Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Police officers filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1988, alleging, inter alia, that the Lafayette PD Defendants imposed a "code of silence" to prevent police officers from reporting certain civil rights abuses and corruption within the police department and that these defendants retaliated against them for objecting to these practices. On appeal, police officers challenged the district court's grant of a protective order requiring, among other things, that a particular website they operated be "taken down" in its entirety, which was issued at the request of officials and entities within the Lafayette PD. Concluding that the court had appellate jurisdiction over the appeal, the court held that the district court erred in concluding that the entirety of the website was substantially likely to cause prejudice; the district court's determination that the entire website demonstrated a substantial likelihood of impacting the jury venire was overbroad and clearly erroneous; and, therefore, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Marceaux, et al. v. Lafayette City-Parish Con. Gov't, et al." on Justia Law

The DOJ filed suit against the City in order to remedy the patterns or practices identified in an investigation of conduct by the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) that subjected individuals to excessive force, unlawful searches and seizures, and discriminatory policing practices. On the same day the complaint was filed, the City and the DOJ agreed to a proposed consent decree outlining reform measures for the NOPD. On appeal, the City challenged the district court's orders entering judgment on the consent decree and denying the City's motion to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b). The court concluded that the City consented to both consent decrees at issue; the City could afford to fund both consent decrees; the secondary employment provisions of the NOPD consent decree did not violate federal or state law; the investigations and negotiations with the DOJ were not tainted by the actions of DOJ employees; and procedural deficiencies did not taint the district court's approval process and further erode the City's consent. Accordingly, the court rejected the City's contentions and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. City of New Orleans" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer after he was injured in a slip and fall accident on the job. The district court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment based in part on plaintiff's subjective awareness of the risk the spill presented. The court held that the district court erred in relying on plaintiff's subjective knowledge of the spill to grant summary judgment in favor of the employer because Section 406.033(a) of the Texas Labor Code took the employee's own negligence off of the table for a non-subscriber like the employer; there was a fact issue regarding the necessity of the product at issue to clean the spill; and the district court improperly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's premises liability claim. In regards to plaintiff's ordinary negligence claim, the court remanded for the district court to consider in the first instance whether plaintiff's necessary-instrumentalities theory was sufficient to support a stand-alone ordinary negligence claim. In regards to plaintiff's gross negligence claim, the court agreed with the district court that no reasonable juror could conclude that the employer was consciously indifferent to the safety of its employees. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Austin v. Kroger Texas, L.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Secretary of the Department of the Army, alleging age discrimination and retaliation claims. As a threshold matter, the court concluded that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act's (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., federal sector provision applied here, and the court need not decide whether a federal plaintiff must prove but-for-causation or some lesser standard under 29 U.S.C. 633a because plaintiffs' complaint stated a claim for relief under the heightened, but-for standard in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court plaintiffs have stated a claim for which relief could be granted under section 633a where plaintiffs were within the protected class under the ADEA, plaintiffs were qualified for the two newly-created positions at issue; plaintiffs were not selected for the positions; a "substantially younger" employee was selected for one of the positions instead; and one of the officials with decision-making authority over the younger employee's selection said that the department needed "new blood." Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' age discrimination claims and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Leal, et al. v. McHugh" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Chevron alleging that it terminated him in retaliation for exercising his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601. The district court granted summary judgment for Chevron. Under the mixed-motive framework, plaintiff was assumed to have established a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation. At issue was the second step of the framework requiring that Chevron articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination. The court concluded that Chevron failed to meet its burden and establish as a matter of law that it would have fired plaintiff despite its retaliatory motive where, inter alia, Chevron's evidence of plaintiff's history of attendance and performance-related deficiencies was insufficient to establish that it would have fired plaintiff. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ion v. Chevron USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., against the Army after plaintiff, an employee of a private Army contractor, was injured on the job when he tripped and fell. Plaintiff sued the Government for negligence and premises liability because he found that the workers' compensation benefits he received through his employer's policy was insufficient to cover his needs. Under Texas law, general contractors who require subcontractors to provide workers' compensation insurance to their employees and who pay for that coverage were "statutory employers" protected by the exclusive-remedy provision. In this instance, the parties agreed that the Government has taken the basic steps it needed to take to avail itself to the exclusive-remedy rule as a statutory employer. The court concluded that, because plaintiff did not allege a lack of notice or prejudice from any lack of notice, the federal government was in "like circumstances" as a Texas statutory employer. Accordingly, plaintiff's workers' compensation benefits were his exclusive remedy, and his claims against the Government were properly dismissed. View "Willoughby, et al. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former assistant attorney general for the Louisiana DOJ, claimed that LDOJ discriminated against her by declining to provide a free on-site parking space to accommodate her disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and violated the ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-1 et seq., by terminating her employment in retaliation for charges she filed with the EEOC. The court concluded that, because the district court erred in requiring a nexus between the requested accommodation and the essential functions of plaintiff's position, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the summary judgment dismissal of the retaliation claim because the LDOJ has offered a non-retaliatory explanation for plaintiff's dismissal and because plaintiff has presented no evidence of pretext. View "Feist v. State of Louisiana" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her secondary employer, Keppel Amfels, alleging that it violated the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1), by discouraging her primary employer, staffing agency Perma-Temp, from seeking her reinstatement after an FMLA-authorized maternity leave. The court concluded that, because plaintiff failed to create a fact issue that Keppel Amfels's actions went beyond what the relevant FMLA statutory regulatory provisions allowed, her claims failed regardless of whether intent was an element of her claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Keppel Amfels. View "Cuellar v. Keppel Amfels, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act), 29 U.S.C. 2101 et seq., requires that certain employers provide written notice within 60 days in advance of any "mass layoff" at a "single site of employment." Plaintiffs filed suit against Signal, alleging that Signal's reduction in employment constituted a mass layoff under the WARN Act and Signal violated the Act by failing to provide proper notice. The district court concluded that Signal's two facilities constituted a single site of employment because they fell into a regulatory exception for "truly unusual organizational situations," and thus, workforce levels were to be measured across both facilities. The district court also concluded that the "snapshot" date of June 24, 2009, was representative of ordinary employment levels at Signal. The court concluded that the district court did not err in concluding that there was a mass layoff under the Act where the parties have stipulated that there was a mass layoff during the 90-day period following July 24, 2009, the date of the first layoff alleged by plaintiffs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Davis, et al. v. Signal Int'l Texas GP, L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against their former employer seeking deferred compensation payments. The district court held that plaintiffs' deferred compensation arrangements in their Employment Agreement contracts with the employer constituted a plan under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. Because plaintiffs' deferred compensation arrangements did not necessitate an ongoing administrative scheme, there was no ERISA plan. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded, concluding that plaintiffs' state law claims were not preempted by ERISA. View "Cantrell, et al. v. Briggs & Veselka Co." on Justia Law