Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff worked as a longshoreman as early as 1998 and worked regularly for Cooper from 2008 through the date of his injury on June 22, 2018, never going more than a week and a half without working. He performed various jobs including operating a front-end loader and track hoe, flagging cranes, and loading barges. Employer classified Plaintiff as a non-assigned employee, meaning he was not assigned to a specific vessel. Employer has other employees who are assigned to vessels.Plaintiff was hurt when he fell to the deck of a ship he was working on. He filed suit against Employer in federal district court in November 2020, alleging that he was a seaman and a member of the crew, and bringing claims of Jones Act negligence, failure to pay maintenance and cure, and unseaworthiness. In the alternative, Plaintiff alleged that if he was not a seaman and was covered by the LHWCA.The District Court found Plaintiff failed to cite evidence that showed a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was a seaman and, alternatively, as to vessel negligence.The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that Plaintiff did not have a connection to the ship he was working on at the time he was injured, and that he could not establish vessel negligence. View "Johnson v. Cooper T. Smith Stevedoring" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was arrested and released on a surety bond provided by Big Bubba’s. Plaintiff was formally charged with the same offense in April 2016, but due to an epileptic seizure, he was hospitalized before receiving notice of the indictment. As a result, he was incapacitated for several months, but according to Plaintiff, his wife stayed in touch with Big Bubba’s on his behalf. Big Bubba’s filed a petition with the trial court, requesting an arrest warrant for Plaintiff on the grounds that he had failed to fulfill his contractual obligations by neglecting to check in and provide contact information. The trial court granted the request, and Plaintiff was arrested pursuant. Plaintiff sued Big Bubba’s, alleging that it violated their agreement and caused him to be wrongfully arrested by presenting misleading information to the court. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation and granted Big Bubba’s motion to dismiss. On appeal, Plaintiff contends that his false imprisonment and contract claims were wrongly dismissed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court as to Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim, and the court reversed and remanded his contract claim. The court explained that while Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim was properly dismissed, his contract claim was not. The district court held that principals, such as Plaintiff, who seek to contest a surrender, are “limited to the remedy” set out in Tex. Occ. Code Section 1704.207(b)–(c). Thus the court concluded that Plaintiff is not limited to this remedy and therefore reverse the dismissal of his claim. View "Jeanty v. Big Bubba's" on Justia Law

This dispute began in 2016 when Defendants sued a motorist in state court for damages stemming from an automobile accident. The motorist fled the scene of the accident, was criminally charged for failing to provide his name, address, and insurance information, and pleaded nolo contendere to a criminal misdemeanor. The motorist was insured by Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Company (“Allstate”). Allstate paid Defendants claims for property damages, but Defendants rejected Allstate’s offers to resolve their physical injury claims, demanding the policy limit of $50,000. The district court determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit, denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). It subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of Allstate, finding that the motorist’s failure to cooperate in the underlying suit prejudiced Allstate and barred any legal obligation to pay Defendants the judgment amount of $163,822.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that it had subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that where the claim under the policy exceeds the value of the policy limit, courts considering declaratory judgments should ask whether there is a legal possibility that the insurer could be subject to liability in excess of the policy limit. The party seeking diversity jurisdiction should establish this possibility by a preponderance of the evidence. View "Allstate Fire and Casualty v. Allison Love" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Baton Rouge police officer, sued Defendant, the organizer of a protest after Plaintiff was seriously injured by a protestor at a protest Defendant arranged. After a lengthy procedural history, the case came back to the Fifth Circuit after the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed that state law recognizes a negligence cause of action in the circumstances alleged in Plaintiff's complaint.In turn, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's order dismissing Plaintiff's negligence claim. Additionally, due to these developments, the district court also erred in failing to grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. Otherwise, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's other claims. View "Doe v. Mckesson, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for Defendant Huntington Ingalls (formerly “Avondale”) as a shipyard electrician from February 1969 to June 1977. In March 2020, Plaintiff was diagnosed with mesothelioma. Following his diagnosis, he filed a state-law tort suit in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, alleging that Avondale, among other defendants, caused Plaintiff to contract mesothelioma by exposing him to asbestos in a negligent manner. Because Plaintiff primarily worked on United States Navy ships when he was exposed, Avondale removed the case to the federal district court under the federal officer removal statute. Plaintiff never claimed benefits under the LHWCA, which provides a no-fault compensation remedy to injured workers. Avondale moved for summary judgment. The district court held that the claims are preempted.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held express preemption does not apply. Despite the clear proclamation of exclusivity in the LHWCA’s text that prohibits any liability “at law or in admiralty” for injuries covered by the Act, there is no express preemption here. The court wrote that its conclusion that conflict preemption does not apply is supported by the existence of concurrent jurisdiction and the acceptable incongruity inherent therein, the Supreme Court’s consistent rejection of arguments resisting that regime, the LHWCA’s role of supplementing rather than supplanting state law, the limited category of claims at issue here, and the similarity between these claims and those the Supreme Court has already permitted in Hahn. View "Barrosse v. Huntington Ingalls" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was arrested for driving while intoxicated. She sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and related state laws. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, dismissing all of Plaintiff’s claims. On appeal, Plaintiff contests the summary judgment for the Section 1983 claims of false arrest and excessive force along with the state law claims of false arrest, excessive force, negligence, and vicarious liability.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for driving while intoxicated. The court explained that the following facts are confirmed: (1) A witness reported to the police that Plaintiff was driving in a dangerous manner;(2) there is video footage of Plaintiff’s car swerving out of the lane and recorded audio of the officers noting the swerve, and (3) The officers could not conclusively determine that she had not taken drugs. Those facts alone are sufficient to give rise to probable cause that Plaintiff was driving while intoxicated. Further, the court found that the officer’s limited use of force (in such a short time frame) to restrain Plaintiff and place her in handcuffs as a response to Plaintiff’s perceived resistance does not amount to excessive force.   Moreover, the court found that the officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for driving while intoxicated, and accordingly, there was no false arrest. Finally, because Plaintiff’s underlying state law claims were properly dismissed, there is no basis for her vicarious liability claim against the municipal Defendants. View "Scott v. City of Mandeville, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a citizen of India, worked as a crew member on the Stargate, a merchant ship managed by the Singapore-based shipping company Eastern Pacific. Plaintiff brought suit against Eastern Pacific in the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging tort claims under the Jones Act and general maritime law, as well as contract claims arising from a collective bargaining agreement. In March 2020—after Plaintiff brought his complaint and Eastern Pacific consented to federal court jurisdiction, but before Plaintiff perfected service—Eastern Pacific sued Plaintiff in Goa, India. In the Indian suit, Eastern Pacific sought an anti-suit injunction to prevent Plaintiff from litigating in American court. Plaintiff sought an anti-suit injunction to prohibit Eastern Pacific from prosecuting its Indian suit against him. Finding the Indian litigation vexatious and oppressive and determining that it need not show comity to the Indian court that had attempted to enjoin the American suit, the district court granted the injunction in favor of Plaintiff. Eastern Pacific appealed the district court’s grant of the anti-suit injunction.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that there is no basis to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in granting the anti-suit injunction. The court reasoned that the district court was well within its discretion to conclude that the vexatiousness of the Indian litigation outweighed any comity concerns. View "Ganpat v. Eastern Pacific Shipping" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that he was denied a bathroom break by his supervisor at a Dallas, Texas, warehouse until he was forced to defecate on himself at his workstation. Plaintiff sued his employer, UPS, for negligent supervision, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The district court dismissed the first two claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and granted UPS’s motion for summary judgment on the third. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court explained that the district court correctly held that Plaintiff has not met the standard for IIED claims. However, it erred in concluding that Plaintiff’s negligent supervision claim was preempted by federal law. Further, the court wrote that based on its Erie guess, the court also disagreed with the district court’s conclusion that the alleged facts do not constitute an invasion of privacy. The court concluded that the invasion of privacy tort covers the alleged facts. In recent years, there have been troubling reports of industry practices that deny employees adequate bathroom breaks. It is important to clarify that such actions, or similar examples of public humiliation by an exhibition of intimate personal details or actions, are not immune from liability. View "Amin v. United Parcel Service" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from Plaintiff’s suit against the City of Harahan (“the City”) for its alleged deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. In October 2019, the Harahan Police Department (“HPD”) Chief of Police determined that Plaintiff was guilty of numerous offenses. Plaintiff was entitled to a fifteen-day appeal window of the Chief’s disciplinary determinations. Plaintiff exercised his right to appeal a week after the charges. However, the Chief emailed the Jefferson Parish District Attorney’s office (“JPDA”) to inform it of his disciplinary action against Plaintiff before he exercised his right. Plaintiff brought a civil rights suit against the City for violation of his procedural due process rights, stigma-plus-infringement, and defamation. He included Louisiana state law claims for defamation, invasion of privacy, and negligence. The City moved to dismiss his Section 1983 claims under Rule 12(c). The primary issue is whether the district court erroneously determined that Plaintiff had a liberty interest in his “future employment as a law enforcement officer.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the City’s Rule 12(c) motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s due process claim. The court explained that Plaintiff’s alleged liberty interest in his career in law enforcement has no basis in Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit precedent. Moreover, he does not provide a different constitutional anchor for this proposed liberty interest. Because he fails to state facts supporting the violation of a cognizable liberty interest, he fails to plead a due process violation. Furthermore, the court declined to address the adequacy of the process he received. View "Adams v. City of Harahan" on Justia Law

The Sabine River Authority of Louisiana ("SRA-L")was created as a conservation and reclamation district lying within the watershed of the Sabine River, by an act of the Louisiana legislature in 1950. The SRA subsequently entered into a joint venture with the Sabine River Authority, Texas ("SRA-T") to create a dam and reservoir, promote industrial development, and conserve water.Plaintiffs are Louisiana and Texas property owners who claimed that the SRAs violated their federal Fifth Amendment rights by opening spillway gates to relieve highwater levels in the reservoir during a rain event in March of 2016. Plaintiffs claimed the SRA's actions flooded their properties, causing significant property damage.The district court determined SRA-L was not an arm of the state and therefore was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. SRA-L appealed. Finding that the first Clark factor weighed in favor of sovereign immunity, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the remaining Clark factors weighed against sovereign immunity. Thus, the court held that, under he Eleventh Amendment, the SRA-L is not an "arm of the state." View "Bonin, et al v. Sabine River Authority" on Justia Law