Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant State of Louisiana, ex rel. Jeff Landry (“the State”) sought to dissolve a consent decree that pertains to the method of selecting justices for the Louisiana Supreme Court. The State attempted to dissolve the consent judgment under the first and third clauses of Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The State contended that the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged because the State has substantially complied with the decree for more than thirty years and the decree was intended to terminate at a defined milestone. The State further contended that it is no longer equitable to enforce the consent judgment prospectively because of widespread malapportionment in Louisiana’s supreme court election districts. The district court denied the State’s motion to dissolve.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the dissolution motion, as the State has failed to meet its evidentiary burdens under both the first and third clauses of Rule 60(b)(5). The court explained that the State did not meet the evidentiary burden associated with Rufo’s first prong, which requires a showing of changed factual or legal circumstances that warrant reexamination of a consent decree. The State only makes very general claims about malapportionment and asserts that “new policy concerns” have arisen which satisfy Rufo. But the State offers almost no evidentiary support for this argument. Further, the court wrote that the State’s argument that continued enforcement of the Consent Judgment is detrimental to the public interest is unavailing. View "Chisom v. State of Louisiana" on Justia Law

In this case, the parties consented to have their commercial dispute tried before a United States magistrate judge. But, allegedly unbeknownst to Defendant, the judge was longtime family friends with the lead trial lawyer for the plaintiff. Specifically, the lawyer had been a groomsman in the judge’s own wedding, and the judge officiated the wedding of the lawyer’s daughter three months before this lawsuit was filed. None of this information was disclosed to Defendant. After a twenty-day bench trial, the magistrate judge rendered judgment for the Plaintiff, awarding $124.5 million, including over $100 million in trebled damages. After the issuance of the judgment and award, Defendant learned about the undisclosed longstanding friendship and sought to have the magistrate-judge referral vacated. The district judge denied the request and denied discovery on the issue. Defendant appealed.   The Fifth Circuit vacated. The court concluded that the facts asserted here, if true, raise serious doubts about the validity of Defendant’s constitutionally essential consent to have its case tried by this magistrate judge. Further, the court explained remand was necessary because the facts were not sufficiently developed for the court to decide whether Defendant’s consent was validly given or whether vacatur of the referral was otherwise warranted. Accordingly, the court remanded for an evidentiary inquiry. View "I F G Port Hold v. Lake Charles Harbor" on Justia Law

After several instances of inappropriate behavior and twice failing to show up for a client’s sentencing hearing, mostly due to a problem with substance abuse, attorney Plaintiff was referred by a presiding judge to a three-judge disciplinary panel of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Following an investigation and hearing, the panel sanctioned Plaintiff by suspending him from practicing before that court for 12 months, with the option to reapply upon proof of sobriety during the period of suspension. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that a three-judge panel could not sanction him because the rules say only that “[a] presiding judge” may take disciplinary action. He also says the 12-month suspension is excessive.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court explained that the district court did try a less severe option. An informal panel of judges privately reprimanded him in June 2020. That lesser sanction did not work. The court was thus justified in imposing a harsher sanction like the suspension. Moreover, the sanction here is appropriately tailored to Plaintiff’s unique situation: his inability to practice law stemmed from his alcohol abuse, so the court ordered him not to practice until he is able to demonstrate sustained sobriety for one year. Further, the court wrote that the district court here considered that a lesser, non-suspension sanction had not deterred Plaintiff from reverting to his old ways. The panel also considered that Plaintiff’s conduct had persisted for some time and that he was not remorseful for his conduct. View "In re Sealed Appellant" on Justia Law

The attorney appointed to represent Defendant moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Defendant did not file a response.The Fifth Circuit granted the motion to withdraw. The court concurred with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. The court wrote that consistent with Crawley, it holds that Defendant’s restitution order does not present a nonfrivolous issue for appeal because he is liable for the same restitution amount regardless of the ultimate recipients. View "USA v. Fults" on Justia Law

The attorney appointed to represent Defendant moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Defendant has not filed a response.   The Fifth Circuit reviewed counsel’s brief, and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein and granted the motion to withdraw. The court concurred with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. The court held that Defendant’s restitution order does not present a nonfrivolous issue for appeal because he is liable for the same restitution amount regardless of the ultimate recipients. View "USA v. Fults" on Justia Law

An individual and an advocacy group seek to appeal from the denial of a motion to quash two grand jury subpoenas and an order compelling compliance with one of them. There is no jurisdiction for appeals challenging a grand jury subpoena for production of documents unless (1) the appellant has been held in contempt, or (2) a client-intervenor asserts that documents in the possession of a subpoenaed, disinterested third party are protected by attorney-client privilege.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal explaining that neither exception applied. The court explained that the subpoenaed documents are in the hands of Appellants. They are interested third parties in that they are being investigated for witness tampering. They have a direct and personal interest in suppressing the documents that could potentially corroborate the witness tampering accusation. Consequently, Appellants obviously have “a sufficient stake in the proceeding to risk contempt by refusing compliance.” Accordingly, the court wrote it lacks jurisdiction over the appeal, and Appellants must either comply with the subpoena or be held in contempt to seek the court’s review. View "In re: Grand Jury Subpoena" on Justia Law

Appellant a Louisiana attorney representing oil spill claimants in the settlement program, was accused of funneling money to a settlement program staff attorney through improper referral payments. In a disciplinary proceeding, the en banc Eastern District of Louisiana found that Appellant’s actions violated the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct and suspended him from practicing law before the Eastern District of Louisiana for one year. Appellant appealed, arguing that the en banc court misapplied the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct and abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sanction.   The Fifth Circuit found that the en banc court misapplied Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(e) and 8.4(a) but not Rule 8.4(d). Additionally, the en banc court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a one-year suspension on Appellant for his violation of 8.4(d). Accordingly, the court reversed the en banc court’s order suspending Appellant from the practice of law for one year each for violations of Rule 1.5(e) and 8.4(a). The court affirmed the en banc court’s holding that Appellant violated Rule 8.4(d). Finally, the court remanded to the en banc court for further proceedings. On remand, the court is free to impose on Appellant whatever sanction it sees fit for the 8.4(d) violation, including but not limited to its previous one-year suspension. View "In re Jonathan Andry" on Justia Law

Petitioner was ordered to be removed from the United States in absentia on June 23, 2006. On August 26, 2019, Petitioner, represented by counsel, filed a motion to reopen the removal proceedings and rescind the in-absentia removal order. The immigration judge (“IJ”) denied that motion, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed. Petitioner petitioned the court to review that affirmance, arguing that the BIA erred in determining that she was not entitled to equitable tolling of the statutory deadline for filing a motion to reopen because, although she had shown exceptional circumstances, she had not shown that she had pursued her rights diligently.   The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition to reopen. The court explained that it has authority to review only the final decision of the BIA unless the underlying decision of the IJ influenced the BIA’s decision. Here, the court explained that even accepting arguendo that Petitioner was prevented from participating in the 2006 proceedings or seeking that they are reopened by her abusive partner and that she was traumatized and unable to seek legal help for some time after escaping the abuse, Petitioner admits that she obtained legal representation—from the very same lawyer representing her here—more than two years before filing her motion to reopen the removal proceedings. Thus, the court cannot conclude that the BIA abused its discretion in finding that Petitioner failed to act with reasonable diligence in pursuing her rights. View "Masin-Ventura v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction seeking to prohibit the Harris County District Attorney (DA) from enforcing a Texas anti-barratry law. The court concluded that plaintiff has not shown that his First Amendment claim is likely to succeed on the merits where the anti-barratry law is likely narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest in preventing confusion that damages relationships between appointed counsel and indigent defendants. The court declined plaintiff's request to assign the case to a different district judge on remand, concluding that this case does not merit reassignment under either of the two relevant tests. View "Willey v. Harris County District Attorney" on Justia Law

The Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO) agreed to pay Parkcrest $11 million to build affordable housing. Liberty was Parkcrest’s surety. HANO terminated Parkcrest before the project was done. Parkcrest sued, alleging breach of contract. Liberty and HANO executed a “Takeover Agreement,” incorporating the original contract; Liberty stepped into Parkcrest’s shoes to finish the project. Liberty hired Parkcrest as its completion contractor. HANO claimed that Liberty had forfeited any right to continue working on the project and requested that it relinquish control of the site. Liberty claimed the termination was wrongful. Rather than following the contract’s dispute resolution procedures, Liberty filed a complaint-in-intervention in the HANO-Parkcrest litigation.The district court concluded that HANO had breached the Takeover Agreement and the underlying HANO Contract by terminating Liberty for convenience after Liberty had substantially completed the project, awarded Liberty and Parkcrest damages, and held HANO liable to Liberty for attorney’s fees, but left those fees unquantified. The Fifth Circut affirmed but concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider the fee award because a fee award is not a final judgment under 28 U.S.C. 1291 until reduced to a sum certain. The district court then awarded Liberty $526,192.25 in fees. The Fifth Circuit reversed. Liberty’s claim for fees arises from the contract, which authorizes fee-shifting “upon the receipt by [HANO] of a properly presented claim.” Liberty breached the contract’s dispute-resolution procedures, this breach was unexcused, so Liberty is entitled to nothing. View "Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Housing Authority of New Orleans" on Justia Law