Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Justin Richardson appealed the district court's dismissal of his first amended complaint, which alleged that Axion Logistics, L.L.C. terminated his employment in violation of Louisiana's whistleblower statute. Richardson was briefly employed by Axion from February 7, 2012, to May 21, 2012. Axion promoted him to general manager of the company's Louisiana operations shortly after he was hired. While serving as general manager, Richardson became aware that two Axion employees, Jimmy Hall and Don Ward, were fraudulently billing Dow Chemical, and Axion client, for mileage reimbursement. Richardson first learned of the fraudulent billing when Andy Wheat, whom Hall had told about these billing practices, showed Richardson the discrepant time sheets. Richardson reported the timesheet manipulations up the chain of command. Along with Wheat, he called Axion's former president, Steve Seymour, to report the over-billing. Seymour had previously tried to fire Hall, in part for his fraudulent billing, but Gary Grant, Axion's CEO, would not allow it. On May 2, 2012, Richardson and Wheat met with Grant. Grant instructed them to submit a written repor, which they did via e-mail later that same day. The following week, Richardson attended a dinner with Axion management, who spent much of the evening criticizing Richardson's job performance and qualifications. About a week later, Seymour informed Richardson that he had not made a good impression with Grant and the rest of Axion's management. Seymour terminated Richardson's employment on the stated ground that he “was not a good fit” for the company. Axion moved to dismiss Richardson's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Richardson amended his complaint. Axion again moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion, entering a dismissal with prejudice. Richardson appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Because the complaint stated a plausible claim for relief, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Richardson v. Axion Logistics, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the captain of a crew boat, filed suit against his employer and his supervisor under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 50101, and general maritime law, seeking maintenance and cure and damages. All parties cross-appealed the district court's judgment. The court concluded that the district court's finding that plaintiff merely strained his back while lifting a hatch cover is not clearly erroneous; the district court's findings regarding the weather and condition of the seas at the time and location of the incident are not clearly erroneous; the district court properly ruled against plaintiff on all of his unseaworthiness claims; the district court's finding that defendants were not negligent is fully supported by the record; the court vacated the maintenance and cure award against the supervisor where the maintenance and cure duty extends only to the seaman's employer; and the McCorpen v. Central Gulf Steamship Corp. rule precludes plaintiff from obtaining maintenance and cure from his employer in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment to the extent the district court rejected plaintiff's Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness claims; vacated the awards against the employer and supervisor in their entirety; and rendered judgment in favor of the employer and supervisor. View "Meche v. Key Energy Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-634. Plaintiff alleged discrimination and retaliation under the Act, but defendant never answered or defended the suit. After the district court entered a default judgment against defendant, defendant filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. The court concluded that evidence adduced at a default judgment "prove-up" hearing cannot cure a deficient complaint. In this case, plaintiff's complaint contained very few factual allegations, but his testimony at the damages hearing provided evidence on the elements of his claim that were absent from his pleadings. Accordingly, the court vacated the entry of default judgment and remanded. View "Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assoc, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the TWC under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a), alleging that the TWC discriminated against him when it appointed another person to a management position over him. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to show that he was clearly better qualified for the position or that the TWC's bases for its decision were otherwise affected by his national origin. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court properly adopted the magistrate's Report and Recommendation granting summary judgment in favor of the TWC. View "Martinez v. Texas Workforce Comm'n" on Justia Law

Kristy Sones worked as a nurse for LHC, a home-health company, until she was terminated shortly after she had an epileptic seizure. The EEOC brought an enforcement action on her behalf against LHC under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The district court subsequently granted summary judgment for LHC on all claims. The court affirmed summary judgment on the EEOC's failure-to-accommodate claim; affirmed partial summary judgment to the extent Sones was a Field Nurse because she was not qualified for that position; but concluded that there were genuine disputes of material fact remaining as to (1) whether Sones was promoted to Team Leader, (2) if so, whether LHC could reasonably accommodate her disability, (3) whether LHC engaged in the required interactive process to seek accommodation, and (4) whether Sones was terminated on account of her disability. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings as to these issues. View "EEOC v. LHC Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against their former employers, alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants' hiring of undocumented workers resulted in the depression of their wages. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' second amended complaint for failure to establish RICO standing, as well as denied their motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. The court concluded that, without an allegation as to the proportion of undocumented workers within defendants' workforce, it is impossible to determine whether the hiring of undocumented workers could have had any plausible effect on overall wages. Further, if plaintiffs are alleging that defendants' hiring of illegal workers depressed wages throughout the industry, this theory is implausible too. Therefore, plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege proximate cause. Further, plaintiffs' allegations are insufficient to establish that they suffered any injury, must less an injury under RICO. The court also concluded that the district court did not err by dismissing the second amended complaint with prejudice and denying plaintiffs leave to file the third amended complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Varela v. Gonzales" on Justia Law

Burnside, a sergeant for the Nueces County Sheriff’s Department, was assigned to the patrol division. Burnside also served as chairman of a law enforcement political action committee (PAC). In 2012, Sheriff Kaelin, up for re-election in a contested race, approached Burnside while Burnside was on duty and told him that the PAC should support Kaelin’s re-election bid. Burnside said that he would not treat Kaelin differently from any other candidate and that PAC members would vote on the endorsement. Kaelin told Burnside that Kaelin would move him to jail duty if the PAC did not support Kaelin’s candidacy. Kaelin knew that Burnside personally supported Kaelin’s opponent. That the PAC did not support Kaelin, was common knowledge. Three weeks after the PAC failed to endorse Kaelin, Kaelin transferred Burnside to the “extremely less desirable position” of jail duty. Burnside continued to work at the jail for a year. In 2013, his employment was terminated because of the dissemination of a recording containing Kaelin’s threat against another officer. Burnside sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Kaelin was denied the defense of qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit reversed as to the termination claim and affirmed denial of qualified immunity as to the transfer claim. View "Burnside v. Nueces Cnty." on Justia Law

After the court affirmed the ALJ's determination that Ameristar was liable for discharging Thomas Clemmons in violation of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR21), 49 U.S.C. 42121, the court remanded for the determination of whether an e-mail found by Ameristar after Clemmons was fired was of such severity that he would have been terminated on those grounds alone. The ALJ determined that Ameristar failed to meet the high burden of proof required in AIR21 cases and the ARB affirmed. The court held that the heightened burden applies equally in all instances in which an employer is seeking to avoid providing relief, regardless of whether the employer is relying on pre-termination evidence or after-acquired evidence. In this case, the ALJ determined that Ameristar failed to provide clear and convincing proof that it would have terminated Clemmons solely on the basis of the e-mail. The ALJ had completely discredited the testimony of Ameristar's managers, and Ameristar offered no evidence other than the e-mail. Consequently, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's determination that Ameristar failed to prove its after-acquired-evidence defense by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the court denied Ameristar's petition for review. View "Ameristar Airways, Inc. v. Administrative Review Board, Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

An employee of Halliburton, Anthony Menendez, submitted a complaint to management about the company's questionable accounting practices and also filed a complaint with the SEC. The Review Board subsequently determined that Halliburton's disclosure to Menendez's colleagues of his identity as the SEC whistleblower who had caused an official investigation, resulting in Menendez's workplace ostracism, constituted illegal retaliation under section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), 18 U.S.C. 1514A(a). The court held that to maintain an antiretaliation claim under SOX, as in these circumstances here, the employee must prove that his protected conduct was a contributing factor in the employer's adverse action. The court rejected Halliburton's argument that the Review Board committed legal error by failing to require proof that the company had a wrongful motive. The court rejected Halliburton's contention that the damages awarded to Menendez for emotional distress and reputational harm are not noneconomic compensatory damages available under SOX. The court agreed with the Tenth Circuit that the plain language of SOX's text relating to remedies for retaliation affords noneconomic compensatory damages and this conclusion comports with the decisions of the Seventh and Eighth Circuits respecting essential identical statutory text in the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733. The court concluded that Halliburton failed to show that the Review Board's decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Halliburton, Inc. v. Administrative Review Board, Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

The district court declined to decide as a matter of law whether nine individual plaintiffs, former vessel-based tankermen on Blessey barges, were exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 28 U.S.C. 1292(b), as seamen. Blessey filed this interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court erred when it determined that Owens v. SeaRiver Maritime, Inc. required it to hold that loading and unloading duties performed by vessel-based tankermen were nonseaman duties as a matter of law; instead, the court's review of the relevant law and undisputed facts lead it to conclude that loading and unloading was seaman work when done by these vessel-based plaintiffs; and, consequently, the district court erred when it denied Blessey's motion for summary judgment on this issue. In this case, the tankermen performed duties crucial to the mission and purpose for the unit tow and were at all times engaged in work regarding the safe and efficient operation of a "vessel as a means of transportation" under 29 C.F.R. 783.31. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Coffin, et al. v. Blessey Marine Services, Inc." on Justia Law