Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

During Castilleja's 15 years as Bexar County Community Supervision and Corrections Department (CSCD) community service officer, he had multiple reprimands and termination warnings. After Castilleja was transferred in 2014, his new manager suspected Castilleja was violating overtime rules. An investigation by Assistant Chief Kelly confirmed Castilleja was routinely taking unapproved overtime and using his work computer to send union-related emails. Castilleja only received counseling and was put on a “performance improvement plan.” Castilleja’s 2015 evaluation rated him “satisfactory” overall but gave him the lowest rating in multiple categories. In 2016, Castilleja was sworn in as president of the Bexar County Probation Officers Association (BCPOA), having served in the union since 2007. Castilleja switched units and other issues came to light, resulting in an audit of Castilleja’s former cases. Brady recommended termination, citing Castilleja’s disregard of “the basic ten[e]ts of case management,” multiple policy violations, plus two instances of conducting union business while at work, and one use of work email to send union-related emails. Meanwhile, the BCPOA issued a no-confidence petition calling for Anderson’s removal. Days later, Anderson heard Castilleja’s appeal. Anderson fired Castilleja.Castilleja and the Union sued Anderson and Brady in their individual and official capacities, claiming that Castilleja was fired in retaliation for union-related speech and association in violation of the First Amendment, 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims. The evidence established valid reasons for firing Castilleja. View "United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial & Service Workers International Union v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Lindsey, a registered nurse, alleged that, after 17 years of service, her employer, BMA, terminated her because she was compelled to take Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1) leave in response to a series of personal tragedies that included a fire in her home and the hospitalization of her son. BMA claimed she was fired for poor attendance and missed deadlines.The district court granted BMA summary judgment on her FMLA discriminatory retaliation claim. The Fifth Circuit reversed. Lindsey’s employment records suggest BMA offered attendance issues as a post hoc rationalization to justify her firing. BMA was not able to list specific dates or times of her purported absences; summary judgment evidence suggested that the deadlines were hortatory rather than mandatory and that she was never informed that failure to meet these deadlines could result in discipline of any kind, let alone termination. BMA did not follow its own progressive discipline policy, which instructs that “corrective action be escalating.” View "Lindsey v. Bio-Medical Applications of Louisiana, LLC" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff's former employer, a restaurant chain, and to his former manager. The court concluded that, although plaintiff presented a prima facie case that the restaurant discriminated and retaliated against him, he failed to offer persuasive evidence that the restaurant's proffered, permissible reasons for his termination were a pretext for unlawful action. In this case, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his employer's reasons for firing him—lying and preparing a dish incorrectly—constitute pretextual reasons to cover over racial discrimination and retaliation. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence of bad faith or malice to support his tortious interference claim. View "Jones v. Gulf Coast Restaurant Group, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2015, PRIDE, a non-profit that employs individuals with disabilities, hired Johnson, an African-American. Johnson endured repeated race-based harassment by his fellow PRIDE employee Palomares. Johnson’s colleague corroborated that Palomares used racially offensive language and generally treated non-Hispanic employees worse than their Hispanic counterparts. Beyond his mistreatment by Palomares, several other workplace incidents occurred that Johnson viewed as harassing. Johnson made multiple complaints regarding Palomares’s harassing behavior and was told, “you’ve just got to be tough and keep going.” Ultimately, Johnson angrily confronted Palomares at PRIDE’s worksite. Johnson was written up and told to “follow instructions and remain respectful.” Johnson interviewed for a supervisory carpentry position. PRIDE selected a Hispanic individual for the position, who, unlike Johnson, had supervisory experience. Johnson filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. PRIDE’s Human Resources Director, acknowledged that Johnson reported that Palomares had been harassing him but PRIDE ultimately “did not find that any harassment.” Later that month, PRIDE called Johnson to discuss problems with his attendance. Johnson said coming into work was “too stressful,” declared that he was resigning, and walked out.The district court dismissed Johnson’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981 alleging discrimination based on race and retaliation when he complained about the discrimination. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part. Summary judgment for the employer was proper as to most of Johnson’s claims, but the court erred in its ruling on Johnson’s hostile work environment claim. View "Johnson v. PRIDE Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiff in her employment discrimination action. Plaintiff filed suit against DHS, alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and 42 U.S.C. 1983. DHS filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). After plaintiff did not file a response, the district court granted DHS's motion.The court concluded that plaintiff's arguments unrelated to the grounds on which her claims were dismissed are waived. The court also concluded that plaintiff cannot proceed with a Rehabilitation Act claim as it is precluded by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA); the district court properly determined that plaintiff's section 1983 claim is preempted by Title VII; and, because plaintiff failed to name the Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security as a defendant, the district court had no alternative but to dismiss the case for lack of a proper party defendant. View "Kaswatuka v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Sanchez oil was sued by a subcontractor of a contractor for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). After unsuccessfully requesting indemnification from Crescent, which hired the subcontractor, Sanchez filed a third-party complaint alleging breach of contract for Crescent's failure to indemnify Sanchez and failure to comply with the FLSA.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of Sanchez's motion for summary judgment and grant of Crescent's motion, finding material fact issues as to whether the subcontractor was an "independent contractor" or otherwise was exempt from the FLSA. The court also found material fact issues regarding whether Crescent unreasonably withheld consent to the settlement. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Sanchez Oil & Gas Corp. v. Crescent Drilling & Productions, Inc." on Justia Law

After plaintiff, who was employed by Hulcher Services, lost several fingers at work in an accident at the railyard, he filed suit against Norfolk, the railyard owner, under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA).The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Norfolk, concluding that plaintiff failed to show that he was an employee of Norfolk and thus he could not recover under FELA. The court explained that plaintiff failed to show that Norfolk controlled the performance of his work or retained the right to do so. View "Wheeler v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in an overtime-wage dispute brought by field engineers under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA). The court concluded that, because administrative duties are EVO's only basis for claiming the highly-compensated employee (HCE) exemption, the failure to show either type of administrative responsibility means EVO has also failed to show that plaintiffs are covered by the HCE exemption. For similar reasons, the court concluded that EVO cannot prevail on its more ambitious theory that each plaintiff is exempt as an administrative employee under 29 C.F.R. 541.200.Furthermore, because precedent allows the district court to rely on a record-based estimate, and because EVO did not raise other possible ways plaintiffs might have used to make their estimates more accurate, the court saw no basis for reversing the damages award. Finally, the district court was correct that plaintiffs' argument that their bonuses were hours-based was not supported by the evidence, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees. View "Hobbs v. EVO, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Microsoft on plaintiff's claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for failure to accommodate, discrimination, and creation of a hostile work environment. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from his efforts to obtain accommodations for his Autism Spectrum Disorder while employed as an account technology strategist and an Enterprise Architect (EA) at Microsoft.In regard to plaintiff's claim for failure to accommodate, the court concluded that plaintiff's requests for individuals to assist him with translating verbal information into written materials, recording meeting notes, and performing administrative tasks were unreasonable because they would exempt him from performing essential functions. Consequently, plaintiff is not a qualified person under the ADA. Furthermore, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that plaintiff's performance as an EA at this point was deficient and thus there was no genuine dispute of material fact that he could have performed EA essential functions without all of his requested accommodations. The court also concluded that, even if plaintiff were a qualified person under the ADA, he also fails to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Microsoft failed to negotiate in a good-faith manner. The court explained that, because Microsoft had the "ultimate discretion to choose between effective accommodations," it was justified in placing plaintiff on job reassignment over his objections. In this case, the record demonstrates that plaintiff, not Microsoft, was responsible for the breakdown of the interactive process seeking reasonable accommodation in refusing to indicate interest in any vacant position.In regard to plaintiff's discrimination claim, the court concluded that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie discrimination claim for the same reason his failure-to-accommodate claim fails—he is not a qualified individual under the ADA. Even if he were qualified, plaintiff was not subject to an adverse employment decision. Finally, in regard to plaintiff's hostile-work-environment claim, the court concluded that none of the evidence plaintiff relies on indicates that he was subject to harassment pervasive or severe enough to alter the conditions of his employment. Furthermore, plaintiff's placement on job reassignment is not evidence of a hostile work environment. View "Thompson v. Microsoft Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, employees of a security company that contracted with the federal government to monitor detainees during air travel, filed suit challenging the company's meal-period policy. The company's policy automatically deducted an hour of pay on return flights that exceeded 90 minutes and had no deportees.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the company in this Fair Labor Standards Act case. The court did not find in the regulations or caselaw analyzing general rules on travel time any bar to providing for a noncompensable meal period on airplane flights. Applying the predominant-benefit test, the court concluded that plaintiffs were the ones who predominantly benefited from the one-hour meal periods. The court explained that the effect of any limitations on plaintiffs' activities imposed during an ostensible meal period must be analyzed in the context of the relevant workplace. These restrictions on plaintiff's activities do not undercut the validity of the meal break. In this case, plaintiffs fail to identify any work-related duties they claim interfered with the bona fide meal periods, and thus each employee can use the time effectively for his or her own purposes. View "Dean v. Akal Security, Inc." on Justia Law