Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against Metrocare and others, alleging various federal and state law claims. The district court dismissed plaintiff's Texas Health & Safety Code claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and granted summary judgment for defendants on all other claims. The court concluded that plaintiff has failed to offer sufficient evidence that Metrocare’s articulated reason for firing him is a pretext for discrimination and therefore the district court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of Metrocare on plaintiff's claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.; Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.; and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's procedural due process claim because he received an adequate name-clearing hearing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Miller v. Metrocare Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an employment discrimination suit against the Commission. The district court granted summary judgment to the Commission and plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that most of plaintiff's various retaliation claims are unsupported by the record and are without merit. In regard to the claims that merit further discussion, the court concluded that plaintiff's mere assignment of janitorial duties, without further description or detail about what those duties actually were, does not state a materially adverse action; plaintiff produced no evidence to show that the delay in her evaluation or the failure to grant her 4% step increase - accompanied by a right of appeal that she did not exercise - constituted a materially adverse action; and the denial of a reassignment was not, as a matter of law, an adverse action. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Commission with respect to these retaliation claims. In regard to plaintiff's retaliatory termination claim, the court concluded that - based on the record before the court indicating that the Commission discharged some employees for excessive force, but not others - the mixed record constitutes substantial evidence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff’s discharge would have occurred “but for” exercising her protected rights. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the Commission on this issue. The court vacated as to the retaliatory termination claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Wheat v. Florida Parish Juvenile Justice Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Sage, alleging racial discrimination, wrongful termination, and retaliation, in violation of Title VII as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), and 42 U.S.C. 1981, as well as comparable Texas law and other state law claims. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the dismissal of her retaliation claims. The court affirmed the judgment because plaintiff, who was a supervisor familiar with company employment policies, has not created a genuine material fact issue that she suffered an adverse employment action. View "Brandon v. Sage Corporation." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a negligence suit against defendants after he was injured while employed as a boilermaker by Wyatt. CP entered into a contract with Wyatt to perform work on a vacuum tower. CP and Wyatt signed a Master Services Agreement (MSA). At issue was whether a non-operating partner in a joint-venture qualifies as a “statutory employer” as that term is used in the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act (LWCA), LA. Stat. Ann. 23:1021 et seq., even though the operating partner signed a contract with a contractor that did not specifically designate the non-operating partner as a “statutory employer.” Whether viewed in terms of the inherent legal relationships among CP, Excel, and the joint venture and Wyatt, or proper inferences drawn from the MSA, the court did not think the parties’ failure to name or require the signature of Excel in the MSA can overcome the broad presumption of statutory employer status approved by Louisiana courts. The very purpose of CP and Excel in creating the joint venture was to give CP the exact operational authority it exercised on behalf of the joint venture when it signed the MSA with Wyatt. The parties’ written contract, in essence, “recognized” the parties to the joint venture as the statutory employers through their authorized agent. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wright v. Excel Paralubes" on Justia Law

Entergy filed a petition with the Board, arguing that Entergy's dispatchers are supervisors under Section 2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 152(11). The Board affirmed the ALJ's decision that dispatchers are not supervisors under Section 2(11). About the same time that Entergy first filed its petition to reclassify dispatchers as supervisors, it demanded that intervenor, the Union, remove all references to dispatchers from the collective-bargaining agreement. Entergy refused the Union's request to bargain and the Board subsequently filed a charge against Entergy for violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA. The Board granted summary judgment and held that Entergy had violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5). The court affirmed the Board's decision in all but one respect: the court reversed the Board's determination that dispatchers do not “assign” field employees to “places” through the exercise of "independent judgment." The court remanded for further proceedings. The court denied the Board's request for enforcement. View "Entergy Mississippi, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Department on his claims of employment discrimination in violation of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), 42 U.S.C. 2000ff-1, retaliation in violation of GINA, and national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed the first claim because plaintiff presented no evidence that the Department requested, required, or purchased his genetic information, or discriminated against him on the basis of genetic information; the district court's conclusion that the timeline of events and the Department's submitted evidence showed that its actions were motivated by plaintiff's refusal to take a stress test; and the district court's findings - that the timing of plaintiff's placements on administrative duty showed that the Department’s motive was ensuring compliance with the Wellness Program and furthering its goals, not discriminating against plaintiff because of his national origin - were not erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dept." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, alleging claims of retaliation after her attempt to rescind her resignation was denied. Plaintiff offered her resignation, but before she finished her employment, she testified against the Executive Director, claiming sexual harassment. Then plaintiff attempted to rescind the resignation but the Executive Director rejected her rescission. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment because rejecting an employee’s rescission of resignation can sometimes constitute an adverse employment action and because plaintiff has demonstrated a substantial conflict of evidence on the question of whether her employer would have taken the action ‘but for’ her testimony. View "Porter v. Houma Terrebonne Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

Petitioner, claimant's former employer, appealed the Board's affirmance of the ALJ's order holding petitioner liable for medical expenses attributable to claimant’s asbestosis, under the Longshore Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 901–950. The court concluded that there was substantial evidence for the ALJ to conclude that petitioner did not rebut the presumption of a valid LHWCA claim because it did not provide factual doubt. Therefore, the court affirmed as to this issue. The court applied a liberal causation standard when determining the coverage of initial and subsequent injuries, and affirmed the ALJ's order requiring petitioner to reimburse claimant for annual flu and pneumonia vaccines and the treatment of conditions including pneumonia and bronchitis. View "Ramsay Scarlett & Co. v. DOWCP" on Justia Law

Prosperity entered into contracts with a number of F&M bankers that included covenants not to compete, not to solicit, and not to disclose confidential information obtained while working at Prosperity. Prosperity sought to enforce the restrictive covenants under Texas law, but the district court denied Prosperity's application for injunctive relief. Texas generally allows covenants not to compete so long as they are limited both geographically and temporally, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. 15.50(a). Oklahoma generally does not, Okla. Stat. tit. 15, 217. The court concluded that, with respect to the noncompetition covenants, the choice-of-law provision is likely unenforceable,and the agreement is unlikely to fall within Oklahoma’s goodwill exception to its ban on noncompetition agreements. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of Prosperity’s request for an injunction seeking to enforce these clauses because Prosperity cannot meet the important “substantial likelihood of success” factor. The court concluded that, with respect to the nonsolicitation covenant, the choice-of-law provision is likely enforceable. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court to permit it to decide in the first instance whether the agreement is enforceable under Texas law as is, or pursuant to a modification, and whether the other equitable factors warrant a preliminary injunction. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the nondisclosure agreement was likely enforceable and denied the request for a preliminary injunction on the ground that Prosperity failed to establish likelihood of success or irreparable injury. View "Cardoni v. Prosperity Bank" on Justia Law

Murphy Oil petitioned for review of the Board's decision, holding that Murphy Oil violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158(a), by requiring its employees to agree to resolve all employment-related claims through individual arbitration, and by taking steps to enforce the unlawful agreements in federal district court. The Board also held that both the Arbitration Agreement and Revised Arbitration Agreement at issue were unlawful because employees would reasonably construe them to prohibit filing Board charges. The court granted Murphy Oil’s petition, and held that the corporation did not commit unfair labor practices by requiring employees to sign its arbitration agreement or seeking to enforce that agreement in federal district court. The court denied Murphy Oil’s petition insofar as the Board’s order directed the corporation to clarify language in its arbitration agreement applicable to employees hired prior to March 2012 to ensure they understand they are not barred from filing charges with the Board. View "Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law