Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

KBR allegedly accepted kickbacks from two companies angling to win subcontracts on KBR's prime contract to service American armed forces in military theaters across the world. At issue on appeal was whether, and if so under what conditions, the Anti-Kickback Act's (AKA), 41 U.S.C. 55(a)(1), civil suit provision extended vicarious liability to an employer for the acts of its employees. The court discerned no persuasive evidence of congressional intent in section 55(a) to vary from the common law norm of permitting vicarious liability for employee actions taken under apparent authority. The court reversed the district court's ruling granting KBR's motion to dismiss the government's AKA claim, concluding that the district court erred in finding that section 55(a)(1) did not allow the government to allege vicarious liability. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employee of the Hays County Sheriff's Office for over twenty years, filed suit alleging constitutional violations against Hays County; the Sheriff's Office; and Sheriff Gary Cutler, in his official and individual capacities. Plaintiff claimed that the comments he made during the Sheriff's Election motivated his demotion. The court found that defendants failed to show that they would have terminated plaintiff in the absence of his protected speech and, in the alternative, plaintiff was speaking as a citizen and his letter to the editor was protected speech under the First Amendment. The court concluded that plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine dispute as to a material fact relating to his claim of First Amendment retaliation and that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Haverda v. Hays County, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against GE Energy, alleging violations of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h) (the "whistleblower-protection provision", because GE Energy terminated him after he made an internal report of a possible securities law violation. The court concluded that the plain language of section 78u-6 limited protection under the whistleblower provision to those individuals who provided information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the SEC. In this instance, plaintiff did not provide any information to the SEC and, therefore, he did not qualify as a "whistleblower" under Dodd-Frank. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of his claim. View "Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed suit against Conoco for breach of the Offer Letter and breach of its obligations under a severance plan (the Plan). The court concluded that plaintiff waived any challenge to the Trustee's application of the common law presumption of integration or Texas's parol evidence rule; plaintiff's arguments regarding his change in title were unpersuasive; plaintiff's "at will" employment argument relied on outdated and out-of-context Texas authority and was unpersuasive; the waiver was not invalid and unenforceable on account of fraud in the inducement; plaintiff ratified an alleged fraud, thereby preserving the validity and enforceability of the waiver regardless by submitting a claim to Conoco Human Resources but then continuing to work at Conoco; the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B), civil enforcement provision "completely preempts" plaintiff's state law claims against Conoco and the district court did not err by denying plaintiff's first motion for remand; the district court correctly denied plaintiff's renewed motion for remand; plaintiff was not entitled to recover attorneys' fees; and plaintiff waived his claim for breach of the Offer Letter, pertaining to a substantial reduction in his post-merger job position and responsibilities, for failure to plead with specificity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiff. View "Clayton v. ConocoPhillips Co., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, IMM, claiming that he was entitled to minimum-wage and overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act, (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 216(b). On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of IMM. The record indicated that plaintiff spent the vast majority of his time selling goods or performing work incidental to his sales. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that plaintiff was more similar to an outside salesman than a deliveryman and, therefore, IMM was excused from paying him the wages that the statute would otherwise mandate. View "Meza v. Intelligent Mexican Marketing, et al." on Justia Law

IEC-Houston petitioned for review of two of the Board's orders stemming from unfair labor practice charges against IEC-Houston and others. The charges stemmed from allegations that IEC-Houston's member employment-assistance programs discriminated against the hiring of union members and "salts" in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3). Concluding that the court had jurisdiction, the court granted IEC-Houston's petition for review and denied the Board's cross-petition for enforcement where IEC-Houston was deprived of due process of law because it was charged and tried under Section 8(a)(3), while each Board panel rejected the ALJ's finding of liability under Section 8(a)(3), and instead found violations of Section 8(a)(1) under a novel theory of liability. The Board's change of liability theories on appeal was error and it was not harmless error. Accordingly, the court did not reach the merits of the Board's novel Section 8(a)(1) theory of liability. View "Correct Electrical, Inc., et al. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's denial of his motion to remand his retaliation suit against CVS and the district court's conclusions of law. Plaintiff worked as a CVS pharmacist until his termination. The court concluded that CVS's removal was timely where the removal clock was not triggered until CVS received a copy of an "amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper from which" it was first ascertainable that the case was removable. The individual defendants were improperly joined because CVS demonstrated that plaintiff had no reasonable possibility of recovery against the individual defendants under Texas law. Therefore, the parties had complete diversity and the district court had jurisdiction. On the merits, plaintiff's retaliation claim failed where CVS terminated plaintiff for legitimate non-retaliatory reasons. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mumfrey v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of her claim of sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court ruled that plaintiff, a volunteer firefighter, was not an "employee" within the meaning of Title VII. The court concluded that plaintiff was not an "employee" for purposes of Title VII because she failed to make a threshold showing of remuneration. Plaintiff's benefits were purely incidental to her volunteer services with District 5. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire District No. 5" on Justia Law

The EEOC sued Houston Funding, alleging that Houston Funding unlawfully discharged one of its employees because she was lactating and wanted to express milk at work. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Houston Funding, finding that, as a matter of law, discharging a female employee because she was lactating or expressing milk did not constitute sex discrimination. However, given the court's precedent, the court held that the EEOC's argument that Houston Funding discharged the employee because she was lactating or expressing milk stated a cognizable sex discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. An adverse employment action motivated by these factors clearly imposed upon women a burden that male employees need not - indeed, could not - suffer. Moreover, the court held that lactation was a related medical condition of pregnancy for purposes of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-(k). Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "EEOC v. Houston Funding II, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this gender discrimination suit against LSU, alleging that the LSU Police Department violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq., as well as Louisiana state employment law, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 23:332(A)(1), 23:967, by failing to promote her to the position of Chief of Police and retaliating against her for filing complaints with the EEOC and LCHR. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of LSU because plaintiff had established a prima facie case of discrimination and there was a genuine disputed issue of fact of whether LSU's alleged non-discriminatory reason for not promoting plaintiff was pretextual. Accordingly, summary judgment on the gender discrimination claim was improper. Plaintiff had also shown a conflict in substantial evidence regarding retaliation and, therefore, summary judgment was improper on that second claim. View "Haire v. Board of Supervisors of LA State University" on Justia Law