Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for appellees (GNOFCU and Cumis). The district court found that GNOFCU did not violate either the Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. 1790b, or La. Rev. State. Ann. 23:967(A), by terminating plaintiff's employment after she complained of possible fraud in the company's lending practices. Because the court found that the district court minimized key evidence in finding no causal link between plaintiff's termination, demotion, and pay decrease, and her National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) complaints, and because section 23:967 seemed to offer broader protections than its federal counterpart, the court found that the district court's grant of summary judgment was improper. Accordingly, the judgment was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff sued defendants under Title VII, alleging claims of racial harassment and constructive discharge. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint based on a finding that plaintiff committed perjury and the district court's grant of defendants' motion for sanctions. Plaintiff argued that a less severe sanction was more appropriate and that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to allow plaintiff to explain his conflicting testimony. Plaintiff's counsel, who was separately sanctioned, also appealed the denial of his motion for recusal of the magistrate judge. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to dismiss plaintiff's complaint with prejudice where plaintiff plainly committed perjury; plaintiff's argument that the district court failed to hold a hearing was meritless where he made no effort to explain why he and his attorney failed to show at the hearing held by the district court to address objections to the magistrate judge's report; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying counsel's motion for recusal where a reasonable person would not question the magistrate judge's impartiality in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Appellant appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Zurich, SRS, and an insurance adjuster on his claim for wrongful denial and delay of workers' compensation benefits under Texas state and common law. At issue on appeal was whether appellees complied with the duty of good faith and fair dealing in resolving appellant's claim. The court affirmed summary judgment and held that appellant failed to raise a material fact issue with respect to his common-law bad faith cause of action.

This appeal involved a putative class action brought against several oil and gas companies and several companies that provide labor for offshore oil and gas projects. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants maintained a hiring scheme to employ foreign workers on the Outer Continental Shelf in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. 1331 et seq. The district court disposed of all plaintiffs' claims and then entered final judgment dismissing all claims. The court held that the Service Defendants did not violate RICO because the law that would make their conduct racketeering activity did not apply in the place where that conduct occurred, namely vessels floating on the waters of the Outer Continental Shelf. The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the exemptions the Service Defendants possessed to the OCSLA manning requirements did not shield them from RICO liability because those exemptions were fraudulently obtained. The court also held that plaintiffs could not state a claim for a private right of action for damages under the OCSLA and the district court's dismissal was proper. The court further held that the district court did not err in disposing plaintiffs' OCSLA enforcement claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendant appealed a jury verdict awarding damages to its former employee for breach of a stock options contract. Defendant argued that the jury instruction misstated the governing Korean law, that the jury's verdict relied on legally insupportable evidence, and that the district court applied the wrong law when determining attorney's fees. The court held that defendant failed to prove that the district court abused its discretion in excluding a requirement of coercion or intimidation from the jury instructions. Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial on damages. Finally, the award of attorney's fees would be permitted under either Texas or Korean law. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Plaintiff brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12102, against defendant for failing to provide a reasonable employment accommodation in consideration of his diabetes. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of defendant. The court held that because plaintiff's diabetes treatment regiment required only modest dietary and lifestyle changes, no genuine issue existed as to whether his impairment substantially limited his eating. Therefore, the district court properly concluded that plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA. The court also held that, based upon the record evidence, no reasonable juror could conclude that defendant was unwilling to, in good faith, participate in an interactive process to reasonably accommodate plaintiff's needs. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

This case arose when Cat Tech sought indemnification from its insurers after Cat Tech damaged several components of a hyrotreating reactor owned by Ergon Refining, Inc. and arbitrators entered an award against Cat Tech for the damage. Insurers subsequently denied the claim, contending, inter alia, that the "your work" exclusion found in the policies precluded coverage for damage to the reactor. The district court found that insurers had no duty to indemnify Cat Tech. The court held that the information contained in the arbitration award was insufficient to properly apply the "your work" exclusion. As such, the court concluded that the district court erred when it relied on the award in granting insurer's summary judgment motion. On remand, the district court should conduct any additional fact-finding necessary to determine whether the damage suffered by Ergon's reactor was limited only to those components upon which Cat Tech worked, or instead included other components unrelated to Cat Tech's operations. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

This case involved a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. 1981 by a terminated employee against his former union, which represented him in a grievance hearing in connection with his termination. Plaintiff alleged that defendants discriminated against him on account of his race by failing to argue during the grievance hearing that he was being terminated for a racially discriminatory reason. The court held that plaintiff failed to state a prima facie claim for racial discrimination by the union under section 1981, and therefore the district court was correct to grant defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff sued his former employer under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, et seq., to recover profit sharing and retirement benefits that were allegedly withheld from him. The district court granted summary judgment for plaintiff on his claims that the employer breached its fiduciary duty of loyalty and violated ERISA's disclosure requirements. The district court also awarded plaintiff statutory penalties and attorney's fees. The court affirmed the district court's award of damages for breach of fiduciary duty and attorney's fees. The court held, however, that the summary allocation report contained no information about how a participant could elect to receive a rollover distribution, nor did it inform the participant of her rights under the profit-sharing plan. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court for additional findings on whether the employer failed to furnish plaintiff with the requisite documents under ERISA 104(b)(1), and if so, whether that omission served as a basis for statutory penalties.

Plaintiff brought an age discrimination suit against her former employer and at issue, on appeal, was whether plaintiff's claim was time barred. The district court held that plaintiff did not experience an adverse employment action until she was finally terminated on January 2, 2008. In the alternative, the district court found that the 180-day limitations period should be equitably tolled because the employer's actions induced plaintiff not to file suit until after the limitations period had expired. The court held, however, that the limitations period began to run upon the unequivocal notification that her employment would ultimately be terminated, absent any later equivocation which did not occur here. Based upon this record, plaintiff's suit was time-barred. The court also held that plaintiff failed to present evidence that the employer's actions prevented or discouraged her from filing a claim of age discrimination. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in holding that plaintiff's wrongful termination claim should be equitably tolled.