Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Symetra appealed the district court's refusal to award attorneys' fees under the Texas and Washington State Structured Settlement Protection Acts (SSPAs). Rapid cross appealed the district court's award of attorneys' fees as damages for tortious interference and the district court's permanent injunction, arguing that the injunction relies on an erroneous interpretation of the SSPAs. The court concluded that the district court erroneously held that Symetra could not recover any fees under the SSPAs where specific transfers were challenged throughout this litigation and Symetra can recover some portion of its fees related to some of those transfers. Therefore, remand is appropriate, but Symetra bears the burden of segregating fees and the district court retains discretion to deny Symetra's attorneys' fees request for failure to segregate. The court also concluded that the district court's award of fees incurred in state court with respect to one annuitant as damages for tortious interference under Texas law was proper where the natural and proximate cause of Rapid's conduct toward the annuitant was to drag Symetra into Indiana state court litigation. The district court's requirement that state court transfer orders also list first-refusal rights contravenes the SSPAs. However, the court found no error in the district court's analysis of first refusal rights under the SSPAs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Symetra Life Ins. Co. v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs participated in the Occupy Wall Street protests in front of Austin City Hall. The City then started a policy under which it issued criminal-trespass notices to plaintiffs and other protestors. Plaintiffs filed suit against the City, alleging facial and as-appliec challenges to the policy under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. After bench trial, the district court entered an order declaring the policy unconstitutional on its face and enjoined the City from issuing the notices. The district court denied plaintiffs' motion for attorneys fees and expenses under 42 U.S.C. 1988 and plaintiffs appealed. The court reversed the denial of fees because plaintiffs were the prevailing party on their constitutional challenge. The district court abused its discretion when it relied on limited injury and limited success as special circumstances justifying a wholesale denial of fees. Even accepting the district court's consideration of the limited injury and limited scope of the injunction as special circumstances, the district court's factual support for those points is unsupported by record evidence. The court remanded for the district court to determine the amount of the award. View "Sanchez v. City of Austin" on Justia Law

B&N, a law firm, represented debtor in his Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court converted the case to Chapter 7 and B&N's services were terminated. B&N then filed an application for fees in excess of $130,000. The bankruptcy court allowed approximately $20,000 and disallowed the remainder. The district court affirmed. Based on the court's review of the statutory framework and the court's decision in In re Pro-Snax Distribs., Inc., the court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not apply the wrong standard in making its ruling on the fee application and thus did not abuse its discretion. The bankruptcy court did not err in finding that B&N was entitled to only a small subset of the fees requested. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Barron & Newburger, P.C. v. Texas Skyline, Ltd., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction after pleading guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Defendant's counsel moved on appeal for leave to withdraw and filed a brief and a supplemental brief in accordance with Anders v. California. Because counsel communicated with defendant, in a language defendant understands, the substance of the Anders brief and defendant's rights under Anders, defendant's due process rights were not violated. The court concurred with counsel's assessment that the appeal presented no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, the court granted counsel's motion for leave to withdraw and excused counsel from further responsibilities herein. The court dismissed the appeal. View "United States v. Moreno-Torres" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Exxon Mobil alleging damages caused by exposure to naturally occurring radioactive material. On appeal, Exxon Mobil challenged the dismissal of its intervention based on the district court's ruling that a memorandum prepared by Exxon Mobil's in-house counsel was ineligible for the protections of the attorney-client privilege. The court concluded that the manifest purpose of the memorandum was to deal with what would be the obvious reason Exxon Mobil would seek its lawyer's advice in the first place, namely to deal with any legal liability that may stem from under-disclosure of data, hedged against any liability that may occur from any implied warranties during complex negotiations. Accordingly, the court concluded that the memorandum was privileged and vacated and remanded the judgment of the district court. View "Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Hill, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against a Louisiana state court judge under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985, alleging a deprivation of civil rights. The judge presided over a custody proceeding between plaintiff and his ex-wife. Plaintiff moved to recuse the judge based on his suspicion that the judge had a social relationship with his ex-wife. The motion was denied. Plaintiff later renewed the recusal motion and the judge issued an order recusing himself, citing his friendship with the ex-wife. Plaintiff then filed this suit seeking monetary damages. Plaintiff alleged that the judge and his ex-wife conspired to make false statements at the first recusal hearing. The court concluded that when the judge testified, he was testifying as a witness in an adversarial proceeding and thus was absolutely immune from section 1983 liability. The court also concluded that the section 1985 claim was inadequately pled because a violation under section 1985 required class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirator's action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Moffett v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Baker Botts and Jordan Hyden served as debtor's counsel to ASARCO during its Chapter 11 bankruptcy and helped ASARCO confirm a reorganization plan that paid all of its creditors in full. At issue on appeal was whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in authorizing a 20% premium to Baker Botts and 10% premium to Jordan Hyden for their unusually successful fraudulent transfer litigation. Also at issue was whether the bankruptcy court was authorized, consistent with 11 U.S.C. 330, to award attorneys' fees to the firms for defending their fee application in court. The court affirmed as to the fee enhancements awarded to Baker Botts and Jordan Hyden where the district court's 85-page opinion on fees described with specificity and in detail Baker Botts's "rare and exceptional" performance and where Jordan Hyden's attorneys were an integral part of the successful team effort. The court reversed as to additional fee awards for litigation concerning fee applications, concluding that section 330(a) does not authorize compensation for the costs counsel or professionals bear to defend their fee applications. View "Asarco, L.L.C., et al. v. Jordan Hyden Womble Culbreth" on Justia Law

Defendant is a Texas law firm engaged in an advertising campaign to solicit former dental patients from Kool Smiles dental clinics as potential clients. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of its Texas anti-SLAPP motion brought under the Texas Citizen's Participation Act (TCPA), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 27.001-27.011, to dismiss a claim brought by Kool Smiles. The court held that it had jurisdiction to interlocutorily consider the denial of a TCPA anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss; because Kool Smiles waived its argument that the TCPA was a procedural law that conflicted with the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, the court assumed that it did not; and the Supreme Court of Texas would most likely hold that defendant's ads and other client solicitations were exempted from the TCPA's protection because defendant's speech arose from the sale of services where the intended audience was an actual or potential customer. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's anti-SLAPP motion. View "NCDR, L.L.C., et al. v. Mauze & Bagby, P.L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law

Attorneys appealed, and the City cross-appealed, the district court's determination of the fees owed by the City to Attorneys for representing the City. Although the court applied slightly different reasoning that the district court in determining that the Attorneys' contingency contract was unenforceable, the court affirmed the district court's quantum meruit award of $1.3 million to Attorney Davidson; Davidson could not recover the contracted-for contingency fee where there was only partial performance of a joint, indivisible obligation before default; and the district court's quantum meruit award was proper and reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "City of Alexandria v. Cleco Corp., et al." on Justia Law

The bankruptcy court ordered debtor's counsel to return all consideration he received, but in so doing it imposed an additional sanction beyond return of compensation. A bankruptcy judge may regulate attorney compensation by ordering debtor's counsel to return to the estate excessive compensation, 11 U.S.C. 329(b). Separately, a bankruptcy judge has authority to discipline attorneys who violate the disclosure requirements of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules. In this case, the court reversed and remanded the bankruptcy court's order because a bankruptcy judge's reach under the plain language of section 329(b) was limited to attorney compensation. View "Baker v. Cage" on Justia Law