Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Carey Salt petitioned for review of the Board's decision finding that the company violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (3), and (5). The disputes underlying this case arose when the parties met to bargain over the terms of a new agreement that would replace the one that was expiring. The court enforced the order in part and vacated in part, concluding that substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole supported findings material to all terms of the order's mandate that Carey Salt cease and desist from presenting regressive bargaining proposals for the purpose of frustrating negotiations. View "Carey Salt Co. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the United States and others, alleging violations of her religious rights under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq. Plaintiff lost her job by failing to comply with the applicable regulations or to receive an appropriate waiver when she wore a kirpan (a Sikh ceremonial sword) to work. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's Title VII claim where her employer's, the IRS, failure to accommodate plaintiff did not violate Title VII as a matter of law. The court reversed and remanded plaintiff's RFRA claim for further development of evidence concerning the government's compelling interest in enforcing against plaintiff the statutory ban on weapons with blades exceeding 2.5 inches. View "Tagore v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, console supervisors at a refinery, alleged that their employer, CITGO, misclassified them as exempt from the overtime payment requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201-219. The district court subsequently granted summary judgment for CITGO based on plaintiffs' inability to prove damages but reduced CITGO's award of taxable costs. Both parties appealed. The court affirmed the district court's discovery sanctions dismissing seventeen plaintiffs (the January Sanction); discovery sanctions dismissing four additional plaintiffs (the March Sanction); and dismissal of the three remaining plaintiffs after preventing them from testifying about damages. The court concluded, however, that it was not entirely evident whether the district court intended plaintiffs' limited resources to be an independent basis for the cost reduction or whether, instead, it was a dependent part of a comparative-wealth analysis. Accordingly, the court reversed the order reducing costs and rendered in favor of CITGO for $53,065.72. View "Moore, et al. v. CITGO Refng. & Chem. Co., L.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against PSEG alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and other statutes. The court concluded that the district court did not err in submitting the first special verdict question - "Was a Plaintiff a qualified individual with a disability?" - where the jury-instruction definitions of "disability" and "qualified individual" properly conformed to the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA). The court also concluded that the district court did not err in submitting the third special verdict question - "Was a Plaintiff a qualified individual with a disability?" Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in either jury interrogatory, there was no need to consider whether an error required reversal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Neely v. PSEG Texas LP, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the police chief, filed suit against defendant, the mayor, alleging unconstitutional retaliation as well as state tort law claims. On interlocutory appeal, defendant challenged the district court's order denying qualified immunity and plaintiff cross-appealed the district court's dismissal of one of his tort claims. Because the court concluded that plaintiff acted pursuant to his official job duties, the court need not consider the remaining prongs of the First Amendment retaliation test since he could not show that defendant violated his First Amendment rights. Therefore, the court remanded, concluding that the district court erred in denying defendant's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's cross appeal, declining to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over a state law tort claim in an interlocutory appeal of the district court's order denying qualified immunity. View "Gibson v. Kilpatrick" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Performance, One Beacon, and others for damages stemming from a personal injury that he sustained while working on a fixed platform. After the parties settled, the suit proceeded to trial, and the district court found Performance 15% at fault for the accident and awarded plaintiff $200,000 in damages. The court concluded that, in light of the evidence presented at trial, it was not implausible for the court to find that Richard John Boutte, as the designated signalman for the blind lift, was significantly more at fault for plaintiff's injuries than was Shalico Andow, a Performance employee. Because the district court took a permissible view of the evidence in finding Andow only 15% at fault, the court affirmed that determination. Because Performance failed to show that borrowed employee status should be applied here, the court affirmed the district court's holding that Andow was not a borrowed employee. Finally, a general damages award of $65,000 was much closer to what Louisiana courts would award plaintiff based on the facts. Because $200,000 was more than 133% of $65,000, the district court's award of general damages was excessive as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court remitted the general damage portion of plaintiff's award to $86,450. View "Delahoussaye v. Performance Energy Services, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department, alleging that after fulfilling his two-week training obligation with the Army Reserve, he was terminated in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301-4335, and Texas Government Code 613.001-613.023. The court concluded that the district court did not err in refusing to apply collateral estoppel to the ALJ's finding in a state administrative proceeding where a finding that plaintiff was discharged due to a disagreement about military service was not the equivalent of a finding that the County was motivated by his military status to discharge him; the court did not analyze the possible collateral estoppel effects of the ALJ's decision on a section 4312 claim because no one has briefed it; and the technical failure to plead all the currently presented defenses did not prevent consideration of them. The court also concluded that section 613.021 established venue in state court and had no effect on the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in federal court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's partial motion for summary judgment. View "Bradberry v. Jefferson County, Texas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff became eligible for an award of unpaid overtime wages after her employer misclassified her as exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the district court's application of the "Fluctuating Workweek" (FWW) method of calculating overtime was not warranted in this case. The court held that the record evidence showed that there was no agreement between plaintiff and her employer that she would receive a fixed weekly wage to work fluctuating hours. Therefore, there was no basis on these facts to apply the FWW method of calculating plaintiff's overtime premiums using the half-time multiplier. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated, remanding for recalculation. View "Black v. SettlePou, P.C." on Justia Law

The Benefits Review Board ordered Sherwin to pay respondent benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. 901-950, when respondent, a dockworker, was injured in one of Sherwin's waterside ore processing facilities. The court concluded that respondent's injury did not occur on a LHWCA-covered situs because the underground transport tunnel where respondent was injured was not used in the vessel-unloading process under section 903(a). Accordingly, the court granted Sherwin's petition for review and remanded to the Board to dismiss respondent's claim. View "BPU Mgmt., Inc., et al. v. DOWCP, et al." on Justia Law

These consolidated cases arose out of an accident aboard Estis Rig 23, a barge supporting a truck-mounted drilling rig. The principal issue was whether seamen could recover punitive damages for their employer's willful and wanton breach of the general maritime law duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. Like maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness was established as a general maritime claim before the passage of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104; punitive damages were available under general maritime law; and the Jones Act did not address unseaworthiness or limit its remedies. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded, concluding that punitive damages remained available as a remedy for the general maritime law claim of unseaworthiness. View "McBride, et al. v. Estis Well Service L. L. C." on Justia Law