Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against PSEG alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and other statutes. The court concluded that the district court did not err in submitting the first special verdict question - "Was a Plaintiff a qualified individual with a disability?" - where the jury-instruction definitions of "disability" and "qualified individual" properly conformed to the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA). The court also concluded that the district court did not err in submitting the third special verdict question - "Was a Plaintiff a qualified individual with a disability?" Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in either jury interrogatory, there was no need to consider whether an error required reversal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Neely v. PSEG Texas LP, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the police chief, filed suit against defendant, the mayor, alleging unconstitutional retaliation as well as state tort law claims. On interlocutory appeal, defendant challenged the district court's order denying qualified immunity and plaintiff cross-appealed the district court's dismissal of one of his tort claims. Because the court concluded that plaintiff acted pursuant to his official job duties, the court need not consider the remaining prongs of the First Amendment retaliation test since he could not show that defendant violated his First Amendment rights. Therefore, the court remanded, concluding that the district court erred in denying defendant's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's cross appeal, declining to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over a state law tort claim in an interlocutory appeal of the district court's order denying qualified immunity. View "Gibson v. Kilpatrick" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Performance, One Beacon, and others for damages stemming from a personal injury that he sustained while working on a fixed platform. After the parties settled, the suit proceeded to trial, and the district court found Performance 15% at fault for the accident and awarded plaintiff $200,000 in damages. The court concluded that, in light of the evidence presented at trial, it was not implausible for the court to find that Richard John Boutte, as the designated signalman for the blind lift, was significantly more at fault for plaintiff's injuries than was Shalico Andow, a Performance employee. Because the district court took a permissible view of the evidence in finding Andow only 15% at fault, the court affirmed that determination. Because Performance failed to show that borrowed employee status should be applied here, the court affirmed the district court's holding that Andow was not a borrowed employee. Finally, a general damages award of $65,000 was much closer to what Louisiana courts would award plaintiff based on the facts. Because $200,000 was more than 133% of $65,000, the district court's award of general damages was excessive as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court remitted the general damage portion of plaintiff's award to $86,450. View "Delahoussaye v. Performance Energy Services, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department, alleging that after fulfilling his two-week training obligation with the Army Reserve, he was terminated in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301-4335, and Texas Government Code 613.001-613.023. The court concluded that the district court did not err in refusing to apply collateral estoppel to the ALJ's finding in a state administrative proceeding where a finding that plaintiff was discharged due to a disagreement about military service was not the equivalent of a finding that the County was motivated by his military status to discharge him; the court did not analyze the possible collateral estoppel effects of the ALJ's decision on a section 4312 claim because no one has briefed it; and the technical failure to plead all the currently presented defenses did not prevent consideration of them. The court also concluded that section 613.021 established venue in state court and had no effect on the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in federal court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's partial motion for summary judgment. View "Bradberry v. Jefferson County, Texas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff became eligible for an award of unpaid overtime wages after her employer misclassified her as exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the district court's application of the "Fluctuating Workweek" (FWW) method of calculating overtime was not warranted in this case. The court held that the record evidence showed that there was no agreement between plaintiff and her employer that she would receive a fixed weekly wage to work fluctuating hours. Therefore, there was no basis on these facts to apply the FWW method of calculating plaintiff's overtime premiums using the half-time multiplier. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated, remanding for recalculation. View "Black v. SettlePou, P.C." on Justia Law

The Benefits Review Board ordered Sherwin to pay respondent benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. 901-950, when respondent, a dockworker, was injured in one of Sherwin's waterside ore processing facilities. The court concluded that respondent's injury did not occur on a LHWCA-covered situs because the underground transport tunnel where respondent was injured was not used in the vessel-unloading process under section 903(a). Accordingly, the court granted Sherwin's petition for review and remanded to the Board to dismiss respondent's claim. View "BPU Mgmt., Inc., et al. v. DOWCP, et al." on Justia Law

These consolidated cases arose out of an accident aboard Estis Rig 23, a barge supporting a truck-mounted drilling rig. The principal issue was whether seamen could recover punitive damages for their employer's willful and wanton breach of the general maritime law duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. Like maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness was established as a general maritime claim before the passage of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104; punitive damages were available under general maritime law; and the Jones Act did not address unseaworthiness or limit its remedies. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded, concluding that punitive damages remained available as a remedy for the general maritime law claim of unseaworthiness. View "McBride, et al. v. Estis Well Service L. L. C." on Justia Law

Police officers filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1988, alleging, inter alia, that the Lafayette PD Defendants imposed a "code of silence" to prevent police officers from reporting certain civil rights abuses and corruption within the police department and that these defendants retaliated against them for objecting to these practices. On appeal, police officers challenged the district court's grant of a protective order requiring, among other things, that a particular website they operated be "taken down" in its entirety, which was issued at the request of officials and entities within the Lafayette PD. Concluding that the court had appellate jurisdiction over the appeal, the court held that the district court erred in concluding that the entirety of the website was substantially likely to cause prejudice; the district court's determination that the entire website demonstrated a substantial likelihood of impacting the jury venire was overbroad and clearly erroneous; and, therefore, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Marceaux, et al. v. Lafayette City-Parish Con. Gov't, et al." on Justia Law

The DOJ filed suit against the City in order to remedy the patterns or practices identified in an investigation of conduct by the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) that subjected individuals to excessive force, unlawful searches and seizures, and discriminatory policing practices. On the same day the complaint was filed, the City and the DOJ agreed to a proposed consent decree outlining reform measures for the NOPD. On appeal, the City challenged the district court's orders entering judgment on the consent decree and denying the City's motion to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b). The court concluded that the City consented to both consent decrees at issue; the City could afford to fund both consent decrees; the secondary employment provisions of the NOPD consent decree did not violate federal or state law; the investigations and negotiations with the DOJ were not tainted by the actions of DOJ employees; and procedural deficiencies did not taint the district court's approval process and further erode the City's consent. Accordingly, the court rejected the City's contentions and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. City of New Orleans" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer after he was injured in a slip and fall accident on the job. The district court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment based in part on plaintiff's subjective awareness of the risk the spill presented. The court held that the district court erred in relying on plaintiff's subjective knowledge of the spill to grant summary judgment in favor of the employer because Section 406.033(a) of the Texas Labor Code took the employee's own negligence off of the table for a non-subscriber like the employer; there was a fact issue regarding the necessity of the product at issue to clean the spill; and the district court improperly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's premises liability claim. In regards to plaintiff's ordinary negligence claim, the court remanded for the district court to consider in the first instance whether plaintiff's necessary-instrumentalities theory was sufficient to support a stand-alone ordinary negligence claim. In regards to plaintiff's gross negligence claim, the court agreed with the district court that no reasonable juror could conclude that the employer was consciously indifferent to the safety of its employees. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Austin v. Kroger Texas, L.P." on Justia Law