Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Burnside, a sergeant for the Nueces County Sheriff’s Department, was assigned to the patrol division. Burnside also served as chairman of a law enforcement political action committee (PAC). In 2012, Sheriff Kaelin, up for re-election in a contested race, approached Burnside while Burnside was on duty and told him that the PAC should support Kaelin’s re-election bid. Burnside said that he would not treat Kaelin differently from any other candidate and that PAC members would vote on the endorsement. Kaelin told Burnside that Kaelin would move him to jail duty if the PAC did not support Kaelin’s candidacy. Kaelin knew that Burnside personally supported Kaelin’s opponent. That the PAC did not support Kaelin, was common knowledge. Three weeks after the PAC failed to endorse Kaelin, Kaelin transferred Burnside to the “extremely less desirable position” of jail duty. Burnside continued to work at the jail for a year. In 2013, his employment was terminated because of the dissemination of a recording containing Kaelin’s threat against another officer. Burnside sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Kaelin was denied the defense of qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit reversed as to the termination claim and affirmed denial of qualified immunity as to the transfer claim. View "Burnside v. Nueces Cnty." on Justia Law

After the court affirmed the ALJ's determination that Ameristar was liable for discharging Thomas Clemmons in violation of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR21), 49 U.S.C. 42121, the court remanded for the determination of whether an e-mail found by Ameristar after Clemmons was fired was of such severity that he would have been terminated on those grounds alone. The ALJ determined that Ameristar failed to meet the high burden of proof required in AIR21 cases and the ARB affirmed. The court held that the heightened burden applies equally in all instances in which an employer is seeking to avoid providing relief, regardless of whether the employer is relying on pre-termination evidence or after-acquired evidence. In this case, the ALJ determined that Ameristar failed to provide clear and convincing proof that it would have terminated Clemmons solely on the basis of the e-mail. The ALJ had completely discredited the testimony of Ameristar's managers, and Ameristar offered no evidence other than the e-mail. Consequently, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's determination that Ameristar failed to prove its after-acquired-evidence defense by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the court denied Ameristar's petition for review. View "Ameristar Airways, Inc. v. Administrative Review Board, Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

An employee of Halliburton, Anthony Menendez, submitted a complaint to management about the company's questionable accounting practices and also filed a complaint with the SEC. The Review Board subsequently determined that Halliburton's disclosure to Menendez's colleagues of his identity as the SEC whistleblower who had caused an official investigation, resulting in Menendez's workplace ostracism, constituted illegal retaliation under section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), 18 U.S.C. 1514A(a). The court held that to maintain an antiretaliation claim under SOX, as in these circumstances here, the employee must prove that his protected conduct was a contributing factor in the employer's adverse action. The court rejected Halliburton's argument that the Review Board committed legal error by failing to require proof that the company had a wrongful motive. The court rejected Halliburton's contention that the damages awarded to Menendez for emotional distress and reputational harm are not noneconomic compensatory damages available under SOX. The court agreed with the Tenth Circuit that the plain language of SOX's text relating to remedies for retaliation affords noneconomic compensatory damages and this conclusion comports with the decisions of the Seventh and Eighth Circuits respecting essential identical statutory text in the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733. The court concluded that Halliburton failed to show that the Review Board's decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Halliburton, Inc. v. Administrative Review Board, Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

The district court declined to decide as a matter of law whether nine individual plaintiffs, former vessel-based tankermen on Blessey barges, were exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 28 U.S.C. 1292(b), as seamen. Blessey filed this interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court erred when it determined that Owens v. SeaRiver Maritime, Inc. required it to hold that loading and unloading duties performed by vessel-based tankermen were nonseaman duties as a matter of law; instead, the court's review of the relevant law and undisputed facts lead it to conclude that loading and unloading was seaman work when done by these vessel-based plaintiffs; and, consequently, the district court erred when it denied Blessey's motion for summary judgment on this issue. In this case, the tankermen performed duties crucial to the mission and purpose for the unit tow and were at all times engaged in work regarding the safe and efficient operation of a "vessel as a means of transportation" under 29 C.F.R. 783.31. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Coffin, et al. v. Blessey Marine Services, Inc." on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated from his position as Director of the University's art galleries after he told a member of U.S. Representative Louie Gohmert's staff that he believed Rep. Gohmert was a "fear monger," plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the University and others, alleging that he was fired in retaliation for the exercise of protected speech in violation of his First Amendment rights. Defendants appealed the district court's denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The court concluded that defendants should have known that plaintiff's speech was protected as the speech of a citizen and that their decision to terminate plaintiff on the basis of that citizen speech would violate plaintiff's First Amendment right. The court held that the law of this circuit clearly established what a reasonable investigation was such that a reasonable official would have known that defendants' investigation was unreasonable under the circumstances. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that every reasonable official in defendants' positions would have known based on precedent that an informal, hastily concluded investigation would be unreasonable. Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding that the law was "clearly established" at the time.View "Cutler v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-1, for racial discrimination. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to allege an adverse employment action under Rule 12(b)(6). The court concluded that, viewing the factual allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff plausibly alleged that he was subject to the equivalent of a demotion. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.View "Thompson v. City of Waco, TX" on Justia Law

Fort Bend hired Davis in 2007 as a Desktop Support Supervisor for 15 information technology technicians. Cook was the IT Director, and in 2009, hired his friend and fellow church member, Ford, as Davis’s supervisor. In 2010, Davis complained to human resources that Cook subjected her to constant sexual harassment and assaults. Fort Bend placed Davis on Family Medical Leave Act leave during its investigation, which substantiated the allegations and led to Cook’s resignation. According to Davis, Ford immediately began retaliating when she returned to work. She alleged that Ford “effectively” demoted her by reducing the number of her direct reports to four; removed her from projects she had previously managed; superseded her authority; removed her administrative rights from the computer server; and assigned her tasks that similarly situated employees were not required to perform. When a special installation was scheduled for the weekend of July 4, 2011, all employees were required to be present. On June 28, Davis informed Ford that she would not be available on the morning of Sunday July 3, “due to a previous religious commitment.” Davis claimed that she had arranged for a replacement. After Davis attended her church event and did not report to work, Fort Bend terminated her employment. Davis filed suit, alleging retaliation and religious discrimination under Title VII, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part. Summary judgment was proper as to the retaliation claim, but not as to the religious discrimination claim.View "Davis v. Fort Bend Cnty." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a corrections officer, filed suit against the County, acting through its Sheriff, alleging that plaintiff was terminated from his employment in violation of his First Amendment right to free speech. The court held that plaintiff's statements to the news reporter was ordinarily within the scope of plaintiff's duties and did not merely concern those duties. Therefore, plaintiff was not speaking as a citizen for First Amendment purposes and his communications were not constitutionally insulated from employer discipline. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of the County.View "Hurst v. Lee County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a nursing home activities aide, filed suit against her employer, Woodland, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., after she was discharged because she refused to pray the Rosary with a patient. Plaintiff alleged that Woodland discharged her for exercising her religious beliefs. The court found that there was no evidence in the record that Woodland knew of plaintiff's beliefs before discharging her and held that a reasonable jury would not have had a legally sufficient basis to find that Woodland violated Title VII by discharging her. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of Woodland's motion for judgment as a matter of law, vacated the judgment, and remanded for entry of judgment.View "Nobach v. Woodland Village Nursing Ctr., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against their former employer seeking unpaid overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201-219. In light of the plain language of 29 C.F.R. 778.105, the persuasive value of the Opinion Letter, and the reasoning in Abshire v. Redland Energy Services, the court agreed with the Eighth Circuit that, under the FLSA, an employer has the right to establish a workweek and was not required to begin the workweek on any given day. In this case, the employer did not violate the overtime wage requirements of the FLSA by using a Monday through Sunday workweek to calculate overtime compensation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Johnson, et al. v. Heckmann Water Resources, Inc., et al." on Justia Law