Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, former Chief Deputy in the Sheriff's office, filed suit against the Sheriff, raising claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Louisiana Constitution, and the Louisiana whistleblower statutes. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff. The court concluded that plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim failed because plaintiff's complaints about the recordings at issue were made within the scope of his employment and, therefore, his speech was not protected by the First Amendment. The court agreed with the district court that it would have been a waste of judicial resources to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where plaintiff's state law claims were neither novel nor complex; the court concluded that plaintiff has not shown that the Sheriff’s Office committed an actual violation of Louisiana law and, therefore, the district court was correct to dismiss his claim under the Louisiana Whistleblower Statute, La. Rev. Stat. 23:967; and La. Rev. Stat. 42: 1169 does not provide a private right of action for plaintiff to sue in either state or federal court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wilson v. Tregre" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who is white, filed suit alleging state and federal claims of workplace retaliation and discrimination. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of the government's motion to exclude certain testimony offered by plaintiff and a police department captain and dismissal of plaintiff's federal claims. The court agreed with the district court that the statements at issue lacked foundation and plaintiff cannot show that all reasonable persons would reject the district court's decision to strike the testimony. The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's Title VII race discrimination claim, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), where plaintiff failed to present evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact that he was treated less favorably because of his race than were other similarly situated employees who were not white, under nearly identical circumstances. Assuming that the district court dismissed plaintiff's race retaliation claim, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), sua sponte and without notice, the court held that the dismissal was harmless and affirmed the judgment. View "Paske, Jr. v. Fitzgerald" on Justia Law

Randy Jenkins, a 51-year-old African-American man, served in the San Antonio Fire Department since 1986. The Fire Department was headed by the Fire Chief, Charles Hood, who managed a deputy chief, assistant chiefs, district chiefs, captains, lieutenants, engineers, and firefighters. In 2008, Jenkins was appointed as one of two district chiefs of Fire Prevention, reporting directly to Assistant Chief Earl Crayton. In this capacity, Jenkins was responsible for oversight of Community Safety & Education ("CS&E"). When the other district chief in the Fire Prevention Division left, Jenkins temporarily assumed his responsibilities. Eventually, a new district chief was assigned to the Fire Prevention Division and given responsibility for CS&E while Jenkins retained oversight of Special Events, Inspections, and Administration. After the recently appointed district chief left in 2009, Captain Christopher Monestier was hired as his replacement and assigned oversight of CS&E and Special Events. In 2011, Assistant Chief Crayton "realigned" Jenkins and Monestier’s duties. Jenkins did not suffer a reduction in rank or benefits but perceived the realignment as discrimination based on his race, color, or age as well as retaliation for giving a statement supporting an EEOC charge against Crayton. Jenkins filed an EEOC charge to this effect, and the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on May 16, 2012. Several other actions would lead Jenkins to amend his EEOC complaint to include several other "realignments." He ultimately sued, taking his right-to-sue letter to district court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Fire Department. It held that Jenkins’s discrimination and retaliation claims stemming from the 2011 reassignment of duties were not timely filed. Even assuming his suit was timely, the district court found that Jenkins’s discrimination and retaliation claims stemming from both the 2011 reassignment and Jenkins’s non-selection as District Chief of Inspections in 2012 failed because he was unable to establish a prima facie case. Jenkins timely appealed. But finding no reversible error, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "Jenkins v. City of San Antonio Fire Dept" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Frederick Morton and Walter Powers, Jr., individually and in his capacity as President of the Fraternal Order of Police, and cross-claimant the New Orleans Civil Service Commission (“CSC”) appealed the district court’s judgment upholding certain ordinances passed by the City of New Orleans related to paid detail for officers of the New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”). The Fifth Circuit approved a Consent Decree entered into by agreement between the United States and the City of New Orleans; the Consent Decree was the product of a nearly year-long United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) investigation into the NOPD which “revealed longstanding patterns of unconstitutional conduct and bad practices and policies within the department.” As relevant here, the DOJ found that the structure of NOPD’s system of paid detail undermined the quality of NOPD policing and facilitated abuse and corruption by officers. To fix the problems associated with paid details, the Consent Decree required the City to “completely restructure” the existing system in which NOPD officers negotiated details and received payment directly from private employers. Morton and Powers alleged in their petition that the paid detail ordinances violated the federal and state Constitutions, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court held a hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, in which the CSC participated. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion, finding that the CSC lacked jurisdiction over NOPD officers’ paid detail work; the ordinances did not violate the state or federal Contract Clauses because, even if contracts between the officers and private employers existed, they were subject to approval by the Superintendent and the ordinances were a legitimate exercise of the City’s police power; and the ordinances did not violate Louisiana’s Anti-Expropriation Clause because NOPD officers working paid details were not a “business enterprise,” and, in any case, the OPSE, a non-profit entity, did not compete with any paid detail business. All parties proceeded to a three-day bench trial. Following the trial, the district court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law and dismissed plaintiffs’ claims and the CSC’s cross-claim. Plaintiffs and the CSC appealed the district court’s rulings on all claims and further alleged that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the case. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. View "Powers v. City of New Orleans" on Justia Law

M. Kathleen McKinney, the National Labor Relations Board’s regional director, sought and obtained a temporary injunction requiring Creative Vision Resources, L.L.C., to negotiate and bargain in good faith with a labor union. Creative Vision appealed the district court’s grant of injunctive relief, arguing that such relief was not equitably necessary under the circumstances of this case. After review, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court abused its discretion because it ordered injunctive relief supported only by general findings of harm that did not evince exceptional or egregious conduct or harms in the context of the NLRA. Nor did the district court address adequately the effect of the excessive passage of time between the onset of the alleged wrongful activities and the issuance of the injunction. The district court’s order enjoined conduct in 2014 in an attempt to preserve a status quo as it existed in 2011. Accordingly, the Court vacated the district court's grant of injunctive relief, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "McKinney v. Creative Vision Resources, LLC" on Justia Law

In this appeal of the grant of summary judgment dismissing a complaint in a Title VII race-discrimination case, plaintiff Lieutenant Gayle McMullin, presented evidence, which, if believed by a jury, would have shown "a fumbling, bumbling case of determined efforts" to deny a promotion to McMullin. Lieutenant McMullin alleged that the Mississippi Department of Public Safety failed to promote her to the position of Training Director and instead promoted a less-qualified officer of lower rank to fill the position, based on race. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, finding that Lieutenant McMullin failed to establish a prima facie case of race-based discrimination. Because the district court erred in granting summary judgment, the Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for trial or other proceedings. View "McMullin v. MS Dept of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Jerrell Squyres sued his former employer, The Heico Companies and its subsidiaries, for violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the companies. In July 2012, Squyres filed an employment-discrimination action against the employer. On September 18, 2012, in his response to the employer’s motion, Squyres raised the possibility of amending his complaint to “ple[a]d quantum meruit and/or fraudulent misrepresentation claims” instead. On October 31, 2012, the district court granted in part and denied in part Appellees’ motion to dismiss and entered a scheduling order that set a discovery deadline of June 21, 2013. At that point, the discovery deadline was nearly eight months away. After the district court entered the scheduling order, Squyres filed his second amended complaint, re-pleading the age-discrimination claims. The employer filed another motion to dismiss, but this time, the district court denied the motion. The employer answered the second amended complaint on January 8, 2013. When the answer was filed, five months still remained before the June discovery deadline. The employer contended Squyres was served interrogatories, document requests, and requests for admission on February 20, 2013. Squyres did not respond to these requests until April 30, 2013. Squyres also did not contact Appellees’ counsel about scheduling depositions until May 22, 2013. After a series of continuations, in late July 2013, the parties filed a joint motion to extend the scheduling order deadlines and to continue the trial, but the district court denied the motion based on the “long period of time in which the parties have had to arrange discovery.” The district court emphasized that “[t]he time has come for the parties and their counsel to be held accountable for the deadlines issued by this Court nine months ago.” The employer then filed a motion for summary judgment. Despite a warning from the court for no more extensions of time, Squyres requested leave to amend his complaint on August 22. Squyres sought to add a fraud claim and drop his breach-of-contract claim. Squyres filed his motion to amend unopposed, citing the earlier quid pro quo agreement. The employer, however, filed a response in opposition to Squyres’ motion, admitting the quid pro quo agreement, but arguing that Squyres had not sought amendment in a reasonable time after their June agreement and that “the circumstances ha[d] changed since that discussion in June.” The district court ultimately denied Squyres’ motion. Upon review of Squyers' arguments on appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court, finding that that court acted within ints discretion when it denied Squyres' motions. View "Jerrell Squyres v. Heico Companies, L.L.C., et al" on Justia Law

In 2011, Micah Phillips (then a 12-year veteran of the Dallas Fire Department) announced his candidacy in the Democratic primary for a seat on the Dallas County Commissioners Court. At that time, city laws prevented city employees from seeking office in any county overlapping the city of Dallas (as Dallas County did). The City subsequently terminated Phillips for violating those laws. This suit was dismissed on the pleadings by the district court, and Phillips challenged those laws both facially and as applied to him. Finding no reversible error, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. View "Phillips v. City of Dallas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee Tammy Bryant filed suit against her employer, the Texas Department of Aging and Disability Services, and supervisor, Kim Littleton, in her individual capacity, claiming violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the bases of sovereign and qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion in full. After review of the trial court record, the Fifth Circuit concluded the Department was entitled to sovereign immunity on Bryant’s self-care claims and that Littleton was entitled to qualified immunity on Bryant’s interference claims. View "Bryant v. Texas Dept of Aging & Disab." on Justia Law

Rebecca Breaux brought an age discrimination action against her employer ASC Industries on May 6, 2012. On May 24, 2013, Breaux’s attorney Lurlia Oglesby filed a statement in accordance with Rule 25(a)(3) noting that Breaux had died. The district court stayed the action pending the substitution of parties. After the ninety days allotted for the substitution of a party passed without any motion being filed, ASC Industries moved for the action to be dismissed. On the next business day, September 3, 2013, the district court granted ASC Industries’ motion to dismiss. On October 1, 2013, Oglesby filed a motion on behalf of Breaux’s estate to alter or amend the judgment of dismissal. The issue this case presented for the Fifth Circuit's centered on whether personal service of a suggestion of death on a deceased-plaintiff’s estate was required in order for the ninety-day time limit to run for the substitution of a party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 25. The Court held that personal service was required. View "Sampson v. ASC Industries" on Justia Law