Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A writ of mandamus is reserved for extraordinary circumstances. TikTok, Incorporated, and various related entities contend that the district court’s denial of their motion to transfer to the Northern District of California was so patently erroneous that this rare form of relief is warranted. The district court denied Petitioners’ motion to transfer after finding that five of the eight factors were neutral, and three weighed against transferring to California.The Fifth Circuit granted the petition for writ of mandamus, finding that denying Petitioners’ motion to transfer was a clear abuse of discretion. The court explained that in the district court’s view, Petitioners’ large presence in the Western District of Texas raises an “extremely plausible and reasonable inference” that these employees possess some relevant documents. But the district court cannot rely on the mere fact that Petitioners have a general presence in the Western District of Texas because Volkswagen commands courts to assess its eight factors considering the circumstances of the specific case at issue. Further, the court explained that under Volkswagen’s 100-mile threshold, the Northern District of California is a clearly more convenient venue for most relevant witnesses in this case. The district court committed a clear abuse of discretion in concluding otherwise. View "In Re: TikTok, Inc." on Justia Law

Antero Resources, Corp., an oil and gas production company, sued a former employee (“Appellant”)  for breach of fiduciary duty, alleging that Appellant abused his position of operations supervisor to award service contracts to companies owned by his close friend Tommy Robertson. Antero also alleged that, after winning the contracts, Robertson’s companies deliberately delayed providing “drillout” operations, resulting in millions of dollars of overbilling. A jury found Appellant liable in the amount of $11,897,689.39, which consists of $11,112,140.00 in damages and $775,549.39 as recoupment for the value Appellant received as a result of the breach. The district court entered a final judgment in the same amount, along with post-judgment interest. The district court ordered Appellant to pay pre-judgment interest and to forfeit 130,170 shares of stock in Antero Midstream. Appellant challenged the judgment on two bases.   The Fifth Circuit concluded that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding on damages. The court further held that the district court’s decision to deny Appellant the opportunity to pursue post-trial discovery was an abuse of discretion. The court explained that discovery is procedural; federal law governs the question of whether a party is entitled to take post-trial discovery. Discovery after evidence has closed is typically reserved for situations where the trial reveals a new basis for seeking further information. Accordingly, the court vacated the order denying Appellant’s motion to amend the judgment. The court remanded to reconsider whether to allow Appellant to pursue discovery relating to Antero’s settlement with the Robertson companies and whether to offset the judgment in light of that settlement. View "Antero Resources v. Kawcak" on Justia Law

Two people were killed while unclogging a machine at Darling Ingredients, Inc., a chicken rendering plant. When the Occupational Safety and Health Agency (OSHA) investigated, it found that the plant’s “lockout/tagout” procedures did not “clearly and specifically outline” how to safely work on the machine, so it cited the plant’s owner. Darling challenged the citations before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.  After the trial, the ALJ ruled in favor of OSHA, finding that (1) Darling did violate Section 147; (2) the violation was a repeat; (3) it was serious; and (4) Darling waived any “independent employee misconduct” defense. Darling appealed all of these decisions, save for the serious classification.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that Darling’s argument is flawed for a couple of reasons. First, there are steps that a worker can take besides waiting around. Second, doing nothing is doing something; if waiting was the right thing to do, there is no reason that Darling’s procedure could not say that. The court concluded that there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding of noncompliance, namely that Darling failed to “clearly and specifically outline the . . . rules and technique to be utilized for the control of hazardous energy. The court concluded that the ALJ’s determination that Darling had knowledge of its Section 147 violations is supported by the law and substantial evidence. View "Darling Ingredients v. OSHC" on Justia Law

This ERISA case concerns the National Football League’s retirement plan, which provides disability pay to hobbled NFL veterans whose playing days are over but who are still living with debilitating, often degenerative injuries to brains and bodies, including neurotrauma. The claimant, former NFL running back Michael Cloud, suffered multiple concussions during his eight-year career, leaving him physically, neurologically, and psychologically debilitated. After the Social Security Administration found him entitled to disability benefits, Cloud went back to the NFL Plan and sought reclassification to a higher tier of benefits. Cloud was awarded a higher tier but not the highest tier. Cloud again filed a claim to be reclassified at the most generous level of disability pay. The NFL Plan denied reclassification on several grounds. Cloud sued the NFL Plan. The district court ordered a near doubling of Cloud’s annual disability benefits. The district court awarded top-level benefits under the Plan instead of remanding for another round at the administrative.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court wrote that it is compelled to hold that the district court erred in awarding top-level benefits to Cloud. Although the NFL Plan’s review board may well have denied Cloud a full and fair review, and although Cloud is probably entitled to the highest level of disability pay, he is not entitled to reclassification to that top tier because he cannot show changed circumstances between his 2014 claim for reclassification and his 2016 claim for reclassification—which was denied and which he did not appeal. View "Cloud v. NFL Player Retirement Plan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff resigned from her tenured professorship at the Thurgood Marshall School of Law at Texas Southern University (TSU) in August 2020. She then sued TSU and several TSU employees for Title VII constructive discharge, Equal Pay Act (EPA) retaliation, and civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court dismissed all her claims, holding that res judicata barred her Section 1983 claims and that she failed to state Title VII and EPA claims.   The Ffith Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that Plaintiff alleges that TSU investigated her for discrimination but found no evidence that Plaintiff discriminated, that defendant “threw her hair into Plaintiff’s face in the law school lobby,” and that defendant yelled at Plaintiff that she couldn’t park in a church parking lot. But no facts suggest that these were more than personal disputes between the parties. Indeed, their parking lot confrontation was not even on school property. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant “has made comments about [her] race,” but she does not identify the comments or their context. The court explained that Plaintiff does not allege conduct by TSU that plausibly—not just possibly—states a constructive discharge claim. Further, the court held that Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant acted under color of state law and thus fails to state a Section 1983 claim. View "Sacks v. Texas Southern University" on Justia Law

BD LaPlace, LLC, doing business as Bayou Steel (Bayou Steel), operated a steel mill in LaPlace, Louisiana. Without giving The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) notice, Bayou Steel terminated Plaintiffs’ employment and closed the LaPlace mill where they worked. Seeking to recover under the WARN Act, Plaintiffs initially filed a putative class action complaint against Bayou Steel in Delaware bankruptcy court. Plaintiffs dismissed that action and filed the instant class action in federal district court. Rather than suing their employer Bayou Steel, Plaintiffs sued Bayou Steel BD Holdings II, LLC and Black Diamond Capital Management, LLC(a private equity firm that advised the fund that owned BD Holdings II). Plaintiffs demanded a jury trial, which the district court denied. Defendants sought summary judgment, which the district court granted. Plaintiffs appealed, challenging both the denial of their jury demand and the summary judgment for Defendants.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that there is no right to a jury trial under the WARN Act. The court also affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to BD Holdings II. But the district court erred in granting summary judgment to BDCM because there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether BDCM exercised de facto control over Bayou Steel’s decision to close its LaPlace steel mill and order Plaintiffs’ layoffs. The court explained that if BDCM “specifically directed” the closing of the mill without proper notice, the company may be liable for Bayou Steel’s WARN Act violation even absent the other factors. View "Fleming v. Bayou Steel" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a black female educator and school administrator who works for the Brookhaven School District (the “School District”). Plaintiff sought to attend the Mississippi School Board Association Prospective Superintendent’s Leadership Academy, a training program for prospective superintendents. According to Plaintiff, the School District “established a precedent of paying for every employee’s fees after the employee was accepted to attend the program.” Plaintiff asked the Deputy Superintendent, if the School District would pay for her to attend the Leadership Academy. Once the program accepted Plaintiff, the School District’s Superintendent reneged and refused to pay for her to attend at that time. But Plaintiff’s spot was for the upcoming class, so she paid the fees herself. Plaintiff sued, alleging that the School District violated Title VII and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 by refusing to pay for her to attend the Leadership Academy but agreeing to pay for similarly situated white males to attend. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).   The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court held that Plaintiff set forth a plausible Title VII claim under Rule 12 because plausibly alleged facts that satisfy both adverse employment action prongs and the adverse employment action element was the only element in dispute. The court explained, taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true—that the School District (1) agreed to pay for similarly situated white males’ fees to attend the Leadership Academy; (2) promised to pay her fees (a promise she relied on); and (3) reneged on that promise—Plaintiff plausibly stated a Title VII disparate treatment claim. View "Harrison v. Brookhaven Sch Dist" on Justia Law

Appellant worked as a barge cleaner for T.T. Barge Services, which provides barge cleaning services to Ingram Barge Company. Appellant asserted negligence claims against Ingram after Appellant was injured by caustic soda that he was cleaning up on Ingram Barge 976, which was moored to one of T.T.’s work barges at the time of his injury. After Ingram filed a district court complaint to limit liability, Appellant counterclaimed and asserted claims of negligence against Ingram. T.T. also filed a claim for contribution and indemnity against Ingram. The district court granted summary judgment (1) as to Appellant’s lack of seaman status under the Jones Act and (2) as to all of Appellant’s negligence claims against Ingram. The district court then dismissed the case with prejudice. Appellant challenged the district court’s orders.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that T.T.’s Cleaning Barge is semi-permanently and indefinitely attached to land by steel cables, except for rare moves during repairs or to accommodate nearby dredging operations. Therefore, the district court did not err in finding that T.T.’s Cleaning Barge lacked vessel status at summary judgment.   Further, the court explained that to qualify as a Jones Act seaman, a plaintiff must satisfy two requirements. First, an employee’s duties must ‘contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission. Second, that employee must have a connection to a vessel in navigation that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature. Here, Ratcliff lacks a substantial connection to Ingram’s barges. View "Ingram Barge v. Ratcliff" on Justia Law

Plaintiff contracted with Dicom Transportation Group to work as a delivery driver. In this position, he would handle deliveries for Defendant L Brands Service Company, LLC. In 2017, after experiencing significant shrinkage at locations serviced by Plaintiff, Defendant Shawn Tolbert, a logistics asset protection manager at L Brands, and Defendant Aidan Duffy, the regional asset protection manager at L Brands, conducted a driver observation of Plaintiff. After discovering several indicators of fraud and interviewing Plaintiff, Tolbert and Duffy concluded that Plaintiff had been attempting to steal the product. The two reported their findings to both Dicom, who terminated Plaintiff’s contract, and local law enforcement, who later obtained a warrant and arrested Plaintiff on a charge of felony theft. No formal charge was filed against Plaintiff. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against L Brands, Tolbert, and Duffy (collectively, “Defendants”) for claims of defamation, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissed the case with prejudice. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the statements at issue were limited communications that were made in good faith and only to interested parties. Accordingly, the conditional privilege applies such that Plaintiff cannot prevail on his defamation claim. Further, the court explained that Defendants provided evidence supporting their position that they reported their findings with the honest and reasonable belief that Plaintiff had attempted to steal cartons of L Brands merchandise. As with his defamation claim, Plaintiff provides no evidence to dispute this contention. View "Phillips v. L. Brands Service" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are two women, Elwood Staffing Services, Inc., placed at a job site working for Schlumberger, Ltd. A senior coworker at their site was a lesbian who sexually assaulted one of the women and harassed the other. Plaintiff submitted a complaint about sexual harassment, and Schlumberger terminated her. The other Plaintiff later resigned. Together, the women filed suit in federal court alleging violations of Title VII. The district court entered a mixed summary judgment order, finding the women had viable claims against Schlumberger but releasing Elwood from the suit. Schlumberger subsequently settled with Plaintiffs at mediation. The women challenged the order to the extent it granted summary judgment in Elwood’s favor on appeal.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff does not provide evidence that Elwood knew what was happening to her in the gun shop. She did not report the discrimination and abuse she experienced to Elwood. And a report would not have been and was not a wasted action. Nor does she provide evidence that Elwood should have linked the other Plaintiff’s complaints to other employees. At best, she has shown that Elwood had good reason to ask Schlumberger some questions, which, of course, it did. But that does not meet the applicable knowledge element in her cause of action. The court concluded that Elwood did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the hostile work environment experienced by Plaintiff. The court concluded that Plaintiffs sought to hold the wrong party liable for their injuries. They cannot establish why Elwood should be held responsible for the misconduct of Schlumberger’s employees. View "Arredondo v. Elwood Staffing Svc" on Justia Law