Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioners appealed the Board's final order granting Claimant benefits under the Longshore Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. 901–950. The court concluded that more than a scintilla of evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Claimant lacks credibility and that Claimant thus could not prima facie prove that the personnel-basket incident could have aggravated his preexisting condition to the extent he claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the Board's judgment awarding benefits to Claimant, except as to the Board's conclusion that he was entitled to benefits for his missing tooth. The court reinstated the ALJ's 2013 order. View "BIS Salamis, Inc. v. DOWCP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a high school JROTC instructor, filed suit against the School Board and two school employees, alleging claims of retaliation under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733; 42 U.S.C. 1983; and state law. The court concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's section 1983 and state law claims where plaintiff was not prejudiced because the suit was still in its infancy when defendants raised the time-bar defense. In this case, plaintiff had notice and opportunity to respond to the motion to dismiss and he does not challenge the conclusion that his claims are time-barred. In regard to the FCA claim, plaintiff's primary theory of liability against the School Board is that the School Board's agents opposed plaintiff's protected actives and they used pretext to convince the Marine Corps to remove plaintiff from the school. Plaintiff also argued that the agents retaliated against him directly for engaging in protected activity, and that the School Board is liable for their conduct. The court concluded that plaintiff has pled enough facts to state a claim under this latter theory. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded as to the FCA claim. The court otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "Bias v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Watch House, alleging that he was discharged in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. The district court granted Watch House's motion to compel arbitration and dismissed plaintiff's suit without prejudice. The court concluded that the three-part test in Lizalde v. Vista Quality Markets remains an accurate statement of Texas law and applied Lizalde to the language of Watch House's Arbitration Plan at issue. The court agreed with plaintiff that the Plan is illusory because it fails to include an In re Halliburton-type savings clause that requires advance notice of termination. In this case, the Plan provides that Watch House may make unilateral changes to the Plan, purportedly including termination, and that such a change “shall be immediately effective upon notice to” employees. Watch House’s retention of this unilateral power to terminate the Plan without advance notice renders the Plan illusory under a plain reading of Lizalde, which is supported by recent decisions from Texas intermediate courts. Consequently, plaintiff is not bound by the Plan and Watch House may not compel arbitration. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Nelson v. Watch House Int'l, LLC" on Justia Law

The Board alleged that Dixie Electric committed an unfair labor practice, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (d) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5), (d), when it reclassified two categories of employees as supervisors, which caused those employees to be excluded from the bargaining unit covered by a collective bargaining agreement. The court held that an employer who unilaterally removes a job title from a bargaining unit mid-contract violates the NLRA. In this case, it is undisputed that Dixie Electric unilaterally modified the scope of the bargaining unit and therefore violated the NLRA. Further, the court concluded that the Board’s conclusion that the unit clarification petition was untimely is reasonable where Dixie Electric filed its petition more than four months after execution of the new contract. Accordingly, the court denied Dixie Electric's petition and enforced the Board's order. View "Dixie Electric Membership Corp. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former police officer, filed suit after he was terminated without notice or a hearing, alleging that the councilmembers’ actions violated state law and denied him constitutional due process. The district court dismissed the suit. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's claims for lack of jurisdiction because he stated a claim for relief under a federal statute and the claim was not frivolous. The court concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim because Texas Government Code Section 614.023 is analogous to the charter provision in Henderson v. Sotelo. Both laws require some action to be taken before termination of employment can occur, but no property right is created by that requirement. The court further concluded that plaintiff's claims against the City and the mayor in his individual and official capacity were properly dismissed. Finally, the court reversed the district court's denial of leave to amend, remanding for an explanation of the district court's exercise of discretion. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Stem v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a contract pediatrician, filed suit against Spectrum and Distinctive for employment discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, alleging discrimination, hostile work environment, and accommodation claims. Addressing an issue of first impression, the court held that an independent contractor who lacks an employer-employee relationship with the defendant may sue that defendant for employment discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Because the district court did not reach the merits of plaintiff's claims, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Flynn v. Distinctive Home Care, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, alleging that it violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k), by terminating her employment because she was pregnant. Plaintiff also alleged that the employer violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207(a), by failing to pay her overtime. The district court entered judgment in favor of the employer. The court affirmed the judgment as to the FLSA claim, concluding that the district court did not clearly err in holding that the employer did not have notice, whether actual or constructive, that plaintiff was working overtime during the period at issue. The court also affirmed as to the Title VII claim, concluding that the employer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law after it established legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for plaintiff's termination. In this case, the record demonstrated that plaintiff had a contentious relationship with her manager, she caused problems regarding store morale and customer service, and she repeatedly had performance-related problems. View "Fairchild v. All American Check Cashing, Inc." on Justia Law

Sanderson Farms petitioned for review of the OSHRC's citation for an unguarded arbor and projecting key in violation of the mechanical power-transmission apparatus regulation, 29 C.F.R. 1910.219. In regard to the unguarded arbor, the court concluded that the ALJ did not err when she found that the arbor was a “vital and integral part of the power transmission apparatus;" substantial evidence established that Sanderson Farms possessed knowledge of the violative conditions; and there is sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s characterization of the violation as serious but of low gravity. In regard to the projecting key, the court concluded that there is not substantial evidence on the record to sustain the citation because the cited standard was inapplicable. The Secretary and ALJ erred when applying 29 C.F.R. 1910.219(c)(4)(i) instead of 29 C.F.R. 1910.219(h)(1) to the protruding key. Accordingly, the court denied the petition as to the unguarded arbor and granted the petition as to the projecting key. View "Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Perez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., against JFS after JFS revoked its employment offer for a field engineer position at a mining site after learning that plaintiff had a rotator cuff impairment that prevented him from lifting his right arm above the shoulder. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of JFS. The court concluded that the district court's finding that plaintiff could not prove that he was disabled or a qualified individual was erroneous becuase it ignored Congress's expansion of the definition of disability when it amended the ADA in 2008. Under this more relaxed standard, the court concluded that evidence exists supporting a finding either that plaintiff is disabled or was regarded as disabled. Because a factual dispute exists on these issues, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded. View "Cannon v. Jacobs Field Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, employed within the CDC in a bio-terrorism preparedness program, filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b) and 2671 et seq., alleging that his employers’ actions constituted numerous torts, including fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff claimed that he was terminated in retaliation for reporting perceived public health threats. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction based upon its conclusion that plaintiff’s FTCA claims were precluded by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. The court agreed with the district court and concluded that the CSRA provides plaintiff's sole remedy against his employer because he is a federal employee, and due to the nature of his employment-related claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Tubesing v. United States" on Justia Law