Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After plaintiff was terminated from his position as Director of the University's art galleries after he told a member of U.S. Representative Louie Gohmert's staff that he believed Rep. Gohmert was a "fear monger," plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the University and others, alleging that he was fired in retaliation for the exercise of protected speech in violation of his First Amendment rights. Defendants appealed the district court's denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The court concluded that defendants should have known that plaintiff's speech was protected as the speech of a citizen and that their decision to terminate plaintiff on the basis of that citizen speech would violate plaintiff's First Amendment right. The court held that the law of this circuit clearly established what a reasonable investigation was such that a reasonable official would have known that defendants' investigation was unreasonable under the circumstances. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that every reasonable official in defendants' positions would have known based on precedent that an informal, hastily concluded investigation would be unreasonable. Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding that the law was "clearly established" at the time.View "Cutler v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-1, for racial discrimination. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to allege an adverse employment action under Rule 12(b)(6). The court concluded that, viewing the factual allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff plausibly alleged that he was subject to the equivalent of a demotion. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.View "Thompson v. City of Waco, TX" on Justia Law

Fort Bend hired Davis in 2007 as a Desktop Support Supervisor for 15 information technology technicians. Cook was the IT Director, and in 2009, hired his friend and fellow church member, Ford, as Davis’s supervisor. In 2010, Davis complained to human resources that Cook subjected her to constant sexual harassment and assaults. Fort Bend placed Davis on Family Medical Leave Act leave during its investigation, which substantiated the allegations and led to Cook’s resignation. According to Davis, Ford immediately began retaliating when she returned to work. She alleged that Ford “effectively” demoted her by reducing the number of her direct reports to four; removed her from projects she had previously managed; superseded her authority; removed her administrative rights from the computer server; and assigned her tasks that similarly situated employees were not required to perform. When a special installation was scheduled for the weekend of July 4, 2011, all employees were required to be present. On June 28, Davis informed Ford that she would not be available on the morning of Sunday July 3, “due to a previous religious commitment.” Davis claimed that she had arranged for a replacement. After Davis attended her church event and did not report to work, Fort Bend terminated her employment. Davis filed suit, alleging retaliation and religious discrimination under Title VII, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part. Summary judgment was proper as to the retaliation claim, but not as to the religious discrimination claim.View "Davis v. Fort Bend Cnty." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a corrections officer, filed suit against the County, acting through its Sheriff, alleging that plaintiff was terminated from his employment in violation of his First Amendment right to free speech. The court held that plaintiff's statements to the news reporter was ordinarily within the scope of plaintiff's duties and did not merely concern those duties. Therefore, plaintiff was not speaking as a citizen for First Amendment purposes and his communications were not constitutionally insulated from employer discipline. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of the County.View "Hurst v. Lee County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a nursing home activities aide, filed suit against her employer, Woodland, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., after she was discharged because she refused to pray the Rosary with a patient. Plaintiff alleged that Woodland discharged her for exercising her religious beliefs. The court found that there was no evidence in the record that Woodland knew of plaintiff's beliefs before discharging her and held that a reasonable jury would not have had a legally sufficient basis to find that Woodland violated Title VII by discharging her. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of Woodland's motion for judgment as a matter of law, vacated the judgment, and remanded for entry of judgment.View "Nobach v. Woodland Village Nursing Ctr., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against their former employer seeking unpaid overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201-219. In light of the plain language of 29 C.F.R. 778.105, the persuasive value of the Opinion Letter, and the reasoning in Abshire v. Redland Energy Services, the court agreed with the Eighth Circuit that, under the FLSA, an employer has the right to establish a workweek and was not required to begin the workweek on any given day. In this case, the employer did not violate the overtime wage requirements of the FLSA by using a Monday through Sunday workweek to calculate overtime compensation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Johnson, et al. v. Heckmann Water Resources, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former employee of a franchise of Craig O's Pizza, filed suit against defendant, the founder of Craig O's, under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201. The court held that plaintiff failed to produce legally sufficient evidence to satisfy the economic reality test and thus failed to prove that defendant was his employer under the FLSA. Because the court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that defendant was plaintiff's employer, the court need not address defendant's remaining challenges. Accordingly, the court reversed the denial of judgment as a matter of law and rendered judgment in favor of defendant.View "Orozco v. Plackis" on Justia Law

Kimberly Kulig and Laura Baatz worked for the Berryhill Baja Grill & Cantina on Montrose Street in Houston, a franchise-location. During their employment, the owner and operator of the restaurant sexually harassed them on numerous occasions. In this appeal, Kulig and Baatz challenged the district court's dismissal of their Title VII lawsuit against Berryhill Hot Tamales Corporation for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court concluded that parties represented by counsel may too invoke the exceptions of the named-party requirement. Because the district court granted summary judgment on the grounds that Kulig and Baatz, as represented parties, could not rely on the exceptions to the named-party requirement, the district court did not determine whether they could fit within either the Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co. or Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130 exceptions. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, Bromac, dismissing her claims under the Jury System Improvement Act (JSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1875. The court rejected plaintiff's claims that the district court misapplied the but-for causation standard by holding that she had to prove that her jury service was the only reason for her termination where the district court did not err in its analysis under the but-for causation standard. Even accepting plaintiff's version of the facts, she failed to create a genuine dispute that Bromac terminated her by reason of her jury service, or that their stated reason for terminating her was merely a pretext. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Bromac. View "Rogers v. Bromac Title Services, L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, the school district, asserting claims of national origin discrimination, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the removal of his suit from Texas state court and the dismissal of his entire suit. The court held that removal was proper where plaintiff's complaint included claims under Title VII. However, because the district court gave no notice to plaintiff before its sua sponte dismissal of his state law discriminatory termination claim, the court vacated the dismissal of the claim and remanded. View "Davoodi v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law