Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought a retaliation action against his former employer under the Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729(a), 3730(h), 178 days after his termination. The district court, applying a 90-day limitations period borrowed from Texas state law, held that plaintiff's suit was untimely. The court held that because plaintiff filed his complaint within 178 days of his termination, he fell comfortably within either a two-year or three-year statute of limitations, and the district court erred in dismissing the complaint as time-barred. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, an engineer aboard defendant's dive vessel, challenged the denial of his claims under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, et seq., and general maritime law and of his costs. Defendant challenged the amount plaintiff was awarded for cure and his being awarded attorney's fees, including the amount. Based on the court's review of the record, the court held that the denial of plaintiff's Jones Act and general maritime law claims were not clearly erroneous. In regard to plaintiff's challenge of the district court's application of the collateral-source rule in determining the amount of cure awarded him, the court held that, regardless of what plaintiff's medical providers charged, those charges were satisfied by the much lower amount paid by his insurer. Consequently, the district court erred by awarding the higher, charged amount. The court also held that the district court clearly erred in finding defendant arbitrary and capricious in denying maintenance and cure to plaintiff. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's Rule 54(d) motion for costs.

Plaintiff brought suit against her former employer, claiming racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer and plaintiff appealed. The court held that because plaintiff had presented a genuine issue of material fact concerning the employer's proffered reason for firing her, the district court's grant of summary judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for a trial on the merits.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on his claims against defendants, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, for wrongful termination. The court held that UTMB was entitled to immunity from suit where plaintiff conceded that UTMB was a state agency and failed to argue that Texas had consented to suit, nor had Congress expressly waived sovereign immunity from section 1983 suits. The court also held that, putting aside plaintiff's purported property interest in his employment, plaintiff failed to identify a genuine dispute that his termination was arbitrary or capricious, or that the decision was made without professional judgment. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for appellees (GNOFCU and Cumis). The district court found that GNOFCU did not violate either the Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. 1790b, or La. Rev. State. Ann. 23:967(A), by terminating plaintiff's employment after she complained of possible fraud in the company's lending practices. Because the court found that the district court minimized key evidence in finding no causal link between plaintiff's termination, demotion, and pay decrease, and her National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) complaints, and because section 23:967 seemed to offer broader protections than its federal counterpart, the court found that the district court's grant of summary judgment was improper. Accordingly, the judgment was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff sued defendants under Title VII, alleging claims of racial harassment and constructive discharge. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint based on a finding that plaintiff committed perjury and the district court's grant of defendants' motion for sanctions. Plaintiff argued that a less severe sanction was more appropriate and that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to allow plaintiff to explain his conflicting testimony. Plaintiff's counsel, who was separately sanctioned, also appealed the denial of his motion for recusal of the magistrate judge. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to dismiss plaintiff's complaint with prejudice where plaintiff plainly committed perjury; plaintiff's argument that the district court failed to hold a hearing was meritless where he made no effort to explain why he and his attorney failed to show at the hearing held by the district court to address objections to the magistrate judge's report; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying counsel's motion for recusal where a reasonable person would not question the magistrate judge's impartiality in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Appellant appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Zurich, SRS, and an insurance adjuster on his claim for wrongful denial and delay of workers' compensation benefits under Texas state and common law. At issue on appeal was whether appellees complied with the duty of good faith and fair dealing in resolving appellant's claim. The court affirmed summary judgment and held that appellant failed to raise a material fact issue with respect to his common-law bad faith cause of action.

This appeal involved a putative class action brought against several oil and gas companies and several companies that provide labor for offshore oil and gas projects. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants maintained a hiring scheme to employ foreign workers on the Outer Continental Shelf in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. 1331 et seq. The district court disposed of all plaintiffs' claims and then entered final judgment dismissing all claims. The court held that the Service Defendants did not violate RICO because the law that would make their conduct racketeering activity did not apply in the place where that conduct occurred, namely vessels floating on the waters of the Outer Continental Shelf. The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the exemptions the Service Defendants possessed to the OCSLA manning requirements did not shield them from RICO liability because those exemptions were fraudulently obtained. The court also held that plaintiffs could not state a claim for a private right of action for damages under the OCSLA and the district court's dismissal was proper. The court further held that the district court did not err in disposing plaintiffs' OCSLA enforcement claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendant appealed a jury verdict awarding damages to its former employee for breach of a stock options contract. Defendant argued that the jury instruction misstated the governing Korean law, that the jury's verdict relied on legally insupportable evidence, and that the district court applied the wrong law when determining attorney's fees. The court held that defendant failed to prove that the district court abused its discretion in excluding a requirement of coercion or intimidation from the jury instructions. Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial on damages. Finally, the award of attorney's fees would be permitted under either Texas or Korean law. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Plaintiff brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12102, against defendant for failing to provide a reasonable employment accommodation in consideration of his diabetes. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of defendant. The court held that because plaintiff's diabetes treatment regiment required only modest dietary and lifestyle changes, no genuine issue existed as to whether his impairment substantially limited his eating. Therefore, the district court properly concluded that plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA. The court also held that, based upon the record evidence, no reasonable juror could conclude that defendant was unwilling to, in good faith, participate in an interactive process to reasonably accommodate plaintiff's needs. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.