismissed all parties’ claims except the plaintiff’s defective-design claim under the Louisiana Product Liability Act. Plaintiff recovered $500,000 and the defendant appealed.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding that the Louisiana Product Liability Act (“LPLA”) permitted the plaintiff’s claim. Section 60(b) of the LPLA provides that no firearm manufacturer can be held liable for any shooting injury unless the injury was “proximately caused by the unreasonably dangerous construction or composition of the product.” The court held that this language unambiguously bars design-defect claims. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the natural reading of Section 60(b) leads to an absurd result. View "Seguin v. Remington Arms" on Justia Law

While shopping at a Wal-Mart Supercenter retail store in Weatherford, Texas, the plaintiff slipped and fell in the store’s deli section. Her amended complaint referred to the cause of her fall as “grease or a similar slick substance.” She alleged that Wal-Mart had either actual or constructive knowledge of the spilled grease yet failed to clean it up or warn her of the hazardous condition.Wal-Mart argued that the plaintiff’s testimony showed that she had no evidence that it had actual or constructive knowledge of the spill Plaintiff submitted an affidavit, and Wal-Mart objected that it “lack[ed] credibility” and was a “self-serving sham.” The Fifth Circuit explained that the sham-affidavit doctrine is not applicable when discrepancies between an affidavit and other testimony can be reconciled such that the statements are not inherently inconsistent.The court found that affidavit testimony did not inherently contradict her deposition testimony, and the district court abused its discretion in applying the sham-affidavit rule. Further, because the evidence shows a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Wal-Mart had constructive notice of the spilled grease, the district court erred in granting summary judgment. View "Seigler v. Wal-Mart Stores TX" on Justia Law

Walmart employees stopped the plaintiffs, a woman and her daughter, on suspicion of shoplifting. The plaintiffs sued Walmart in state court, alleging false imprisonment, among other claims. Walmart removed the case to federal court, and the district court dismissed some claims and entered summary judgment in favor of Walmart. Regarding the plaintiffs' Texas Deceptive Trade Practices & Consumer Protection Act claim, the court found they failed to identify any facts that would establish an unconscionable action. Next, plaintiffs assert that Walmart employees committed acts underlying their false imprisonment claims and that Walmart is vicariously liable. The court reasoned that the off-duty police officer is treated as an anon-duty police officer for vicarious liability purposes. As a result, Walmart cannot be vicariously liable for the off-duty officer’s actions. Plaintiffs further argue that Walmart did not establish that her detention was reasonable. The court found that plaintiff cannot state a prima facie case for assault, battery, or offensive contact. Finally, they do not provide any argument that they were harmed, let alone substantially prejudiced, by allowing Walmart to attach portions of depositions, an asset protection case record sheet, and body camera footage. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the necessary elements for their claims. View "Huynh v. Walmart" on Justia Law

Tarango Trucking, L.L.C. (“Tarango”) appeals from a judgment declaring that its insurer, Penn-America Insurance Company (“PennAmerica”), owes neither defense nor indemnity concerning third-party claims against Tarango concerning a fatal accident on its property.At the time of the accident, Tarango was insured under a commercial general liability policy issued by Penn-America (“the Policy”). Penn-America defended Tarango but reserved its right to contest coverage. Texas law governs the insurance issues in this diversity case. The Policy contains both a duty to defend and a duty to indemnify. PennAmerica must show that the plain language of an exclusion avoids coverage of all claims within the confines of the eight-corners rule. Penn-America argues that the Policy’s Auto Exclusion satisfies this burden. Because the Parking Exception is an exception to the Auto Exclusion, it is reasonable to interpret it as employing the same “arising-out-of” nexus as the Auto Exclusion.The Fifth Circuit held that the Parking Exception applies to bodily injury and property damage arising out of parking. Because the petition alleges some claims that arise out of parking and are potentially covered by the Policy, Penn-America must defend Tarango. The court also held that it was premature for the district court to decide the indemnity issue. View "Penn-America Ins v. Tarango Trucking" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Wedgewood in Texas state court after his mother, Emma Mitchell, died in a nursing home. Plaintiff alleged state-law causes of action for medical negligence, corporate negligence, and gross negligence. After removal to federal court, the district court granted plaintiff's motion to remand to state court.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act does not completely preempt plaintiff's state-law negligence claims. The court explained that, because the compensation fund created by the Act does not satisfy this Circuit's test for complete preemption, and because plaintiff could not have brought his claims under the willful-misconduct cause of action, those claims are not completely preempted. The court also rejected Wedgewood's claim that plaintiff's claims raise a significant federal issue that creates federal jurisdiction under the Grable doctrine. The court concluded that Wedgewood cannot avail itself of the federal officer removal statute because it failed to satisfy the third prong of the test where it was not acting pursuant to a federal officer's directions. Accordingly, the court remanded with directions to further remand to the appropriate state court. View "Mitchell v. Advanced HCS, LLC" on Justia Law