Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Heriberto Chavez, Evangelina Escarcega (representing her son, Jose Escarcega), and Jorge Moreno (collectively “Plaintiffs”) sought to represent a class in a lawsuit against Plan Benefit Services, Fringe Insurance Benefits, and Fringe Benefit Group (collectively “FBG”) for the alleged mismanagement t of funds that Plaintiffs contributed to benefit plans through their employers.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that the litigation may proceed as a class-action lawsuit. The court held that Plaintiffs have standing and certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) or (b)(3). The court explained that here, Plaintiffs have established their standing to sue FBG. First, they have demonstrated injury in fact by alleging that FBG abused its authority under the Master Trust Agreement by hiring itself to perform services paid with funds from the CERT and CPT trusts, effectively devaluing the trusts and retirement benefits that Plaintiffs otherwise would have accrued with their employer. Second, they have established that their injury is traceable to FBG’s conduct by providing evidence of FBG’s direct control over the CERT and CPT trusts and the underlying contractual agreement with their employer. Finally, their injury is redressable in this court by awarding monetary damages or other relief. View "Chavez v. Plan Benefit Services" on Justia Law

Almost a decade ago, Huntsville, Plaintiff, a Texas firefighter, had gallbladder surgery. It did not go well, and ever since, Plaintiff has needed medication and treatment for complications. And for years, both the City and its fire department accommodated him. But in 2016, not long after his surgery, the City caught Plaintiff asking a fellow employee for his leftover prescription painkillers. Because such a request violated city policy, Huntsville placed Plaintiff on probation and warned that future violations could lead to his termination. The City placed Plaintiff on administrative leave and investigated. Two weeks later, it fired him. Plaintiff sued, claiming retaliation under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADEA, and discrimination under the ADA. Eventually, and over Plaintiff’s request for a Rule 56(d) continuance, the district court granted summary judgment to the City on all claims. January appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that beyond temporal proximity, Plaintiff produced no evidence that Lunsford’s reasoning concerning his intoxication was false (such that he was not actually intoxicated at the time) or pretextual (such that Plaintiff’s protected activities were the real reason for his firing). The court explained that it has said temporal proximity isn’t enough. Nothing Plaintiff provides “makes the inferential leap to [retaliation] a rational one.” Because he failed to rebut this proffered justification for his termination, summary judgment was proper. View "January v. City of Huntsville" on Justia Law

Plaintiff received his third citation for Driving While Intoxicated (“DWI”). As a term of his probation, Plaintiff, an alcoholic, was required to attend weekly substance abuse classes. Some of these classes conflicted with shifts that Plaintiff was scheduled to work as an operator at a plant owned by Defendant-Appellee La Grange Acquisitions, L.P. Plaintiff informed his supervisors that he was an alcoholic and that several of the court-ordered substance abuse classes would conflict with his scheduled shifts. When Plaintiff was unable to find coverage for these shifts, La Grange, citing this scheduling conflict, terminated Plaintiff. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Plaintiff sued La Grange under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), for intentional discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of La Grange on all three claims. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the evidence does not create a triable issue of fact as to whether the given reason for his termination was pretextual, that is, “false or unworthy of credence.” Nothing in the record supports such a finding. There is no dispute that, while La Grange may have been able to do more to find coverage for the shifts Plaintiff needed to miss, La Grange did attempt to coordinate coverage for him and, while partially successful, eventually, these efforts failed. It was only at this point when some of Plaintiff’s shifts were left uncovered, that La Grange dismissed Plaintiff. Given this context, no reasonable jury could find that La Grange’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason—the shift conflict—for Plaintiff’s suspension and termination was pretext for discrimination. View "Mueck v. La Grange Acquisitions" on Justia Law

A company providing crane services, TNT Crane & Rigging, Inc., petitioned the Fifth Circuit to overturn the final orders of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. Those orders reversed decisions by an administrative law judge that were favorable to the company. The principal dispute is whether regulations applicable to the disassembly of a crane apply to the tragic accident that occurred here.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court held that substantial e supports the Commission’s determination that TNT did not have a work rule designed to prevent violations of Section 1926.1407(b)(3). Second, substantial evidence supports the Commission’s determination that TNT did not adequately monitor employee compliance with its power line safety rules. Finally, substantial evidence supports the Commission’s determination that TNT did not prove it effectively enforced its power line safety rules when it discovered violations. View "TNT Crane & Rigging v. OSHC" on Justia Law

The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA” or “the Act”), Plaintiff appealed the district court’s entry of judgment, after a jury trial, in favor of Defendant Spring Independent School District (“Spring ISD”). Plaintiff asserted that the district court gave the jury improper instructions and that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. He also contends that he is entitled to front pay and attorney’s fees in addition to compensatory damages because he was the “prevailing party.”   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the jury's instructions were not erroneous, and the jury’s verdict was supported by sufficient evidence. Plaintiff failed to properly raise his asserted errors in the district court and therefore did not preserve them for appeal, and, in any event, his arguments lack any basis in case law and are inconsistent with the text of USERRA. The court explained that Plaintiff acknowledged, as he must, that USERRA provides employers with an affirmative defense, yet contends, without supporting authority, that the court should disregard the statute here. But the text of USERRA clearly provides employers with a mixed-motive defense. There is no carve-out for constructive discharge claims. Thus, it was not an error for the district court to instruct the jury on the defense, and it was proper for the jury to answer Questions 4 and 5. View "Garcia-Ascanio v. Spring Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law

Three installers of window blinds sued FS Blinds, L.L.C., the company for which they worked. The district court granted summary judgment to FS Blinds, determining that Plaintiffs had not met their prima facie burden to show they worked overtime. The court dismissed the case, and Plaintiffs appealed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court held that Plaintiffs have met the lenient standard under Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686–88 (1946), and therefore survive summary judgment, at least as to whether, if employees, Plaintiffs worked overtime. The court declined to reach whether Plaintiffs were employees or independent contractors and instead remand for the district court to consider that question anew. The court explained that, based on the record, Plaintiffs have presented enough to satisfy their “lenient” prima facie burden under Mt. Clemens. This is so even though Plaintiffs’ testimony offers only an estimated average of hours worked. In addition to their testimony, though, Plaintiffs offered supporting work orders and some corroborating testimony from FS Blinds. The court wrote that all told, this record evidence hurdles Plaintiffs’ Mt. Clemens burden. View "Flores v. FS Blinds" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) suit against Rehab Synergies alleging violations of the federal overtime law. The district court, over Rehab Synergies’ objection, allowed the case to proceed as a collective action and a jury found Rehab Synergies liable. On appeal, Rehab Synergies contends that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the case to proceed as a collective action.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court applied the correct legal standards and that its factual findings were not clearly erroneous. The court explained that Plaintiffs’ adverse-inference argument does not suggest a “disparity” as a result of the case proceeding as a collective action; rather, the record shows that any “disparity” had other causes. Because the Plaintiffs were similarly situated, it would have been inconsistent with the FLSA to require 22 separate trials absent countervailing due process concerns that are simply not present here. View "Loy v. Rehab Synergies" on Justia Law

Two Texas employers: Braidwood Management, Inc. (“Braidwood”) and Bear Creek Bible Church (“Bear Creek”), filed suit, as per their closely held religious beliefs, asserting that Title VII, as interpreted in the EEOC’s guidance and Bostock, prevents them from operating their places of employment in a way compatible with their Christian beliefs. Plaintiffs have implicitly asserted that they will not alter or discontinue their employment practices. all parties admitted in district court that numerous policies promulgated by plaintiffs (such as those about dress codes and segregating bathroom usage by solely biological sex) already clearly violate EEOC guidance. Both plaintiffs also contend that they are focused on individuals’ behavior, not their asserted identity.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable; reversed the class certifications; affirmed the judgment against Bear Creek; affirmed the ruling that Braidwood is statutorily entitled to a Title VII exemption; vacated the judgment that Braidwood is constitutionally entitled to a Title VII exemption; and vacated the judgment regarding the scope-of-Title-VII claims as a matter of law. The court reasoned that under the facts presented, it cannot determine a more appropriate, limited class definition for any of the classes presented here. Accordingly, the court held that both Braidwood and Bear Creek have standing and bring individual claims. Further, the court explained that the EEOC failed to show a compelling interest in denying Braidwood, individually, an exemption. The agency does not even attempt to argue the point outside of gesturing to a generalized interest in prohibiting all forms of sex discrimination in every potential case. View "Braidwood Management v. EEOC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her employer Houston Independent School District (“HISD”), for retaliation and age discrimination. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failing to state a claim. Her amended complaint was also dismissed. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. To begin, the court explained that by applying amended Rule 3(c), it concludes that it has jurisdiction to review the final judgment. Under the new rule, a notice of appeal “encompasses the final judgment” if it designates “an order described in Rule 4(a)(4)(A).” Further, the court found that the district court applied the correct standard when assessing whether Plaintiff adequately pled sufficient facts to establish all the elements of her claims. Moreover, Plaintiff’s amended complaint brings three categories of claims. The first is a retaliation claim pursuant to Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and Section 21.055 of the Texas Labor Code. To state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) she was engaged in a protected activity; (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and adverse employment action.” Here, the court found that Plaintiff’s complaint is hard to understand, and parts of it fail even to establish the adverse action prong. For example, the complaint offers no specifics about the “forms of retaliation, harassment, taunting, and badgering” to which Plaintiff was allegedly subjected. It also provides little to nothing about what the positions actually were and what the ages and qualifications were of those who were given promotions. View "Norsworthy v. Houston Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are flight attendants who sustained injuries in connection with their employment by United Airlines. They filed claims in the Northern District of Texas, but the district court dismissed them because the flight attendants failed to adequately plead diversity jurisdiction. This was despite the fact that the parties agree that the flight attendants could have invoked the district court’s jurisdiction if they had included the proper allegations. The flight attendants appealed, and this court affirmed. They filed the instant case shortly after. The district court dismissed the claims as barred by the statute of limitations. This appeal presents two primary questions, both of which concern the interpretation of the jurisdiction savings statute.   The Fifth Circuit wrote that it cannot make a reliable Erie guess on these important matters of state law. Accordingly, the court certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Texas: 1) Does Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Section 16.064 apply to this lawsuit where Plaintiffs could have invoked the prior district court’s subject matter jurisdiction with proper pleading? 2) Did Plaintiffs file this lawsuit within sixty days of when the prior judgment became “final” for purposes of Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Section 16.064(a)(2)? View "Sanders v. Boeing Company" on Justia Law